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STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE IDEALIZING PROCESS, WITH
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EMPIRICAL NATURE OF
RELIGIOUS IDEALISM

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A Dissertation

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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A Word of Acknowledgment

The sources of this dissertation are certain vital contacts and experiences, rather than books. Significant among these influences have been the friendships, or the friendly interest, of several men whose counsels have been invaluable, altho their philosophies may not appear in this writing.

First I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to my father, Dr. E. S. Lewis, who in the formative years taught me the value of uncompromising analysis, of whole appreciations, and the futility of merely conventional distinctions and of bland doctrine.

I will mention nine teachers who, in class-room and in generous personal acquaintance, (beyond all others) incited my thought to ideal, and yet circumspect, adventure. In my earlier university career, Prof. A. E. Davies, Prof. T. H. Haines and Prof. W. H. Scott (in Ohio State University) set me on the pathway of the present investigation.

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After a lapse of years, more recently I have found a quickening of thought and appreciation in the valued association with Prof. E. C. Wilm and Prof. E. S. Brightman (in Boston University), which I can not characterize in words few or many.

With a thrill of gratitude, I can only refer to the rich comradeship - in the ideal quest - with my life-long friends, the Rev. Fred L. Brownlee, field secretary of the American Missionary Association, and the Rev. F. Ernest Johnson, research secretary of the Federal Council of Churches, and with a newer friend, Dr. I. S. Corn, professor in Wesley College, North Dakota.

As a matter of small recognition, and of large personal satisfaction, I may be permitted this word of appreciation for the personal help of the thirteen men who chiefly have influenced my understanding of the meaning of ideals.

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Structure and Function of the Idealizing Process, with
Implications for the Empirical Nature of
Religious Idealism

I. Introduction

A. Purpose and Scope of the Dissertation

This dissertation proposes to make an analytical and functional study of the idealizing process in its various forms. This examination is significant in itself, and the inquiry is fundamental for an attempt to determine the nature and validity of the religious consciousness. It is the pivotal investigation upon which our philosophy of religion will depend.

The point of view and the method of procedure are empirical, in the generous sense of the term. For my present purpose, I accept William James's delineation of the problem of philosophy in Lecture I. of "Pragmatism." (William James, "Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.")

I am not a pragmatist; I disagree in radical fashion with much of James's epistemological theory and philosophy of religion. Nevertheless I wish to record that William James has influenced the development of my thought more than any other philosopher (unless it be Immanuel Kant), and that I have found many of James's suggestions and interpretations to be the most illuminating and the most fruitful for the present inquiry.

Hence the approach to the problem, and the fundamental conception of the nature of the problem, are largely in harmony with James's analysis of "the present dilemma in philosophy." (Op. cit., p. 3) In the first place, I believe that conventional philosophy has not recognized the far-reaching significance of James's statement that, "The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments," and that the professional philosopher, when philosophizing, usually endeavors, "to sink the fact of his temperament. . . . Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises." (Op. cit., p. 6, 7)

This position is admirably developed by James in this Lecture. I refer to it merely to illustrate the point of view and scope of this dissertation. Taking James's analysis of the dilemma of philosophy seriously, it is necessary to emphasize the primary value of an empirical study of the actual idealizing process.

I do not assert that psychological description is self-sufficient, or that it is independent of logical deduction. Description and interpretation cooperate and interblend. As a matter of fact, logic is a separate and independent type of inquiry, with its own problems, principles and validity. However, "independence" is always relative. I believe that empiricism~~s~~ successfully contends for the primacy of the psychological description of the idealizing process (as a preliminary inquiry for the philosophy of religion), and rightly challenges the vaulting ambition of

a certain type of rationalistic metaphysics in its proud, and too exclusive, use of deductive logic in the building of religious systems, and may question the validity of a more critical idealism with its far-reaching ontological inferences based on an organic logic of coherence. This position is taken in the interests of logic, and recognizes the cooperative processes of induction and deduction in all valid, creative thinking.

The extreme rationalist considers the empiricist an incompetent, "out of key with the world's character." (Op. cit., p. 7) However, the empirical method may be able to validate itself as being in key with the character of the world as given, and with the fundamental conditions and characteristics of experience. To the empiricist, concrete facts as they exist, or as they are in process of happening, are of primary significance. To the rationalist, universals, concepts, principles, abstractions, are of paramount value.

To be sure, each type of thinker recognizes both facts and principles. Nevertheless, as James holds, the difference in point-of-view is fundamental and far-reaching. I do not wish to over-stress this issue; I merely assert the importance of the distinction between the "rationalist temper" and the "empiricist temper" for the purpose of this inquiry.

I believe that James's analysis and estimate are sound when he states that rationalism tends to be monistic, optimistic and dogmatic. By dogmatic, I mean having the tendency to proceed confidently without due regard for the natural limitations of human knowledge. Doing business with wholes and universals, rationalism rather easily arrives at splendid

and imposing idealisms. "Absolutism has a certain sweep and dash about it," (op. cit., p. 19) which give it an air of fascination and impressiveness. These may prove to be superficial qualities which fade on examination.

James brings two charges against the absolutistic philosophy: first, that it depends too largely and uncritically upon abstractions, ignoring or distorting facts, or at least drawing inferences which the facts do not warrant; second, the abstractions arrived at are sterile, after achieving them with so much difficulty, one can explain nothing by them, nor do anything with them; they are infertile doctrines. For the pantheist and for the rationalistic theist, God lives on remote heights of abstraction. The absolute mind is a conception remote and practically vacuous. "You can deduce no single actual particular from the notion of it." (Op. cit., p. 19)

The world of the rationalist is "simple, clean and noble. . . . Its architecture is classic. Principles of reason trace its outlines, logical necessities cement its parts. Purity and dignity are what it most expresses. It is a kind of marble temple shining on a hill." (Op. cit., p. 21, 22) I believe that James is correct when he urges that this type of philosophy is no explanation of our concrete universe. "It is another thing altogether: a substitute for it, a remedy, a way of escape." (Op. cit., p. 22)

To the empiricist, this undue refinement appears as "a monument of artificiality." (Op. cit., p. 23) "Intellectualist philosophies exquisitely satisfy that craving for a

refined object of contemplation which is so powerful/^{an} appetite of the mind." (Op. cit., p. 22) These philosophies do not satisfy the robust hunger of the empiricist. "Truly there is something a little ghastly in the satisfaction with which a pure but unreal system will fill a rationalist mind." (Op. cit., p. 23) It breeds the sort of guileless intellectualism and naive optimism which permit a Bradley to dismiss the tragic hurt of evil with this sort of flourish (a little ghastly to the empiricist's more candid and courageous view): "The Absolute is the richer for every discord and for all the diversity which it embraces." (F. H. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 204. Quoted by James, op. cit., p. 30)

Of course there are all sorts of permutations of views, but I believe that I have correctly and justly stated the prevailing contrast between the empiricist and the rationalist views. With the bland innocence of the intellectualistic type of philosophy I am wholly dissatisfied. This is enough to indicate, if not to justify, the empirical method of this paper.

Also I have intended to indicate my dependence upon James's defence of empiricism, altho I have arrived at my view-point along other lines as well. I shall proceed to develop my thesis in the main independently of James. Then in Part III. I shall undertake a critical appraisal of his philosophy of religion. For this I have two reasons:

- (1) It is the best way logically, and the most personal and pleasing way, to develop the implications of my thesis.
- (2) Having taken my stand with James's empirical point of

view, I find his philosophy of religion a challenge. Much of it I believe to be sound; at many points I find it seriously defective. Hence the investigation in Part III. becomes an organic part of the whole.

What do you find, asks James, in the philosophic offering? "You find an empirical philosophy that is not religious enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical enough." (Op. cit., p. 15) In undertaking to make good the deficiency, James violates his own principles (I believe), and proves disloyal to the empirical method. My thesis seeks to give the true answer to our problem with consistent loyalty to the principle of empiricism and to the principle of logical deduction.

The ramifications of the thesis might be infinite. Rigorously I have endeavored to leave out of the discussion all phases of the question not necessary to the development of the theory.

B. Review of the Work of Other Investigators

1. General perspective of our theme in the history of thought

Our inquiry has the entire history of philosophy for its background, for thought has always been concerned with the ultimate problem of critical reflection: the nature of the universe of reality in the light of human ideal longings. Socrates was engaged in a life-long quest to discover, thru introspection and by rigorous cross-questioning, true universals. Plato regarded particular objects as imperfect copies of eternal patterns; he sought to discover the essen-

tial forms of things, a hierarchy of beauty, and so to possess eternal and changeless Being. Aristotle was interested in the true function of man, and found in entelechy the inner principle of life and development.

Amid the disillusionment of a decadent age, Stoic and Epicurean attempted to salvage some significant insight from the wreck of culture. In the centuries that followed, eclectic religious movements sought in fantastic forms of experience to locate a transcendent God above the flux of things. Augustine, wavering between world-denial and world-affirmation, attempted to lay the foundations and to lift the pinnacles of the City of God.

A Dominican monk, "doctor angelicus," gave the world his monumental "Summa" of natural and revealed theology. With the decline of Scholasticism, we see the flourishing of mysticism and the rise of critical systems. Francis Bacon, interested in the advancement of learning, offered the world a *Novum Organum*. Descartes discoursed on method, and distinguished between "res extensa" and "res cogitans." Spinoza meditated upon life under the aspect of eternity, gloried in the intellectual love of God, who is one, infinite, self-determined.

Meanwhile Locke wrote "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," refuted the doctrine of innate ideas, distinguished between sensation and reflection, and defined knowledge as the perception of the connection of our ideas. He adopted Descartes' metaphysics. Nevertheless, with his empirical ethics, and above all with his elaborate analysis

of the knowing process, he definitely recognized the significance of subjective factors, and prepared the way for the modern, empirical estimate of our problem of knowledge. He provided a psychological approach to philosophy.

Berkeley declared, "Esse ~~est~~ ^{is} percipi." Hume continued the inquiry into human nature, distinguishing between outward and inward impressions, and finding that all objects of reason are either relations of ideas (self-evident) or matters of fact (problematic). He developed the empirical method in radical fashion; thus the mind became a flux of perceptions, and causation was analyzed into habitual expectation. Hume was interested in the natural origin of religion. Recognizing the limitations of knowledge, he held that rational theology was impossible. In general his anti-intellectualism was important, and he developed the genetic point of view and the voluntaristic conception.

On the continent Leibniz worked out his Monadology, a curious blending of Democritus' atoms, Aristotle's entelechies and Plato's ideas. The Leibniz-Wolffian school attempted to reconcile empiricism and rationalism. The mystics emphasized intuition, and gave the world a beautiful pietism.

Kant felt all these, and other, influences, pondered the problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori, and brought forth his Copernican thought, that the understanding prescribes its laws to nature, and held that the ideas of the soul, the world and God are regulative, not constitutive. The ding-an-sich became a limiting concept. After the transcendental dialectics, Kant gave us his ethics of good-

will and the kingdom of ends. On the basis of the categorical imperative he worked out a new rationalism. Idealism was developed at the hands of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Hegel's method we shall discuss at some length a little later.

This brief sketch is sufficient for our purpose, which was to give a rough suggestion of the perspective of our theme in the history of thought.

2. Recent investigations in our specific problem of values

The specific question contemplated in this dissertation is distinctly a modern one; it is, in fact, a recent and contemporary problem. It has been approached from many directions. Philosophers of nearly all schools have been concerned with the nature and fate of values. In fact the interest of philosophy has largely shifted from ontological and cosmological problems to axiological theories: ethics, esthetics, the philosophy of history and of civilization, and the philosophy of religion. The metaphysical interest remains, and will remain; but the characteristic approach to the ultimate questions, today, is thru axiological studies.

It will be necessary to sketch some of these developments only briefly. Many have investigated the general problem of values. Many have built up elaborate systems of spiritualism or idealism. Many have reached naturalistic, pragmatic or realistic conclusions. Few have worked away patiently at the business of psychological analysis and synthesis with a view to determining inductively the implications of the idealizing process for the nature and the validity

of the religious consciousness. William James came near to attempting this type of investigation; but he forsook the empirical method, as we shall see.

In the early half of the nineteenth century Auguste Comte presented a critical type of naturalism, in distinction from the ontological naturalism of Spencer and of Haeckel. (Compare R. B. Perry, "Philosophy of the Recent Past," p. 43.) Comte believed that the source and measure of philosophic knowledge is experience. To know is to formulate laws which conform to experience. He deprecated assertions concerning a reality beyond experience. In his earlier writings he stressed the empirical-objective principle, namely that laws merely reproduce constant connections among facts. He presented his familiar law of "les trois états": the theological or fictive, the metaphysical or abstract, the scientific or positive. In all this, Comte was on the right track. Likewise his classification of the sciences is significant and helpful.

In spite of the necessity for modifying Comte's theory at many points, his main contention is sound, a fact which rationalistic metaphysics does not recognize. It is apt to find flaws in Comte's argument, and then leap to unjustifiable conclusions. The charge is that the intellectualistic philosophy goes far beyond that which the facts warrant (discrediting genuine religious idealism to this extent), that it tends to exaggerate favorable considerations and to minimize unfavorable arguments, that it applies a remorseless logic to positivism (which is admirable) while it becomes naively lenient in the logical requirements made of

theistic reasoning.

Aside from minor shortcomings, Comte failed in that he developed his theory into a sociology, and a philosophy based on sociology, without a psychological background and approach; that is, he did not take account of the subjective, experienced nature of values. Comte left psychology out of his classification altogether. In fact he had an extreme distrust of the claims of psychology to be a science, for he rejected the introspective method. This is not surprising, perhaps, because his contemporaries, the "idealogues," sadly abused the method.

Nevertheless, Comte was prevented from developing his theory as fruitfully as he might have done; he took refuge in the awkward and superficial "religion of humanity." However, all things considered, this (as an attempt) was admirable, rather than contemptible. Subjective interests had their revenge in the end. As a matter of fact Comte had always believed that a stable society waited for the adoption of a stable system of ideas, and thru the inspiration of a common ideal. Now in his later writings, the logic of the heart took precedence, and he thought of the human will (governed by love) as dictating its essential reality to nature. This is only a tendency, but is an unmistakable tendency. It is the natural outcome of Comte's deep-lying idealism, whose subjective nature had been suppressed. The error has its pathetic quality.

If this is a fair statement, Comte does not merit scorn for his modest method of inquiry. Nor is it fair to say that he held that knowledge is confined to the realm of

sense experience. He attempted to work out a sound method for studying the complex phenomena of society, and ^{had} a profound enthusiasm for social ideals. He anticipated "emergent evolution" in teaching that nature, altho continuous, rises successively to new levels of existence where new and different laws obtain.

John Stuart Mill accepted Comte's empiricism, his classification of the sciences, and much of his social theory. Mill continued the British tradition in analyzing the data of experience, rather than in tracing a philosophy of history. He was more psychological and more logical than was Comte. Also he was influenced by the romantic movement led by Coleridge. Hence he sought to do justice to the individual and the social view-points in his appraisal of value. In his ethics he tried to free utilitarianism from its sordidness by modifying its selfish hedonism and by recognizing a hierarchy of values. His views on religion are somewhat fragmentary, but are true to his empirical principle. He held that faith in God is not demonstrable, but is an invigorating hope. He suggested that we may trust in God as a moral Partner, rather than as the Absolute, or the Infinite Being. Mill's important work on the problem of induction was bound to affect religious thought in more ways than one.

Albert Lange began with a strict interpretation of Kant, stressing the subjective or volitional factor in knowledge. Thus he departed from Comte's earlier and more typical empirical position. He recognized the ideal realm

created by the inventive imagination. Ideals are to be judged with regard to their value as legitimate expressions of our nature. Thus Lange connected with the later development of the philosophy of value.

Emile Durkheim took for his point of departure the concept of society, which (once constituted) has a unique character. The fundamental concepts of science are "collective representations." He emphasized the elemental nature of social obligation, and on this basis built his social theory of religion. Lévy-Bruhl is one of the principal representatives of this contemporary current of thought in France.

~~Rudolph~~ Lotze developed a speculative metaphysics, which he based ultimately on faith in reason and on judgments of value. This culminated in a significant movement in the philosophy of religion in which Ritschl was the most important figure. Maine de Biran attempted to base his religious faith on immediate self-consciousness, but found it necessary to invoke "belief" as a faculty which is able to apprehend the absolute.

Charles Renouvier with his "phenomenism" connected with Hume and Kant. The real stuff of reality is experience. In order to escape the relativity of science, he defended the postulates of belief, which satisfy the total demands of personality. But phenomena are real, and the larger universe is revealed in them, and is verified by them.

Wilhelm Windelband was influenced by Lotze's doctrine of "Geltung." Truth is the satisfaction of the fundamental

needs and demands of the subject, not the particular individual, but the "logisches Bewusstsein überhaupt." Ethical and esthetic values, rising above logical values, have transcendental implications. Now the ideals in the "Normalbewusstsein" are unfulfilled. Religion is the insistent demand for their realization in the perfect or "holy", so that the opposition between value and reality may be overcome.

In spite of the rationalism of Windelband, the empirical temper and the pragmatic evaluations are significant. In contrast with the English idealists, Green, Bradley and Bosanquet, Josiah Royce's philosophy usually retained an empirical flavor. He was influenced largely by Lotze. Even more decidedly the pupil of Lotze, Borden P. Bowne, in spite of his spiritualistic metaphysics, recognized the limits of speculative reason: beyond these limits, "we have to fall back on belief based on the necessities or the intimations of the practical life." (Borden P. Bowne, "Metaphysics," p. 427) He was fond of calling his doctrine of personalism his "transcendental empiricism."

Heinrich Rickert developed Windelband's thought by reducing more thoroughly the "Sein" to the "Sollen." His view was based on the Kantian primacy of the practical reason. He tried to reconcile "Wert" and "Wirklichkeit" in "immanent Sinn." Wilhelm Dilthey/the ^{employed} psychological and historical methods, distinguishing between "Erkennen" and "Verstehen," and turned to a philosophy of history.

Rudolph Eucken developed this thought away from Naturalism, altho he recognized that truth must meet the

requirements of the whole life. Georg Simmel developed the empirical intimations in Dilthey's theory. Simmel undertook to describe the actual growth of ideals in response to specific needs. He stressed relativity, and interpreted truth in terms of life-process which can not be included under any fixed system of categories. Here, and in Eucken's teaching that life is essentially action and struggle, we have a transition away from Kantian orthodoxy toward thought movements neo-vitalistic and pragmatic.

The thought of Croce is noted for its closeness to history, and for its inclusive interest in the manifestations of the spirit in art and in nature. He deprecates the pseudo-concepts of science as artifices and fictions. Giovanni Gentile is fond of identifying reality with the actual historic processes of thought. Modernism in the Catholic Church taught that the truths of faith were to be apprehended only by faith, since they were inner, subjective valuations, expressions of the soul's needs. The formulas of these ideals are symbolic. This view was denounced by the Church, which reaffirmed a Scholastic rationalism, or neo-rationalism.

Henri Bergson discovered metaphysical reality to exist in the natural life and intuitive consciousness. William James found reality in "experience." His philosophy was largely determined by his psychological theory where he stressed the selective activity of consciousness and the continuity or connectedness of experience. From these he developed his pragmatism and his "radical empiricism." His appraisal of the moral and the esthetic demands led to his doctrine of "the will

to believe." His philosophy of religion we shall discuss at length later. John Dewey has developed an "instrumentalism" as a social philosophy which contemplates the continual reconstruction of ends for the liberalizing of the group life. He rejects metaphysics, and holds that the function of religion is to furnish an imaginative background to scientific and social theory. The business of philosophy is to undertake the reconciliation "of the attitudes of practical science and of contemplative esthetic appreciation." (John Dewey, "Reconstruction in Philosophy," p. 127) However, in "Human Nature and Conduct," he goes beyond this purely naturalistic hypothesis in referring to religion as "marking the freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole." In the presence of religion, "we put off mortality and live in the universal." Idealization includes "a sense of these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach." (P. 330-332) In England, F. C. S. Schiller had offered his "Humanism." In Germany, Hans Vaihinger wrote his "Philosophie der ³ Als Ob," which represents the concepts of science, jurisprudence and religion as fictive but efficacious.

In the neo-realistic movement, we find Alexius Meinong working out his "Gegenstandstheorie," with its application to a theory of value, according to which values have a sort of non-existent objectivity. Von Ehrenfels has given us his "System der Werttheorie," and Edmund Husserl has formulated his "Phänomenologie." Bertrand Russell's realistic analysis leads him to individualism, pessimism, and "The Free Man's Worship." Neo-realists differ widely in their philosophy of value.

Santayana somewhat resembles Meinong, and holds that value concerns "essences" rather than physical or mental existences. G. E. Moore believes that value is a quality attaching to objects. S. Alexander inclines to the view that value is psychological and subjective; however, on the basis of the principle of emergence, he has presented an original theology.

Hugo Münsterberg, in his rationalistic and optimistic "Philosophie der Werthe," presented a brilliant defence of eternal values. R. Otto, in "Das Heilige," has urged the unique character of the holy. Following Meinong and Von Ehrenfels, and influenced by Windelband and Rickert, W. M. Urban has given the world an ambitious study of values, "Valuation: Its Nature and Laws." This painstaking inquiry has given a new direction to the study of ideals, and can not be ignored by any present-day student of value.

W. R. Sorley's "Moral Values and the Idea of God" I have taken as a typical metaphysical, idealistic interpretation of values, and will discuss the book at some length in the next section.

Psychology has been awakened to a new interest in the emotions and the ideal phase of experience. James Mark Baldwin, in his "Social and Ethical Interpretations" and his "Theory of Mental Development," gave assistance and inspiration to this enterprise. Since Darwin's "Expression of Emotions in Animal and Man" and Ribot's "Psychology of Emotions," much has been done in the study of the feelings, mood, temperament, sentiments, and consequently in the working out of a sounder psychology of idealization. Experiments in volitional

phenomena, and able research in the psychology of the thinking process, have contributed to the same end. Most psychologies today include in their theory a more or less extended study of some aspects of the valuational process.

Making their significant contributions are numerous other types of research: scientific ethical theories, genetic studies in logic, recent inquiries in the rich field of esthetics (such as Flaccus's "The Spirit and Substance of Art"), critical surveys of the intellectual background of the age (such as Randall's "The Making of the Modern Mind," a splendid example of the new philosophy of history), also the new science and art of history, and recent, illuminating literary criticism.

Beginning with James, Starbuck, Coe and Leuba, the psychology of religion has presented a rich and fruitful investigation of idealization. Many special studies have been made. Special studies in child, adolescent, social and abnormal psychology have contributed, as well as the working out of theoretical and practical educational problems, including recent theories in the philosophy of education. Many important, altho one-sided, movements in psychology (such as Freudianism) have thrown much light on dark problems. Researches in anthropology and the history of religion have been exceedingly valuable; likewise other evolutionary studies, such as L. T. Hobhouse's "Morals in Evolution." Philosophies of religion have centered more or less self-consciously in the concept of value; for example, one of Edgar S. Brightman's books has for its title, "Religious Values."

This completes our survey of the investigations in the field of our thesis. Our problem is pretty definitely conceived. Nevertheless it has so many approaches, ramifications and implications, that we have taken the only practicable way of summarizing the manifold inquiries which have been made, with their variety of solutions.

II. Nature and Implications of the Idealizing Process

A. The Problem

1. The experiential character of idealization

Gilbert Murray has said (quoted by M. C. Otto, in "Things and Ideals," p. 50) that the larger portion of a man's life "is rigidly confined in the round of things that happen from hour to hour. It is exposed for circumstances to beat upon, its stream of consciousness channeled and directed by the events and environments of the moment."

We are concerned with the description and evaluation of that other (quantitatively) minor portion which is not rigidly confined in the round of things that merely happen. We are to study the increment of growth in conscious experience, as process and product. The ideal is embodied in the increment of growth. The ideal is a construction in imagination of a phase of experience whose meanings are not fully realized.

This novel idea, this imaginative and reflective construction, is discoverable in the actual stream of experience. It is a definite type of experience. It can be observed, analyzed more or less successfully, and the laws of its development can be traced. We must apply the empirical

method as rigidly as possible, and the method of inferential reasoning as carefully as may be.

By novelty is meant not merely unfamiliar, unexpected or different experience, but rather experience which has new pattern-meanings. These meanings are taken to be intelligible and valid. Analysis must determine the nature of their intelligibility; reflection must assess their validity. In the idealizing process we have old meaning, tested and enjoyed, and novel meaning. It will be our problem to determine the relation of assured valuation to deepening insight, and to estimate the significance of the projecting of ideals in the light of their ultimate validity.

Ideals, as determinable phases of the stream of consciousness, must be largely comprehended in empirical terms. However, it is the very nature of ideals to refer beyond the immediate context, beyond accredited items, to an experience in the making. A logical procedure will take account of both aspects of idealization. Of course reflection on experience becomes an organic part of the total experience.

Sympathetic study of biography and history may lead to the impressive belief that man may be understood best from the point of view of those upward leanings which culminate in religious experience. But this facile impression must be examined with painstaking care. It is difficult to separate myth and magic from wholesome idealization. Whatever cosmic truth religion may hold, it is primarily religious experience. Hence description of the complicated processes involved must go a long way in the direction of explaining the meaning of

religious idealization. Whatever outlying significance ideals may have, they must be understood in terms of their functioning as instruments of adjustment.

There is a certain familiarity and conventionality about the religious consciousness which often prove deceptive; there is an easy fluency in referring to its characteristic concepts which is often misleading. The customary language of piety, for our purpose, would confuse the issue. The religious consciousness is persistently and naively objective. We are compelled to distrust this ready objectivity, if we are to be true to our declared method of inquiry.

I believe that it is fair to say that, in the long history of thought, the common distrust and disdain of the experienced nature of values is a glaring characteristic.

In "The Sense of Beauty," George Santayana observes that the comparative failure of esthetic speculation has been due to the subjectivity of the phenomena with which it deals. He continues:

"Man has a prejudice against himself: anything which is a product of his mind seems to him to be unreal or comparatively insignificant. We are satisfied only when we fancy ourselves surrounded by objects and laws independent of our nature. . . . /Many/ psychologists have neglected the exclusively subjective and human department of imagination and emotion. . . . /Certain/ philosophers seem to feel that unless moral and esthetic judgments are expressions of objective truth, and not merely expressions of human nature, they stand condemned of hopeless triviality. A judgment is not trivial, however, because it rests on human feelings. On the contrary, triviality consists in abstraction from human interests; only those judgments and opinions are truly insignificant which wander beyond the reach of verification, and have no function in the ordering and enriching of life." ("The Sense of Beauty," p. 3, 4)

In this passage, Santayana may disparage the real problem of

objective reference. The quotation is made with the sole purpose of recording a significant judgment in regard to the comparative neglect of the subjective aspect of valuational experience.

2. Criticism of Hegel's method in his "Philosophy of History"

The nature of our problem, and some of the principal bearings of our thesis, may be indicated by a critical estimate of the procedure of Hegel in his "Philosophy of History." No contemporary inquiry into the meaning and validity of idealization could well proceed until it had taken account of, and had come to terms with, the greatest of Idealists.

Hegel's general philosophy is so opposed to our point of view that its consideration would not be so helpful as a survey of the "Philosophy of History," which is a brilliant study of the actual evolution of idealization in history. This commends the work to us at this point because of our thesis just presented concerning the experiential character of idealization.

One might draw the contrast between a radically empirical-materialistic (e.g., "the economic") philosophy of history and an extreme absolute-idealistic theory, with the implication that the latter presents an Absolute Spirit unfolding itself, in full consciousness and with absolute precision, in the complex processes of history, and that the process is wholly rational (and therefore rationally traceable), the details in the development being of no inherent significance. This contrast might be made, but it would not justly

represent that between the mechanistic method and the Hegelian point of view and method.

Hegel's philosophy of history differs radically from one popular understanding of it in two respects. In the first place, Hegel has a genuine and large regard for the empirical facts of history. This regard may not be so persistent or so inclusive as we might wish. Nevertheless it is a real interest and evaluation, which determine his approach (at least in part), an aspect of his theory and many a pregnant suggestion.

His regard for facts is indicated in his own preliminary statement. It is insisted that the philosophy of history is, in general, the thoughtful consideration of history.^{*(P. 51)} It is evident that such consideration (in so far) would be empty without the content of actual historic processes. More specifically does he state that the only idea that philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of history is the simple conception of Reason, that Reason is the sovereign of the world, that the history of the world therefore presents us with a rational process. ^{*(Page 52)}

It might be objected that this conception, if "simple," is rather stupendous. However, we are concerned now merely with pointing out the fact that Hegel definitely (officially) adopts the empirical point of view as far as the consideration of the facts of history is concerned. Moreover he insists that we must not introduce a priori inventions, but must proceed inductively.^{*(P. 54)} It is quite possible that he does not always proceed in this fashion. But at least we should give him full credit for recognizing the advisability, nay-

* References are to Hegel's Philosophy of History (translation by J. Sibree), published by P.F. Collier, New York, 1911.

the necessity, of thus reasoning, and of honestly intending so to do.

We shall have to maintain that Hegel frequently does give history an artificial cast, cavalierly twisting facts and distorting movements, in order to fit his material into the dialectic and speculative process. Hence, first, we should give full emphasis to the "concrete" nature of his interest, as understood and intended by him. Hegel does maintain that the development of Spirit is his principal concern. But he insists that the term "World" includes both physical and psychical nature, and that, on the stage of universal history, Spirit displays itself in its most concrete reality. (Op. cit., p. 53, 54)

It is our problem, then, to understand the meaning of this statement. We must note that Hegel distinguishes two phases of the thought that Reason rules in the world's history. One is Anax^{ag}oras' doctrine of Nous. This refers to a Reason implicit in phenomena, not to a self-conscious Spirit. To be sure, this concept of Nature as an embodiment of Reason does not appear strange. Socrates adopted the doctrine, but regretted its abstract (external) form in Anaxagoras. (P. 55-57)

Now there is a very important difference between ~~as~~ an abstract principle and its determinate application. (P. 56, 57) That it should constantly be borne in mind, Hegel frequently reminds us. Socrates sought to comprehend the union of the Concrete with the Universal. (P. 57) The belief in particular Providences is hostile to this attempt. We must find the manifestation of Providence in universal history; only in this way can we see

(Op. cit., p. 56-58)

Spirit concretely realizing itself./ In the history of the world, the individuals that we have to do with are peoples; the totalities are states. Hegel believes that he is justified in expecting to see that which was intended by eternal Wisdom actually accomplished in History, as well as in Nature. (P.58-60)

Hegel definitely begins by determining the abstract characteristics of Spirit./ This does not appear very hopeful for an empirical treatment. But he finds the essence of Spirit to be freedom, and this concept, of all others, would seem to lend itself to a very real, empirical survey of life./ (P. 64) (It may be that this concept of freedom suggests more than Hegel himself realizes. We shall return to this point).

Hegel asserts that all the qualities of Spirit exist only thru freedom, which is the sole truth of Spirit. Furthermore, he states that Spirit is self-contained existence; this status is freedom. It is consciousness of its own being; for Spirit knows itself. This would not tend to substantiate our favorable preliminary survey of Hegel's empirical interest. But he goes on to make us believe (almost) that his colossal thesis will not dim his perception of the most literal of facts. For he declares most positively his interest in concrete processes. Hence universal history is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially. (Op. cit., P. 65)

Again he emphasizes the distinction between an implicit principle and its application in the actual phenomena of life. The Philosophy of History is nothing other than universal history itself, and this is the progress of the

consciousness of Freedom, which we have been told is the central movement of the Universe. (Op. cit., p. 67-69, 71,72)

We may feel that we are being betrayed by an alleged historical method into the entertaining of a mere abstract conceptual judgment, a vague metaphysical theory. Is the final cause of the world the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of Spirit? Is the nature of God the Idea of Freedom? What of it, we may be tempted to ask. What has this to do with history; what means does Spirit employ in order to realize its Idea? Then we find that Hegel has anticipated us. He himself has recorded that this is "the next question." And he replies that this conducts us directly and inevitably to the phenomena of history itself. (Op. cit., p. 65)

Rickert sees Hegel as pragmatist and philosopher of life. Can we agree with this judgment? At least we may note that Hegel offers an illustration reeking with pragmatic color: we see - and therefore confess - that the passions of men have made of History a slaughter-bench. To what purpose is all this sacrifice? His reply is that the nature or idea of Spirit is here actualized. For it emerges into existence only as individuals seek their own satisfaction in the issue. Hegel insists that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion. So the Idea, and the passions of men, are the warp and woof of universal history. (Op. cit., p. 65-69)

Altho Hegel is enamored of the idea that freedom is the activity of the absolute Idea, he is certainly not obsessed by it. That this enthusiasm does not become monoideism, that his philosophy does not remain altogether abstract (as many

students of Hegel are too sure that it does) is due in large part to his ethical interest. Hegel is concerned with the development of character. This preoccupation goes far toward keeping his attention on concrete realities and experiences. He maintains that a state is well constituted when the private interests of its citizens are one with the common interest of the state. Surely this is an empirical generalization. (P. 70)

Nor would we care to insist that the thought, that at first the Idea is implicit, takes us too far afield in the conceptual realm. For the idea is worked out objectively, even as it is maintained that in freedom the universal principle is translated into objectivity. The grades of this consciousness (which suggest the divisions of history) are broadly and suggestively true: Eastern nations ("One is free"), the Greek and Roman world ("Some are free"), the German nations ("All are free"). We shall recur to this point. (Op.cit., p.64)

It is easy to dwell too much on Hegel's abstract ~~(as it essentially is)~~ statements concerning Spirit. He does say that Spirit has its center in itself: it exists in and with itself. (P. 62, 72) But we must not forget that Hegel is perpetually turning to the actual course of history: his interest is in individuals, in concrete happenings, in the clash of pragmatic forces, in significant movements and in the lifting of fair ideals which have lighted humanity's way to triumph and approved happiness.

By studying Hegel's interpretation of history we are brought to see momentous collisions between existing laws and rights on the one hand, and adverse contingencies on the other. Here is an essential phase in the development of the creating

Idea, of Truth striving and urging toward itself. If this is not empirical in stand-point, it is certainly so in direction of gaze. (Op. cit., p. 71) (Note also p. 75-76.)

Moreover Hegel is concerned with the place and importance of heroes, World-historical Individuals, in whose aims the above-mentioned principle lies. They have derived their purposes and their vocation from the World Spirit. They are the clear-sighted ones. Their deeds are the best of that time. They know the requirements of their age, what is ripe for development. They act for themselves, but the Spirit is realized in them. As the agents of the World Spirit, their lives are full of labor and trouble; and their followers help to realize the absolute principle. Thus the Idea pays the penalty of determinate existence, not from itself, but from the passions and sufferings of individuals. (With but slight change in phraseology, this passage would parallel the eloquence of James Mark Baldwin in his "Social and Ethical Interpretations," as he discourses concerning heroes.) (Op. cit., p. 76-79)

Are historical individualities wholly the tools of the Absolute Spirit, in Hegel's thought, or is there a genuine self-determination? It is impossible to give a completely satisfactory answer to this question. Certainly the nature of the dialectic would imply a determined process, in detail as well as in wider-swinging movements. Nevertheless, a true freedom, self-determination, often appears to be assigned to the individual. Certainly morality and religion are not subordinated to a mechanical process, however imposing. It is definitely asserted that human beings are not used merely as a

means to an end. They are objects of their own existence, for they share in the universal purpose. Man's true part, ethics and religion, are elevated above all alien necessity and chance. (P. 81) Nevertheless, this necessity (altho never alien) might prove to be of an absolute-spiritual nature, which would effectively rule out individual determination in any rightful meaning of the term. Often enough this appears to be the situation.

Let us consider further. What form does the perfect embodiment of Spirit assume? What is the material in which the Ideal of reason is wrought out? Reason attains positive existence in human knowledge and volition. But the subjective will has also a substantial life. This essential reality is the union of the subjective with the rational Will: it is the moral whole, the State. In it the individual possesses and enjoys his freedom. Law, Morality and Government alone are the positive/^{reality}and the completion of freedom. (Op. cit., p. 85-86)

The State is the divine Idea as it exists on earth. In it the object of history appears in definite shape; for it is here that freedom obtains objectivity. Hence, in his survey of the history of the world, Hegel deems as worthy of consideration only those peoples that have formed states. A view contrary to the foregoing maintains that man is free by nature, but limits that freedom by the state. Hegel rejects this theory, finding it contrary to facts; for the state of nature is characterized by injustice and violence. The limitation by the state is the limitation of brute emotions. Society and the State are the necessary conditions of freedom. Even the patriarchal state is transitional. (Op. cit., p. 87 - 90)

This seems to deprecate the fact of genuine freedom on the part of the individual. And the impression is increased in his treatment of the form of government. For if it is held that the majority should control, the subjective aspect alone is being regarded. In this case, the minority are not respected, and freedom is not attained. It is impossible to secure the consent of every individual. Hence in monarchy proper a constitution secures the maximum of individual freedom to the people and the minimum of autocratic power to the rulers. This constitution is intimately connected with all the other spiritual forces involved. In general, the form of government is not a matter of choice, but is that form which is adapted to the spirit of the people. (Op. cit., p. 91 - 94)

However, the question is a very complex one. For now we must recognize that Hegel characteristically speaks of the Spirit's becoming conscious of its own freedom in the union of the objective and the subjective in the human spirit; at the same time the Idea of the Spirit is the State in the external manifestation of human will and its freedom. Hence Spirit requires the cooperation of spirits, and is able to realize its sublime potentiality in their freedom. (Op. cit., p. 93-99)

Thus we are brought to a consideration of the second respect in which Hegel's philosophy of history differs from a popular understanding of it. The Absolute Spirit does not exist perfect, pre-formed and apart, using men as the mere tools of his artificial self-expression; hence his activity is not coldly rational, that is, predictable by the operation of abstract reasoning. (Op. cit., p. 85-87, 99, 128)

Josiah Royce has written: "The Absolute of Hegel is no Absolute on parade, no God that hides himself behind clouds and darkness, nor yet a Supreme Being who keeps himself carefully clean and untroubled in the recesses of an inaccessible infinity. No, he is a Man of War. The dust and the blood of ages of humanity's spiritual life are upon him; he comes before us pierced and wounded, but triumphant, the God who has conquered contradictions, and who is simply the total spiritual consciousness that expresses, embraces, unifies and enjoys the whole wealth of our human loyalty, endurance and passion." ("The Spirit of Modern Philosophy," p. 216) This has particular reference to the "Phenomenology;" but the interpretation is beautifully true of the "Philosophy of History."

From this point of view, we might conclude that the entire ground is cut from underneath the problem of individual freedom; or we might look for a re-establishment, on personalistic grounds, of a cooperation involving the free expression of Self and selves. Which of these we do actually have, it is impossible to say with complete confidence. I strongly incline to the belief that Hegel's central thesis rules out genuine self-determination, but that irrational, or indeterminate, factors are introduced, or suggested, in many places, and that they might be incorporated without doing violence to Hegel's essentially spiritual interpretation of history and of the world. (This would, of course, radically modify his conception of Spirit).

Altho dialectical thought expresses the innermost essence of Absolute Reason, the logical-dialectic process lies

implicit (to a degree) in the universal Mind. The latter does not exist, self-conscious and realized, before the creation of the universe, but becomes fully self-conscious in the thought and life of human beings. (P. 85-87) The full comprehension of this teaching of Hegel's will profoundly modify our understanding of his theory of history. It will prevent hasty conclusions, and hard and fast distinctions. It will, perhaps, tend to discredit traditional, over-sure conceptions of freedom (with all their superficial and futile correlaries), as we are led to view the vast integration of the cosmic process. This cosmopolitan sweep, with the consequent liberalizing of our thinking, make up (I believe) a large part of the abiding value of Hegel, and remain one of the chief contributions of his philosophy of history. The appreciative reader of Hegel is progressively emancipated from the limitations of the provincial mind, and is freed from some of the sentimental prejudices of the parochial heart. (Op. cit., p. 104-108)

One phase of this view is seen in Hegel's statement that, among the forms of this conscious union (of the subjective and the objective in the human spirit), religion occupies a lofty place. The individual in devotion lays aside his individual interest. Self puts away the limited and particular. Feeling passes into reflection, and a form of worship results. A second form of this union is art. This advances farther into the realm of the actual and sensuous than does religion. The third form is philosophy; for the true is the object of the thinking faculty. This is the wisest and freest and most inclusive form. (Op. cit., p. 99)

We may now return to the problem of the status of empirical facts in Hegel's treatment of history. It is undoubtedly true that he invokes the Absolute, the Idea, the Universal Spirit, too easily, too intimately, too authoritatively. And he does so at the expense of actualities, ignoring (too often) concrete facts, deprecating individual existents, and too smoothly passing over irrationalities.

This is illustrated in his reply to the complaint that Ideals are destroyed by cold actuality. He admits that these Ideals sometimes are mere fancies, which can not be the model for universal reality. He then asserts that, apart from this consideration, we may indeed have nothing to do with the individual empirically regarded. (P. 83) It is a too easy optimism which maintains that, when we take notice of Reason pervading the whole, we know that the real world is as it ought to be! In the pure light of the divine Idea, the phantom of an incoherent world vanishes. (P. 84) The forms of religious and moral purposes may be subject to the sway of chance; in their essences they are infinite and eternal. The claims of the World-Spirit rise above all special claims. (P. 85) If they do, we may retort, then they rise into too thin an atmosphere. The judgment is merely conceptual, and possesses not the required empirical contact. The assignment to this theory of the adjective "concrete" is mere verbalism; it does not command respectful attention.

Hegel's total theory is a strange mosaic: with much that is magnificent he mingles much that is utterly fatuous. We will remember, of course, his fundamental contention that

the only real is the concrete Whole. But this does not justify a cavalier treatment of data, as he himself insists, on occasion. Too often his employment of ^{the} concept, "concrete," is nothing more than a verbal flourish.

The fallacy of futile abstraction is carried into the detailed explanations of history. For instance, Hegel admits that there are many periods in history when the development of Spirit appears to be intermitted. Then there are long-continued processes of growth. He maintains that the retrocessions are to be regarded as external contingencies: it is a relative matter; the development is all in all. Universal History exhibits the gradation in the development of freedom. Thereupon every grade, within itself, is compelled to exhibit a process of formation, constituting thus the links in a dialectic of transition. (Op. cit., p. 106-107)

In working out every dialectic of transition, Hegel is clearly far more interested in the dialectic than he is in the rich pattern of facts; in truth, he rather despises the facts as such. The intermediate tracings, therefore, tend to become artificial and unreal; his thought is abstract, not concrete. ("The particular is for the most part of too trifling value as compared with the general." P. 80)

It seems not to occur to Hegel that historical movements are far too complex to be put into the form of a dialectic. The latter is two-dimensional; with the speculative movement, it is three-dimensional. While history itself is poly-dimensional. Superficially, historical movements may appear to have the pendulum swing. Roughly speaking, they often do; and practical lessons may be deduced therefrom.

However, taken as a constitutive principle, the dialectic-metaphysics is wofully insufficient to account for the facts. For history is infinitely varied and variegated. It ramifies, and spreads, and evolves. It springs from multitudinous sources. It reaches out in countless directions. Moreover, it has many abortions, many forgotten births, ten thousand irrational tragedies. At least, Hegel's conceptualisms do not illumine the seeming tragedies, nor resolve the apparent irrationality. (Cf., "The Idea advances to an infinite antithesis." P. 72)

The status of the empirical data in Hegel's thought, and the validity of his method, may be summed up as follows:

(a) In that which I have called Hegel's intermediate tracings (the links in the dialectic of transition), the empirical has no adequate place. Actualities are distorted, not intentionally, but because the entire view-point is unreal. Movements are misinterpreted because the principles of historic appreciation are hard, wooden, inadequate. The fundamental difficulty is that Hegel is interested primarily in metaphysical speculation, not in determining the experienced nature of idealization.

(b) In his larger horizon-sweepings, when he forgets the somewhat futile dialectic, Hegel is largely and impressively true. He offers mighty visions. He makes worthy suggestions in regard to some of the major movements of history, even if his conclusions are mechanical and inadequate as they stand in their self-sufficiency. For example, the three stages in the development of political (and individual) freedom have a certain ponderous applicability, even tho we are not ready to admit

that they are "the ground-work principles of the general process." (Op. cit., p. 64)

But the vision in Hegel can be seen only by the sympathetic imagination, and by it only in flashes. For it is nearly lost in sterile conceptualisms. Often we meet an imposing generalization which turns out to be a cosmic abstraction, having little vital connection with the idealizing process of actual experience. (Cf., "The Union of Universal Abstract Existence with the Individual." P. 71)

An illustration is found in Hegel's statement that universal history is the development of Spirit in time, as nature is the unfolding of the Idea in space. We are told that, in a casual glance over the past, we see a vast picture of changes and transactions. But while death is the issue of life, life is the issue of death. Spirit consumes its own existence, and each successive phase shows the exaltation of Spirit. We are to think of Idea as manifesting and perfecting its powers in every possible direction. The essence of Spirit is activity: it makes itself its own deed, and contemplates itself. Hence nations are what their deeds are. And Spirit gains a comprehension of itself in the universal element in history, which the Spirit creates. (P. 125-8) If this is the soul of the philosophy of history (as Hegel asserts), we have to do with a pallid soul. Except for a certain vague reminder of ideals in real life (thru similarity of terminology), this representation is barren speculation. At least it appears to be such to the empirical-minded thinker. If it appears otherwise to the intellectualistic type, there is no argument: we have two radically different conceptions of the nature of idealization

and of reality. To the empiricist, the Hegelian abstractions are not so much erroneous as irrelevant and trivial, when offered as interpretations of the actual idealizing process in history and human life.

(c) When Hegel is toying deliciously with the fascinating details of history, and is not worrying with the rather fatuously conceived links of transition, he is incisive in criticism, resourceful in imagination and delightfully suggestive. The Philosophy of History is replete with ^{instances.} ~~them.~~ They are its chief charm, as the occasional vision of the horizons is its great inspiration. Hence we may say that in the "mean" he is not golden, and in the extremes the truth of Hegel lies!

I have endeavored to establish the basic lines of my problem in this survey of the thought of a great idealist. I have tried to make the most of his empirical recognitions, and have condemned his ultra-rationalistic speculation. In both phases of the discussion I hope that my problem is set forth. I deemed this the best method of placing it against its proper background.

It may be added that the unfavorable criticism of Hegel must be made since he can not answer this penetrating query: How can the Universal Reason (ultimate reality) be Absolute Spirit and at the same time be developing Spirit, as yet only partially self-conscious? How can it be Spirit-completed and also Spirit-at-war-with-itself? This question is unanswerable, or at least unanswered. Therefore the history-dialectic is largely vitiated. For the spirit of the dialectic

assumes, and its method destroys the assumption of, Absolute Spirit. It is the conviction of this paper that the whole enterprise is misconceived and impossible, and that the true undertaking is to be found in terms of a genuine empirical evaluation.

Hegel makes the attempt to resolve the antinomy when he maintains that the Spirit makes itself actually what it always was potentially: it is only that which it attains by its own efforts. The realization of the Idea is mediated in consciousness, which is at first sunk in its merely natural life. Thus Spirit is at war with itself; it has to overcome itself as its most formidable obstacle. This involves not merely development, but the attainment of a goal. This is Spirit Completed, that is, Freedom. The grades that Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its present. (Op. cit., p. 133-4)

This will not meet the case, however. Critically viewed, the Philosophy of History crumbles at the start with this sort of Spirit-biography. And therefore, as so often has happened in the long progress of thought, the great thinker fails in his forlorn hope (to him an undertaking so splendid and assured), and yet wins many an incidental victory more daring than his intention, more enduring than his dream.

A few sentences from a most significant treatise on Hegel's method are pertinent. Ernst Troeltsch, in "Der Historismus," heartily approves the dynamic character of the "Hegelschen Dialektik:" "Sie ist die erste Theorie der historischen Dynamik." (Page 241. See foot-note on following page.) Troeltsch

indorses Hegel's interest in concrete happenings. "Er sah infolgedessen im individuellen und empirischen historischen Geschehen die realen und lebendigen Gegensätze, in denen alles wirkliche Geschehen erwächst." (*P. 245)

But Troeltsch holds that Hegel often forgets his concrete facts, and that his abstract method goes too far in the direction of rationalization. "Damit ist in Wahrheit eine Reihe konkreter und realer historischer Probleme von der Dialektik her mit dem Eindruck rationaler Notwendigkeit und Folgerichtigkeit gelöst." (*P. 269)

"Hegel macht den Versuch, die Dialektik des Historischen und des Daseins überhaupt zu rationalisieren, die Geschichte zu logisieren. Und zwar geschieht das in einer doppelten Richtung: zunächst erkenntnis-theoretisch und pantheistisch-identitäts-philosophisch durch die Verwandlung aller Realität in Geist und dann im weiteren Verfolg der Erkenntnis_theorie metaphysisch-logisch durch den im Dreitakt verkleideten Monismus oder durch die hinter die dialektische Widerspruchslogik dann doch gestellte Identitätslehre. Nach beiden Seiten ergeben sich unerträgliche Gewaltsamkeiten und Verengungen, insbesondere eine ganz unhaltbare Rationalisierung der Dialektik." (*P. 273)

"Von dieser Erkenntnistheorie rührt nun aber der übermässig einseitige und übermässig spiritualistische Charakter dieser ganzen Geschichtsauffassung her. Man braucht nur die Tendenz des Geistes in seine Hand zu bekommen, um damit die

* "Der Historismus und seine Probleme (Gesammelte Schriften III.)," by Ernst Troeltsch. Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1922.

ganze von ihm hervorgebrachte und in ihm konzentrierte Wirklichkeit zu erfassen." (Op. cit., p. 274)

"Noch schlimmer aber wirkt die Umbiegung dieser monistisch-spiritualistischen Erkenntnistheorie in eine Metaphysik, die nichts anderes ist als die Identitätslehre Spinozas, beweglich gemacht und dem konkreten Leben angenähert durch die Lehre von einer in dieser Identität von Geist und Natur enthaltenen Selbstentgegensetzung und ewigen Selbstvermittlung, innerhalb welcher letzteren die historische Vernunft der Menschen auf unserem Planeten ein bestimmtes Moment ist. . . So wird die ganze grossartige Gestaltfülle Hegels zu Schemen." (P. 274) "Die Menschen erscheinen dann in der Tat als Marionetten, die einem Schauspiel dienen, von dem sie selber nichts wissen." (275)

"Er wollte ein absolutes, rationell begründetes Wertsystem, das nur eben auch die Eigentümlichkeit hatte, die historischen Individualitäten in logischer Folge, Verknüpfung und Vollendung aus sich heraus zu setzen." (Op. cit., p. 130)

"Der Widerspruch zwischen der rationalen Idee und der individuell-konkreten Geschichte bleibt daher auch bei Hegel trotz der denkbar innigsten Ineinanderziehung bestehen." (P.131)

"Eine wirkliche Schwierigkeit bietet dagegen die berühmte Definition der Weltgeschichte als des 'Fortschritts im Bewusstsein der Freiheit,' eine Definition, die mehr gepriesen als im Urtext gelesen wird. Es ist nicht zu leugnen: sie ist durch und durch zweideutig." (Op. cit., p. 263)

"So gibt es Künstlichkeiten über Künstlichkeiten, Gewaltsamkeit über Gewaltsamkeit. Und zum Ueberfluss kommt

dazu noch das Schwanken zwischen der rein logischen Zeitlosigkeit des Prozesses auf der einen Seite und der konkreten Zeitlichkeit der Endlichen Erscheinung dieses Prozesses auf der andern Seite, worin oft die ganze Chronologie zugrundegeht oder doch wenigstens in Unordnung kommt." (Op. cit., p. 276)

3. Examination of Sorley's assumptions, and approach to the problem, in his "Moral Values and the Idea of God"

The discussion in this section is not offered as a systematic critique of this book, but is concerned solely with the postulates and the view-point of Sorley, in so far as they affect the fundamental conception and procedure of this dissertation. I pass over the logical structure of his arguments because I am concerned only with the validity of his assumptions and with the significance of his approach to the problem of religion.

This narrows our interest, and justifies a treatment which may appear impressionistic. This is frankly an empirical estimate of Sorley's point-of-view, and is presented for the one purpose of affording our thesis a larger modern setting, and of defining the nature of the problem as conceived in this undertaking.

We may gain not only additional perspective for our theme, but also a provisional solution of our problem, by a survey of this significant and valuable contemporary study of

idealization, W. R. Sorley's "Moral Values and the Idea of God."

First I shall attempt the discussion of a problem fundamental to the general appraisal of Sorley's method. He postpones the interpretation of reality based on epistemology and metaphysics in favor of a primary theory of moral values. He seeks to determine the bearing of these values on our view of reality. According to the traditional method, ethical inquiry (he asserts) not only has been postponed, but has been left largely extraneous to the system of thought. (Ch.I.,p.1-2,20)

I am particularly interested in his declared purpose because I have long felt that theology usually begins at the wrong end: it constructs the idea of God, and then employs it as a huge hammer to pound the desired system into shape, and to weld it into rigid permanence. Whereas it would appear that the thinker should reach the idea of ultimate reality somewhat farther along in his critical and constructive work. Hence the method indicated by Sorley is valid and wholesome as far as the conception of God is concerned.

Nevertheless, from another (the human) point of view, the thinker is bound to make terms with metaphysics at the beginning of the inquiry. This fact the author does not clearly recognize (in its bearing on the status of idealization); as the result, the position of the entire book is weakened. With his purpose set forth, Sorley comes early to the (almost) crucial question for philosophy: What are the legitimate demands that values make on the universe of reality? (Ch. IV.,VI.,VIII.) This however depends upon a prior, the truly critical, question: What are values;

what sort of reality do they themselves possess? This is the fundamental query. It is deserving of particular attention because it is so fond of appearing in disguise.

To this question there are two opposed answers: (a) Values are pretty, ^{and} interesting, ~~and winsome~~. But ^{their} ~~there~~ loveliness is pathetic, for they are ~~ephemera~~ phenomena; "in the long run" they are appearances only. For they are subject to material (physiological) conditions. When these changes in a particular fashion, values disappear: they simply puff out like lighted candles in the breeze. (b) Values are part of the real stuff of the universe; hence their right to solid existence is inalienable.

Sorley does give the former answer brief notice (P. 472, 501) in a later place. / He does not give it adequate preliminary consideration. It is broadly true that he assumes that there is only one solution to the riddle of the universe. He takes for granted that ideals have a genuine irreducible being, and proceeds proudly on this assumption. / (P. 78-79) The categorical imperative is held to prove itself as a thing of cosmic significance. / (P. 95-97) This begs the whole question. The battle is already won, or needs not to be fought, if this assumption is to be allowed.

Now Sorley's too easy supposition, in the last analysis, may be correct; but it is not axiomatic. Hence ought not one, in this critical age of science and with the background of thought, to be quite self-conscious in taking a position like this of Sorley's? The experiencer of values may occupy a strong position when he trusts in those ideals that have been validated (somehow) even in the vicissitudes of life. He who is living

his true life, who knows its worth and the "deep power of joy" that is its inspiration, may remain untroubled, serenely trusting in the "abiding/^{presence and}persuasion" of his highest ideals as their deepest and all-sufficient warrant. But such a one has dared to make a choice. One should make that choice without illusions, and accepting no indulgence.

Because I believe that this is the ultimate crisis of philosophic thought, I maintain that Sorley does not bravely face the critical issue. The subtle suggestion is found thru the book that brilliant maneuvering will obviate the necessity. It is not so obviated. The chasm is there, and fine phrases do not make a bridge. The chasm is crossed by an assumption, a leap. Thereafter, nice logic becomes a plausible instrument. But the formalities of reasoning make a poor offering when one is faced by the elementary problem of life in its naked, uncompromising, terrible intensity.

Thruout the book the tacit assumption is made that values have such a substantial, enduring existence that their connections with reality are conclusive; their demands can not be gainsaid. They are supposed to have a coordinate status with the causal series which science studies; or rather, they enjoy a primary being which makes them determinative of reality. Essentially, their demands are final. (E.g., p. 132f.) Our hopes do allure us toward this happy conclusion. But Sorley is too naive in his assurance of their constitutive quality. He is rather oblivious of thought's perilous venture.

Even if he recognized more candidly the nature of our quest, his confidence in the abiding being of values is a

little too robust. The demand of the categorical imperative may appear to be quite stalwart when observed by itself. But there are other thronging challengers in the tragic field. Moral values are so frail, and our ideals so fragile, when confronted by the colossal threat of the seeming materiality of things, especially in the frustration of accident, of injustice, of disease, of death. And the Problem of Sordidness is more ominous than the Problem of Pain; it is the most sinister aspect of Evil. Moreover, psychological analysis and social theory do not regard conscience and the categorical imperative as the simple and conclusive essences that they appear to be to the naive moral consciousness and the unscientific mind.

Certainly Sorley considers disastrous alternatives. But one feels that such consideration is incidental. It comes "after the fact." (E.g., p. 501) The conclusion is established really not on the basis of a criticism of unfavorable possibilities, except in formal fashion. The conclusion is established on the basis of the enormous claims of values in their own right.

Sorley dismisses naturalistic theories much too cavalierly. Doubtless they seem quite impossible to him. His readers, however, might find his own reasoning more convincing if the writer himself were not so convinced. Sorley states: "Naturalistic theories were barely mentioned in my argument owing to their inability even to explain law in nature and the facts of psychical existence, as well as because they are obliged to deny the objectivity of moral and other values." (Page 502) Barely to have mentioned these theories

is a damaging confession, and the reason given does not improve the situation. They are worthy of first consideration. For it is quite possible to hold, rationally and critically, that law can not, and need not, be explained, that the facts involved are to be accepted and described (which is explanation enough), that the spiritualistic theory is no true explanation, but rather a formal hypothesis which throws no genuine light on the situation, and involves assumptions more difficult to accept than the more elementary statement of the problem recognized by naturalism.

Moreover, the social, historic objectivity of values is not denied by naturalistic theories. Perhaps a further objectivity ought to be denied, or at least seriously challenged. Certainly there appears to be an impressive and insistent (absolute?) quality in the moral imperative. But the interpretation of the felt obligation is as important as its recognition. The progress of thought is continuously indicating that assumed irreducibles are capable of analysis or of further assignment. Thus this feeling of objectivity might be due to instinctive reactions, this claim to continuous reality to biological adjustments, this sense of absoluteness to social pressure, to the authority of long habit. They may function as pragmatic illusions, all the more successfully because admiration is innocently synoptic in nature, resisting the probing process of criticism. These possibilities are airily dismissed. This blandness is the basic weakness of the book. I could not object to the final dismissal of ^ohypotheses found wanting. I do protest against the scornful gesture.

The defect is radical. After the tour de force, the

subsequent skillful and earnest argument is singularly unconvincing, for it has taken on an inevitable atmosphere of remoteness. As a matter of fact, we are primarily biological, psycho-physical organisms. This aspect of life having been summarily dismissed, the price of unreality must be paid. The reasoning becomes too formal to justify such tremendous conclusions concerning reality. In the end, since experienced reality has been disparaged, the situation is ironic.

Having considered the underlying issue, we may take a closer view of the book. It is an excellent example of Rationalism. Certain axiomatic elements are accepted; then momentous conclusions are rigorously deduced therefrom. Perhaps the volume is rather too massive in its total impression, owing to an overly elaborate consideration of some questions (the answers to which are pre-determined by the point of view taken and the assumptions made). It appears somewhat arbitrary in its treatment of certain philosophical positions, for instance, that of pantheism. The author may be a little self-assured in his analysis and disposal of some problems of renowned elusiveness (the problem of freedom, for example).

Sorley insists that value resides in the concrete existent. If value "belongs to the individual, not to the law or general concept," in just what sense does the "standard" which "implies as its ground an ideal of goodness" (p. 498-499) possess concrete reality? As far as experience goes, this standard is merely a general concept. The author's argument is clear. Altho intrinsic values belong to persons only, the objectivity of morality is taken to imply the ideal of goodness,

the Supreme Mind as the ground of all reality. It is a question how much feeling of reality Sorley is able to make us put into this inference. It is highly abstract and formal in character. Even if formally plausible, it would seem to be disloyal to the earlier contention that value resides in the concrete existent, unless the logical implication is held to be persuasive.

The author clearly discriminates between the two aspects of reality: the realm of causation and the moral order or realm of ends. He insists - and rightly - that the laws determining value are not of the same order as the laws determining the causal or other connections of things and persons. (P. 189) Again, with clear perception, he states that the value which we ascribe to material things is never value in the strict sense, but only a means to value. (P. 498) How, then, can he assert so confidently that it is legitimate to assume the objectivity of knowledge and consequently at the same time the objectivity of morality? (Op. cit., p. 190f.)

As an essential stage in the development of his thesis, this assertion does not seem to have the clear warrant that he assumes. To be sure, intrinsic values are a part of the sum total of reality. Does this furnish a sufficient basis for the declaration (upon which the argument depends) that (P. 499) "the grounds for denying the objectivity of morality are equally grounds for denying the objectivity of knowledge"? (Cf. op.cit., p. 93f., 182f.) Decidedly not; the flimsy argument is all the more astonishing since Sorley himself has insisted on the lack of congruity between the natural order and the moral

order. "Even their phenomenal appearances diverge." (P. 501)

The obscurity is increased by a subtle and unobserved difference in the use of the word, objectivity, in the two phrases. Knowledge is the recognition of connections and things in the causal order. But moral values do not exist in this realm; they reside only in persons. The "objectivity of morality" is a different sort of objectivity; it has its own unique quality, and it employs another type of demonstration. (P. 76-79) "Objectivity" has different connotations and references in the two cases. The impression is inevitable that the author is advancing his argument by a sort of (unintentional) word-juggling. It is to be feared that he has the habit of beginning with clear, concrete distinctions, and of ending in abstract obscurities.

In addition to the fallacies in reasoning, the typical procedure is much too intellectualistic. (By this term I mean ultra-rationalistic: having an undue confidence in the ability of the mind to proceed in architectonic fashion.) I recognize that this impression is due to a personal attitude and method of approach. One might say that it is a matter of philosophic taste. Sorley's conclusions are too abstract, rationalistic, non-empirical, to yield - with a reality-feeling - the concrete Universal, as they are supposed to do.

The Moral Judgment does appear to possess an inherent claim and (in some sense) authoritative character. On this foundation Sorley builds in truly architectural style. The resultant structure has its quality of formal impressiveness. Granting certain postulates, the logic has a precise and

ceremonious cogency - for concepts. But values - in their concrete, living nature - seem to have been left behind in the process. In the end, I do not get a picture of reality, a description of life as it is.

I have sympathy for that mood which makes the ideal postulates. At times I feel the logical pressure. But I do not find the main development of the thesis enlightening. For me the chief value of the book lies in the treatment of particular topics and in the criticism of various views. For the most part, these are keen, tolerant, generous in their appreciation, and helpful in their large, ideal suggestiveness. They issue in reconstructive interpretation. Discussions which I have found especially worth while are: the scale and the system of values; the function of things, and degrees in capacity, in realizing values; the conservation and the increase of values; synopsis and the unity of reality; consideration of the ontological argument; criticism of monism; the problem of freedom; philosophical ideas and religious experience; the limits of morality.

The book abounds in shrewd observations and illuminating thoughts. For instance, it is a fine thesis that values may be not yet fully realized, and therefore that it is not allowable to adjudge (finally) the reality of values by a cross-section. For it is the nature of persons to be "realizers of value." The love of value is prophetic, and the attainment of truth an active process.

In the light of the fore-going, I would like to suggest a rather searching criticism, not with particular reference to

Sorley, but with regard to the typical rationalistic treatment of values. Frequently we have a faulty analysis and a faulty logic.

(a) Faulty analysis. For the scientific student, "values" are not pre-existent (divine or human) entities; they are not principles which determine experience. They are results, created in the push and pull of experience; they are pragmatic and provisional formulations in the complicated adjustment process. Vitally is their character determined by the voluminous strains of actual experience. I do not mean to suggest that they are passive; produced in the strife of many factors, ideals function in the progress of experience.

Therefore we may state that, strictly speaking, there are no such things as values, that is, no self-contained entities which may be ~~blantly~~ manipulated for the formal demonstration of a value-view of the universe. "Value" is a convenient term used to indicate the fact that experience has a valuational aspect. Values are not molecules or crystals; they are not tags to be detached from experience and applied to "objective reality." They are cognitive and emotional valuations of a thoroly organic kind. Their nature is violated by the casual and too assured analysis of the rationalistic system-builder.

(b) Faulty logic. It is not, therefore, a question ^{exclusively} whether values are/subjective or objective. ^{The empiricist be-} ~~The problem is not~~ ^{lieves that} ~~so simple-~~ "values" are subjective in that they are phenomena of consciousness; they function in the mental stream. They may be considered objective in so far as they have contacts and

connections with our perceptual, objective world.

In view of the criticism in this, and the preceding, sections, we are justified in holding that theistic-minded students are apt to be amazingly lenient with the dubious logic of rationalism. We can not avoid the conviction that, if they were not influenced by their wishes, they would be more rigorous in their demands. In these two sections, we have had more than one occasion to note the pathetic eagerness with which the intellectualist, at the slightest excuse, escapes (probably unconsciously) from the rigorous methods of inductive and deductive reasoning, and ignores with superb composure the demands of empiricism for a faithful allegiance to facts.

Not being discrete things, nor separable spiritual essences, "values" are to be dealt with much more circum- spectly than they are treated usually at the hands of rational- istic theists.

4. The Meaning of Religion

It is the thought of this paper that religion must be considered primarily and essentially as an experience. Even so, there are so many conceptions of the nature of religion, that one is compelled to be a bit arbitrary. Again, religions certainly differ widely in the measure of their soundness and beauty. I offer this ^{working} definition of genuine religion: Religion is a pervasive sentiment, including appreciation of the highest (recognized) values, loyalty toward adventurous ideals, both appreciation and loyalty made more tender and wistful and strong by the attitude of reverent wonder toward the surrounding and inclusive mystery of the universe. (This is presented frankly as a selective definition for the purpose of indicating the view-point of this dissertation.)

It is the thesis of this paper that religion thus conceived, and only thus conceived, is validated by the critical, empirical study of the idealizing process.

For our purpose, it is not necessary to enter upon an extended discussion of the instinctive bases of the religious consciousness. It is commonly recognized that (altho there is no religious instinct) religious experience roots in many instinctive tendencies. (We are not concerned with the vexed question of the status of instincts; we are not implying the existence of discrete "instincts." It is enough to recognize inherited biological tendencies, however amorphous and dependent on habit-formation).

In philosophical discussions of religion, there is frequently much confusion in regard to the instinctive nature of moral and religious idealization. For instance, H. W. Conn, in "Social Heredity and Social Evolution," Chapter X., has this valuable and largely just statement (condensed):

The moral nature of man furnishes the foundation for civilized society. This moral nature is found in a new instinct, the ethical instinct, only the barest rudiments of which exist among the animals. Morality is not based on reason or intelligence. It reverses natural selection, and preserves the unfit. Will this process result in the degeneration of mankind? To a certain extent it must degrade the physical nature. But altruism elevates society, for ethics alone makes society possible.

Civilization is not just a substitution of altruism for egoism, but the result of a constant struggle between the two principles. In this struggle egoism seems to have the usual victory; but the real triumph is always won by altruism. For the operation of its law makes possible every advance of the race. This is true because human evolution is social, not organic; and ethics places society above the individual. Again, civilization waited for the successful accomplishment of organization. The last is preserved (if not produced) only by altruism.

Religion has held an important place in this

progress. For religion strengthens the demand for the sacrifice of the individual, and furnishes the foundation of government. Altho religious authority, if unchecked, will result in stagnation, broadly speaking religion means organization, and irreligion disintegration. Religion and civilization have gone hand in hand.

I present this condensed statement partly because it supplies a constructive interpretation which we shall build on in what follows. But it is necessary to make the following points in criticism:

(a) Self-preservation is carelessly spoken of as an instinct. Self-preservation is a result which normally follows from the operation of several appetites and instincts, such as hunger and thirst, the sexual impulse, the instinct of flight, of combat, etc. Self-preservation itself is plainly not an instinct. "Ethical instinct" is an even broader assumption.

(b) He does not show how the alleged ethical instinct had, or could have had, its "origin in the ~~instinct~~ instinct that leads to a struggle for the life of a species." (P. 248) It did originate in connection with that struggle, undoubtedly; but that is a different thing. He uses the word, instinct, loosely and carelessly; he is vague and unsatisfactory in his reference to origin and development.

(c) "The moral nature of man controls his actions not by reason, but by impulse." (P. 248) This is true in so far as the moral nature grows out of (or is influenced by) the gregarious, and other, social instinctive tendencies. It does not follow that there is an "ethical instinct," nor that the moral nature controls actions by impulse, chiefly or characteristically. The categorical imperative, and related experiences and activities, may be intuitive; they have an

instinctive rootage. But they are more than instinctive. They are more rational, more controlled and directed, more ideal than instinctive behavior could be.

(d) The ideal nature is not a wholly new impulse. On the biological side, it develops from the matrix of the social instincts, such as: gregariousness, desire for approval, display, imitation, sex behavior, the maternal attitude and the allied tendencies of kindness and sympathy.


To sum up: in the proportion that morality is instinctive (or impulsive), it is not novel, but has rich, biological connections. In the degree that it is truly ethical, it is derived, rational, far developed from the instinctive plane. Here we have the new factor, or factors, emerging. Conn has his attention so fixed on his thesis that (altho a biologist) he makes many crude and careless statements. (Note his disparagement of the importance of physical inheritance, and his theory of human instincts, in the first chapter of the book). And his psychological study of altruism is mechanical and inadequate.

(e) Sacrifice, to be ethical, must be recognized as reasonable. Socially and wholesomely motivated, it is reasonable. Altho a little knowledge may be a socially dangerous thing, it is not (necessarily) true that "intelligence leads to disintegration." (P. 265) The mere blind impression of "oughtness" would not, could not, lead the individual very far. As a matter of fact, the enlightened individual will recognize that the well-being of society not only will secure safety and physical advantages for himself, but also will

make possible many ideal satisfactions and delights.

Certainly the ethical-religious consciousness is not an isolated or ephemeral quality. It is an integral part of the structure of attitudes toward life. The following diagram will indicate my general conception of the character of ethical and religious development, historically and logically viewed:


The Evolution of Spirituality



Out of the original culture mass many ideal interests have evolved. From the primitive conglomerate, art, science, philosophy, the practical arts, literature, education and a complex social organization have emerged. We are particularly interested in the development of a true morality (based on social appreciations), growing out of the more spontaneous attitude toward men, and in the growth of the tribal ceremonial from the more personal attitude toward natural forces, (as well

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as involving and expressing tribal evaluations, as Durkheim, Ames and King have shown). Later forms of morality and ceremonial fuse to generate the genuine idealism of ethical-religious experience. From the formal type of conventional morality, and from impersonal magical practices, no ideal interests evolve. But true morality (stressing love as a motive and character as the objective), and the nobler ceremonial (mediated by the attitude of awe before the splendid mysteries of life), are conjoined (yet maintaining their identities) in spirituality. As we have suggested in the diagram, developed forms of esthetic, reflective and practical experience make their rich contributions to the ultimate idealism.

According to this view, ceremonial religion and magic have a common origin, developing along different lines from Mysterious Power. Religious idealism (in a sense) has a two-fold rootage, evolving from the attitude toward nature and the attitude toward man; in addition, it has roots in other areas of experience. The diagram presents, of course, an oversimplification; for there are many other cross-references.

All ideal interests are inter-related; and they retain much of their early irrational coloring. Religious experience today is a mixture of many things; but it has become purified and clarified, until in its noblest forms it has taken on the character embodied in the definition offered at the beginning of this section.

If this is a just presentation, it follows that it is difficult to determine the proper interpretation of religion.

Thus it can not be said that religion is good or bad. It depends on the type of the religious consciousness. It would be as impossible to say that government was good or bad, that an undesignated hypothesis of conduct was true or false. Moreover, we can not afford to draw naive, sentimental conclusions from the prevalence of "religious" phenomena in human history and biography. "Religion" contains too wide a range of connotations. In poetic mood, we may say that the long cry of the human soul for God is witnessed by the ruins of ancient civilizations. With tender regard for the early dreams of man, we may assert that in the child-race there are dim forebodings of that higher life to which he is related and akin. With the poet we may exclaim,

"That in even savage bosoms
There are longings, yearnings, strivings
For the good they comprehend not."

But this will not advance us far in our critical problem. It remains to determine the precise nature of the religious experience, and to adjudge its cosmic implications. The prevalent objective assumptions of uncritical religious experience create no a priori proof of its necessarily objective character. Primitive ideation is usually objective. Prayer in the form of communion is the natural result of the conversational (because largely social) character of thinking, especially of idealistic, or valuational, thinking. Mature idealism steadily turns away from the conversational method, and has progressively less need for objective references and absolute certainties.

We may recall our definition of religion: Religion

is a pervasive sentiment, including appreciation of the highest (recognized) values, loyalty toward adventurous ideals, both appreciation and loyalty made more ~~tender and wistful and~~ strong by the attitude of reverent wonder toward the surrounding and inclusive mystery of the universe.

B. Psychology of the Idealizing Process

1. Preliminary analysis

I believe that it is possible to analyze provisionally, and to reconstruct, the idealizing process, and so to determine its essential nature. Some have held that this interest destroys the true character of the process. I admit that this attempt at reflective understanding does modify the process. But the modification is not serious, especially since the modification results (or may result) in an enrichment of the process. We may admit that analysis temporarily interferes with appreciation. But the memory images are fairly clear, and may be examined. Then, when we go back to appreciation's synoptic view, we shall find that it is far more meaningful and adequate by reason of the intervening analytical study.

This position is the more justifiable because the critical study of consciousness, especially from the genetic and functional points of view, discloses the ideal nature of every process of intellectual growth. Idealization is not a peculiar, unnatural state superinduced upon the ordinary course of psychic life by mythical agencies. All intellectual progress, all unfolding appreciation, all volitional activity, involve the idealizing process.

Child psychology has thrown much light on the course

of psychic organization and control. The young infant is a center of relatively unorganized energy. The instinctive tendencies provide an incipient order; but the random movements are the over-flow of surplus energy, finding expression without regard to experience or desire.

A few weeks after birth the child connects his impressions to a sufficient degree to exhibit traces of memory; his memory remains weak for about three months, depending upon intense stimulations. Nevertheless, a certain order is now implicit in experience; there is more than a series of random discharges. Attention, sufficient to arouse vague interest, becomes noticeable after about three months. This interest develops very rapidly during the ensuing weeks, especially in connection with those changes upon which the child's own comfort and discomfort depend.

The actions of persons form the most significant and variable factors in the baby's environment, and it is for these that his powers of comprehension and adjustment are taxed. The mother's manner of bathing him suffers variations, or perhaps is perplexingly different from the nurse's method. The memory image of the dressing process fails to get verified by the present order of events. It is necessary to expand the scope of expectation; later there is necessitated the projection of a vague idea to harmonize the conflict. (Compare an article by A. E. Davies, "Genesis of Ideals," in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, August, 1906).

Even the mother's caress and way of fondling are distressingly changeful. These conflicting elements involve in

the mental life an increasing intricacy, which is recognized as complexity, in so far as it baffles adjustment, thru the presence of that which we may tentatively designate as ideal images or experimental attitudes, - an experience, however, which is significant for higher development only thru clarification and recognition of these ideal constructions.

I have given the provisional characterization of the ideal (page 22, above) as an imaginative and reflective construction of a phase of experience whose meanings are not fully realized. Now we may say that the ideal is partially designated as an idea which functions in experience as its organizing factor, in the interest of progressive understanding, appreciation and achievement. It consists not wholly of perceptual elements as given, but is (in part) a synthesis (governed by an active interest) of selected elements of experience, which renders possible the assimilation of new items and their apperception in a more definitely ordered life.

The place of feeling in this process is vital. Feeling makes possible the valuation placed upon the environment as result of the active relation of the conscious organism thereto. Ebullition of feeling-impulses gives opportunity and stimulus for growth. What further is meant will be reserved for later study; we merely note here the fact as significant for development early and late. It is true of the child, as we have seen; and the great painter, inventor or reformer, is one who feels strongly far beyond the limitations of ordinary experience.

2. Question of methods

In this discussion we have made frank use of any suggestions which the introspective method may afford. The extreme behaviorist would deny the scientific validity of this method. Hence we endeavor to come to terms with the behaviorist. We gladly admit our debt to the behaviorist psychology. On its positive side, it has delivered us from much easy-going "explanation" and some self-confident mythology. To a degree it represents a wholesome tendency. It furnishes an excellent method for certain problems, for example, animal psychology and child psychology. Nevertheless, it can be only a supplementary method; for introspection alone affords direct access to the unique phenomena, conscious states.

Behaviorism's elaborate avoidance of the central processes is distinctly amusing. That which it drives out of the door with such a flourish flies in at the window. J. R. Kantor, in an article on memory, makes a typical statement: "We have no room in our description for the sorcerous reinstatement of mental states thru a mysterious association of ideas." (Article, "Memory: A Triphase Objective-Action," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Nov. 9, 1922, p. 624-639)

Now we freely admit that the notion of association of ideas has been naively conceived, and its "laws" have been formulated too confidently and have been used uncritically. But mental states are not exactly subject to a "sorcerous reinstatement;" they are immediate data.

Failure to admit to consideration any data, no matter

how inconvenient the recognition may be, is not scientific. Conscious data exist, and must be taken account of. On the general evolutionary hypothesis, that which is so obvious and universal would naturally appear to have a significant place in the human-environment relation. Kantor calls his treatment of memory the objective analysis of human behavior. He holds that in memory the "factor of retentiveness is decidedly a matter of associative connection," but insists that "the associative process is at every point a thoroly and completely objective series of happenings." (Op. cit., p. 634) It is clear that he regards any sort of reinstatement of mental states as "sorcerous." I submit that, altho this may be objective description (and partially sound), it is not complete analysis, and therefore not a true explanation. As a matter of fact, in spite of his declared purpose, introspection phrases are employed, or hinted at, constantly. This habit is common among behaviorists.

Non-introspective attempts at explanation often become mysterious, or meaningless, thru various forms of imaginative neurology. No doubt the cerebro-spinal system (if accessible) might be theoretically conceived of as a perfect table of reference for psychological explanation. In many respects it would be the one adequate scientific method, if it were open to extensive use. But the critical psychologist must insist that the cerebro-spinal system (with the cerebral cortex in particular) as an explanatory table of reference is largely imaginary. Of course it is valuable. We know, all the while, that the system is there, and we use it as much and as far as possible. This

is the justifiable neurological, supplementary method. As such, it steadies our theory, and makes many valuable concrete suggestions. It is exceedingly important.

Failing a completely accessible table of reference, we have two other avenues of approach: responses of the organism carefully observed; introspection. All three methods are useful. For we have a three-fold process: Stimulation, Central adjustment, Response. A psychological description (which is to be as complete as possible) requires all possible methods. Even then we fall far short of a full accounting. Faced by a difficulty, it is sheer folly to reject an alternative method of description and explanation. Psychology too often is guilty of a suspicious provincialism.

This estimate of the situation favors one current view of the body-mind relation, which holds that mental phenomena do not belong to a wholly different order of reality from that of neural phenomena. They appear to belong to mutually alien realms because we are in the habit of approaching them from different angles. They are different; that is, they present distinguishable aspects of reality. But they can not be absolutely different, for they are organically united. It is not so strange that here (as so often occurs in nature) we have different factors organically incorporated, which are distinguishable, altho not separable. The evolutionary story gives a sufficient indication of the situation: we have to do with a developing process, unified, natural, operative.

The conscious state is a datum, altho not a thing-in-itself to be isolated, or to be understood in isolation.

Consciousness is a convenient term for the specific character of subjective experiences. Absurd is the declaration: "Perception is an actual interaction of one object with another."

(J. R. Kantor, op. cit.) It is a mediated interaction. Recognition and memory can not be reduced to behavior: the whole is larger than the part; behavior is the end-result. Consciousness reports on one aspect of the central adjustment (the middle portion of the nervous arc).

Consciousness is the other side of the neural process. Consciousness is certainly an aspect of reality, but of itself (as a separate unit) is not necessarily to be thought of as effecting neural changes. Something happens, and the being aware is one of the phases of the happening, and often probably is one of the necessary conditions of the happening. Awareness is not a self-contained somewhat existing by itself. The problem must be understood conceptually in functional fashion. In the nature of the case, we lack the mental machinery for picturing the situation. It is not picturable, and we should not try to picture it. It is enough for our purpose that we recognize the patent fact that we are psycho-physical organisms, and that experience is psycho-physical in nature.

3. Development of ideals

I named the ideal an idea which functions in the organization of experience, mediating richer interpretations. In the projecting of the ideal, we have at first the activity of the "reproductive" imagination. In fact this is a simpler manifestation of the "constructive" imagination which (always

functioning in alert and significant cognition) revives images and ideas, selected portions of experience, freely molds, manipulates and resynthesizes them according to some ruling interest in a fresh conception, which (when it serves to resolve conflicts in a higher harmony, or to infer novel meaning from complexity) is an ideal.

Much of that which has preceded has served only as a preliminary statement, and (altho true in part) is not at all adequate for that which we are trying to comprehend. It affords the first broad truth of the nature of the ideal; but it is too broad. Hence I have preferred to employ the term "ideal" as an adjective when referring to an experience which illustrates one functional aspect of the ideal, being however only the matrix of its development. The ideal is evolved in the course of active, striving life; its projection is demanded in the increasing complexity of that life by the impulse of needs, appetites and desires for something more, which the ideal makes better, something more satisfactory, which the ideal makes more complete and meaningful. This requires explicit emphasis.

A mere reorganization of given elements would be a general image, the result of accumulated filtrations of sense-data; or it would be a general idea, the arrangement of attitudes taken, for example, toward the social environment as offered to the organism. But the ideal is more than a composite picture; it is more than a formulation of tabulated items. If this were all, there might be spreading and expansion, but no true development. There might be voluminous ramifications, but no orthogenic evolution, no growth in manifold and richer

differentiation, in inclusive and higher unity. Conscious development is orthogenic (at least in a figurative sense), and its principle is the ideal.

I have stated that the ideal is the guide to progress, that it makes for advancement as well as for order. In this it is more than a resynthesis of data as experienced. It is a synthesis of experience according to a new pattern, a pattern which reveals a meaning not before perceived, and suggests a further meaning not yet fully realized. It is a synthesis of experience as actually assimilated, with its wider implications. This synthesis is recognized as surpassing past achievement, and as promising superior insight.

The wealth of new relations, discovered and created by thought, provide sufficient data and give sufficient opportunity, for the fresh meanings perceived, and enable us to understand the process empirically. (By understanding, I mean having a reasonable sense of familiarity and degree of insight. It is, of course, impossible to explain fully any process in nature; for every natural process is a mystery. It is easy to construct more imposing and architectonic "explanations;" but these are apt to prove illusory.)

Perception is a complex mental state, made up of sensational elements. We may think of apperception as focussed perception. An image consists of perceptual elements, its quality being largely determined by the retention trace. In the case of memory images, the components are sensational elements and primary traces. In the case of imaginative, synthetic images, its components are reassembled elements (percep-

tual, affective, conative) and modified traces. In the case of the idea, sensory stimulation and muscular response have served to alter the set of the cortical neurons. The central process no longer retains its former character. To be sure, the overflow current which arouses an ideational experience is usually comparatively weak. On the neurological side, ideation depends upon a complex branching system of neurons in the cerebral cortex. Of course the retention traces are manifold.

This may not be very enlightening. At least it may help to make more comprehensible the many rich border-line experiences, the apperception of new elements, and above all the comprehension of novel relations in our diversified and ever changing experience. It is these relations that are replete with bright, untried possibilities, and with verdant acquaintances.

Shall we ask, how may we explain the purer pattern of the ideal, this transcendence of the actual? It will not do to say that the ideal wells up from unseen depths of mind, nor that it is the inflow of a divine life. One assertion is mythical, and the other mythological. We must hold to the empirical estimate of the ideal as the principle of insight and achievement. We are concerned with inventive creations as means of self-realization.

In seeking the explanation of a process, it ought not to be demanded that we explain in a sense other than ^{the making of} a disclosure of the relationships and ~~system~~ system within the development as given. The present as actual appears self-contained and finished. The present in the light of past and future is beheld

as a stage in an evolving process, - as product looking toward the past, as factor looking toward the future. At any particular stage, experience is given partly as product, partly as promise. The product may contain the germ, but as promise it is not offered as actuality, but rather as potentiality. On every level, experience in its broader meanings is given in germ. In development, these meanings unfold according to manifold laws. In its largest aspect, growth is in the form of increasing differentiation within a wider integration, enlargement of scope within a more adequate unity. It is an organic evolution.

It so happens that present experience opens out to the future, as well as recapitulates the past. Not only is the future situation bound up "potentially" with the present, but in that present is forecast the real nature of the future, together with the conscious realization on the part of the individual of an efficient relation to its promise. If experience were a mechanical process, this insight would be anomalous. Since experience is conscious, intelligent development, it is reasonable that the higher future should not only grow out of the lower present, but should be foreseen within the limitations of that present.

Otherwise, the changing order would be a blind, mechanistic, or at most a merely organic, process, not an intelligent, guided development, as it claims and appears to be. And I am confident that we may trust the testimony of intellectual progress as it validates and confirms its claims, believing that the present is not only historic in its solid gain, but also

prophetic in its richer promise.

4. The genius

Light has been thrown on the nature of idealization by the psychological and sociological study of the genius, by the psychology of invention, and by the philosophy of civilization. History has been made by the minority. Culture has been created by the few geniuses: thinker, scientist, artist, poet, social leader. The religious consciousness has appeared most winsomely in the meditation and the vision of the mystics, most eloquently in the challenging appeal of the prophets.

It is the perpetual miracle of history that the genius, nurtured with others, surrounded by their limited accomplishment, should rise to splendid heights of understanding, perceive original meanings in human life, and create new forms of beauty.

The creative man is to be understood as an organic part of the life of the world. His productive imagination finds its material in the opulence of social experience. The genius is a social man. His ideals are rooted in the culture and wisdom which constitute his valuable inheritance. Here he finds much of the substance of his dreams. He discovers also certain standards of theoretical criticism and of practical suggestiveness, which will necessarily guide his insight.

James Mark Baldwin, in his "Social and Ethical Interpretations," has explained that it is the glory of the great man that he is so intimately related to his fellows, for on

this account he is able to lead them; in so far as he denies these connections and privileges, he fails of his high calling.

The prophet is a man among men. He is the master of men; he is the latter partly because he is the former. This does not mean that his thought is the adaptation of the crude opinion of the populace. In this dross there are a few grains of golden aspiration. These yearnings would remain ineffectual, however, if there were not some one who could gather up the weak and ill-defined impulses of the heart, and advance them as ideals of striving. The gold would lie unnoticed if there were no dreamer-artisan to select the scattered grains, and shape them into a clean and beautiful image.

The poet is a variation toward fine sensitivity to suggestions of social meaning and beauty. His is a more responsive organism. Being so susceptible, he detects the abortive impulses in his fellow-men. With his power of vision, he perceives the upward-leanings, inefficient because unconscious and unguided; he will unify the scattered objects of conflicting aspirations into a clear and shining ideal. Then his fellows, gazing with astonished pride upon this vision, will say, "This is what we loved. This is what we meant!"

He who is able to do this for others does not furnish ideals ready-made. To appropriate a vision, one must strain to see it, and must labor to obey. The seer can only suggest his truths. If men are sufficiently responsive, if their love be deep enough, and their will strong, they will be able to interpret the suggestion. If they have not this sympathetic resonance, it will mean nothing. Yet if it were not for the

insight and skill of the artist, the poet and the seer, which directs our feebler vision and enlightens our ignorant longings, our lives would be dark, dim, confused.

We must not suppose that these are exempt from strife, they who direct us in ours. Our effort is as nothing compared with theirs: where we follow, they must lead. These are they who live splendidly while the many dumbly exist.

The dreamers are the saving men, world-quickeners, torch-bearers. They succeed in their ideal enterprise, altho probably less satisfyingly to themselves than to those whom they encourage. A vision and a melody in their loveliness have captivated a poet's heart. As he sings, he knows that he is not translating into rhythm all the tender meaning throbbing there. Altho inadequate to express the worth of his ideal, the incomplete expression itself will endow his thought with a richer intimation than he had guessed at first. He will be impelled once again to fix in carved imagery those fair, fleeting forms. At the last, he will not despair; for he believes that the unfinished song will thrill the hearts of many, who by imaginative sympathy will find more in the song than is explicitly present, who (thru reverent appreciation) will catch a glimpse of the singer's meaning.

5. Conceptual thought, meanings, and idealization

The transcendence of the actual, in idealization, is that insight which discovers, within the imperfect, intimations of the whole. Now this is much more significant and thoroughgoing a process than the mere dropping out of non-essentials or

imperfections, and the setting up by the fancy of an imaginary good. We have to do with the process of reflection in which the logical distinction is made between mere existences (factual data) and perceived meanings.

In contemplating a vital area of experience - let us say, a developing process - thought discovers significant lines which suggest values involving experience lying beyond present realization, recognizes a design which gives meaning to a whole thus held in imagination, and infers the being-to-be of goals for achievement and appreciation. The mind constructs ideal configurationsthru a process of inference. This process is, of course, unpicturable; but it can be conceived.

We must not distinguish too sharply between the perception of things and the inference of meanings. Because perception is apperception, it follows that mere things receive an enhancement in perceptual experience, and are invested with an inferential quality. Nevertheless we are aware of a real change when we pass from perceptual data to conceptual inference. (Compare M. T. McClure, "An Introduction to the Logic of Reflection.") Things have mere local and literal qualities. When their meanings get dislodged from the particular things meant, we have concepts. We are no longer in the realm of precise ingredients, but rather in the realm of "essences," inferred meanings, conceived values. Plato understood this; but he did not see that there is nothing in this that requires us to venture beyond the empirical idealizing process under observation.

"Meanings work loose from things meant, and operate

independently. They become weighted with representative reference; that is, they become concepts. A concept, therefore, is a standardized meaning. When meanings are entirely disentangled from things meant, they become concepts." (Op. cit., p. 171) Since thought deals in conceptual significations, since it makes use of signs for ampler, pre-figured meanings, and even for the drift of intention, an indefinitely wide and magnificent range of idealization is opened up. John Dewey observes: "As data are signs which indicate other existences, so meanings are signs which imply other meanings." (Dewey, "Essays in Experimental Logic," p. 52)

To quote McClure, we may employ the term "meaning" to stand "for the body of interpretative material, of explanatory conceptions, which are used in any cognitive experience." (Op. cit., p. 174) He points out that between Problem and Solution, various tentative mental processes intervene. These are instruments in knowing "when special care is taken to investigate the evidence which supports them." Some of these tentative activities are: Vague impression, conjecture, assumption, hypothesis, theory. (Op. cit., p. 176)

He quotes John Dewey, "An idea is a meaning that is tentatively entertained, formed, and used with reference to its fitness to decide a perplexing situation - a meaning used as a tool of judgment." "Ideas are not then genuine ideas unless they are tools in a reflective examination which tends to solve a problem." (Dewey, "How We Think," p. 108, 109) Dewey summarizes by saying that "conceptions, or standard meanings, are instruments (1) of identification, (2) of supplementation,

(3) of placing in a system.." (Dewey, op. cit., p. 126)

Reasoning is a more extensive elaboration of meanings. Reasoning as a more developed phase of reflection, interpenetrates with the simpler conception of meanings discussed above. As Woodworth states: "Reasoning might be described as mental exploration, and distinguished from motor exploration of the trial and error variety." (R. S. Woodworth, "Psychology," p. 462) Dewey asserts that, "Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal in imagination of various competing lines of action. . . . An act tried out is irrevocable, its consequences can not be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final nor fatal. It is retrievable." ("Human Nature and Conduct," p. 190)

Thus reasoning involves inductive thought, which is the imaginative flight making possible some daring hypothesis, the perception of explanatory pattern lines hidden in the data, and deductive thought, which is the taking account of stock, the backward look, the application of the hypothesis to known facts and to data newly collected. This normally results in the modification and amplification of the hypothesis. These two processes interpenetrate, each supplementing the other in the organic oneness of reflective thinking.

This is a fruitful field of logical inquiry, which has been investigated by many thinkers. We need only to suggest the main lines of the theory of thinking, indicating its relation to the life of idealization. This we have endeavored to do; we will carry the discussion a little farther. Santayana gives expression to the significance we have in mind:

"Thus if we use the word life in a eulogistic

sense to designate the happy maintenance against the world of some definite interest, we may say with Aristotle that life is reason in operation. The Life of Reason will then be a name for the part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals. . . . Thus the Life of Reason is another name for what, in the widest sense of the word, might be called Art. Operations become arts when their purpose is conscious and their method teachable. In perfect art the whole idea is creative and exists only to be embodied, while every part of the product is rational and gives delightful expression to the idea." (George Santayana, "The Life of Reason," p. 3)

And John Dewey has said: "Every ideal is preceded by an actuality; but the ideal is more than a repetition in inner image of the actual. It projects in securer and wider and fuller form some good which has been previously experienced in a precarious, accidental way." (Human Nature and Conduct, p. 22)

It is important for our purpose to stress the superiority of the abstract image as an element of technique in thinking. We may first quote a definition of meaning given by Irving Elgar Miller: "Meaning is the mental anticipation of the outcome, or result, or reactions not yet made, but which might be made, in response to data immediately given to sense or to images arising in the mind." He asserts that meaning and symbol are strictly correlative. ("The Psychology of Thinking," p. 155)

The abstract idea bearing meaning is not mechanically formed like a composite photograph. The organism is so biased by interest that the resulting meaning is largely predetermined by this partiality. Meaning therefore is to be understood as a functional phase of consciousness. With this general conception of meaning in mind, we may quote Miller in regard to the

superiority of the abstract image in thinking. These are the qualities of excellence: (a) Less irrelevancy of suggestion, (b) Greater rapidity of movement, (c) Superiority in making logical connections, (d) Increase of power. (Miller, op. cit., p. 160-162)

The mind by making use of concepts can move swiftly from meaning to further implied meaning. It can "skim" along, thus moving to outlying implications and suggested possibilities, ranging far beyond the ~~range~~^{field} of perceived or fully validated values, opening up new realms of half-guessed and fascinating mystery. This suggests again the facility and power of ideals, with their constant accession of novel import. - We may note that modern methods of training children to read develops a skill which should expedite this idealizing process, freeing them from sense anchorage, and preparing them for the adventurous flights of imaginative appreciation.

I have tried to present the process of hypothesis-making, during which - thru long contemplation of a given situation - the significant lines of a pattern gradually emerge. This emergence of a design makes it possible for the mind to adjust itself to future possibilities, larger meanings, and thus in an imperfect experience to gain intimations of a more nearly perfect.

Why then are these ideal constructions not defined merely as ideas, as phases of actual experience? It is because, altho parts of actual (that is, present) experience, the word "idea" does not include the implications thereof. Ideals refer beyond themselves; in a sense, progress is toward them.

They are goals of striving. They remain perceived possibilities involving richer fruition. They are fore-gleams on the upward pathway of attainment.

It is denied that the ideal transcends (exceeds) our total experience; but it is asserted that the ideal does possess a transcendent (surpassing) quality, that is, it contains a meaning which is elevated above present realization. Actuality consists, in the first place, of degenerative processes and of merely factual items devoid of evolutionary value; and in the second place, of assimilated and tabulated circumstances. These would yield multiplication, but no genuine development. However, these occurrences are seen to be minute threads and partial tints in the pattern of the whole, conceived in imaginative thought; and thus the facts are assigned to their fitting place.

We have seen that the ideal is not a luxury or far-off prize, but is the immanent principle, implicit in intellectual development, making possible and revealing the inner meaning of that growth. We have noted the transcendent nature of the ideal, guiding in progress because it is exalted above all achieved success. Nevertheless, our conception of the idealizing process is too broad; it requires further explicit limitation. We may proceed on the basis of our study of conceptual thought and meanings.

We have traced the early stages in the process of idealization; these processes form the matrix in which the ideal is conceived. The ideal is not brought to the birth until it is recognized and consciously adopted. In early

process there is a restlessness, a dissatisfaction, a desire, a reaching-out for something. The "something" remains unknown or misjudged until, in conceptual thinking, its ideal aspects are disengaged from their sensational and affective contacts; the clarification continues while the ideal emerges in resplendent meaning.

The process thus simply sketched is ~~in~~reality much more complicated, and is subject to many vicissitudes and reverses. The principle of growth, long unacknowledged, has been present in the strife, resolving its conflicts, guiding the struggle. Only gradually does the process become conscious of the dramatic situations involved, and aware of the epic movement. By degrees the process comes to be intentional, directed. At last its inner worth is recognized, and in this conscious prevision of the unattained beyond, the ideal comes into its own, achieves its being.

There is a perpetual interaction between our certified knowledges (with the success which they make possible) and our ideals. Progress involves both terms which have their being in reciprocal influence. Achievement is made possible thru the ideal principle, and in the moment of victory the ideal is projected beyond present realization. In its very projection, it organizes and further interprets attainment, and suggests an even finer fulfillment.

In its nature the ideal is intangible. It is forever elusive in its onward flight. The ideal is transcendent meaning and surpassing loveliness. We may possess it only in imagination, only in startled perception of suggested meanings, only in

loyal surrender to its guidance. A retreating beauty leads us on.

C. Types of Ideals, and Their Implications for the Religious Consciousness

1. Introductory statement

Ideals are of three main types: the cognitive, the emotional, the volitional. These are not mutually exclusive. Every ideal involves apperception, affective tone and sentiment, and active attitude and response. However, depending on the proportionate emphasis, there are clearly marked realms of idealization:

- (a) Ideals of practical understanding, and of systematic, logical reflection (elementary: the practical arts; derivative: science, ^{epistemology and} metaphysics, theology).
- (b) Ideals of imaginative appreciation (elementary: friendship, love of nature, literature, art; derivative: esthetics, philosophy of beauty).
- (c) Ideals of social adjustment and happiness (elementary: the moral life, self-realization; derivative: ethics, ethical philosophy, philosophy of history and of civilization).

Religious idealism is the synthesis of all idealizing processes in the imaginative and reflective attempt to achieve the highest harmony and supreme ideal unity in experience.

Because religious idealism is composite in structure, it is a complex experience; because it is unified in the attitude of reverent appreciation, it is characterized by a beautiful simplicity.

We shall undertake a study of the specific nature of

these three types of ideals, with their implications for the validity of the religious consciousness. I shall permit the exposition of the thesis to be its principal justification. No rigorous demonstration is possible. My principal interest lies in the functional study of ideals. I shall develop the thesis also by a certain amount of refutation, but chiefly with the object of clarification and illustration. I have no intention of attempting to refute elaborately or conclusively any opposing theory. One's conclusion will depend upon one's temperament and general point of view. Hence the total impress of a theory of idealization is its only significant recommendation. If at times my statements or claims appear dogmatic, the impression may be softened by bearing in mind that I am not attempting to establish a thesis, or prove a theory, except in the (perhaps modest) sense of suggesting one consistent, and (to me) the most reasonable, interpretation.

If our analysis of the idealizing process is correct, it would seem to follow that ideals are to be understood in empirical terms. Only in human experience do we find idealization. We have said that the ideal is a construction in reflective thought and imagination of a phase of experience whose meanings are appreciated, altho not fully realized. These meanings are more adequately determined as they work themselves out in experience.

It may be asked, how far out into the realm of cosmic reality, in the strength of logical requirements, does the significance of ideals extend? The functioning of ideals lies at the heart of the religious consciousness, for this is

essentially a valuation experience. Our philosophy of ideals validates the religious attitude, if this is conceived in the spirit of simplicity and humility. If ideals are extra-experiential (holding suggestions reaching beyond fully understood and tested values), not super-experiential (transcending human experience), it follows that they can furnish no definite or certain information concerning the ultimate structure of reality. Of course, ideals are a part of the structure. It may be that they are the most significant and determinative part. There are impressive arguments against this theory. If it is held, it can be no more than a tentative postulate.

Perhaps a minimum of cosmic hope is a requisite for religious idealism. However, men can live successfully and happily on a very little hope. The major portion of the religious consciousness, when it rightly understands itself, has to do with the ascertainable values of ideals in an enlarging experience, imaginative and social in character. Because ideals are functions of psychic evolution, they minister to the religious sentiment, whose appreciations and loyalties are quickened by awe in the presence of life's ultimate mystery.

It is necessary to distinguish between this valid religious attitude, in which ideals naturally and inevitably eventuate, and the many invalid types of religious belief and experience, which seek to establish themselves by insufficient argument and adventitious pleas.

When the metaphysical question is raised, the transcendentalist forsakes the values as known for a super-experiential

reality, or at least claims to see in these values a necessary reference to some wider entity than is immediately concerned in the experience itself. The empiricist on the other hand insists on the autonomy of the ideal, maintaining that the values are factors in a developing experience, and must be understood within the pragmatic series where they are evolved and where they are seen to function.

It is clear that many thinkers would not admit that this hypothesis will take account of their own religious experience. Altho this formulation does not satisfy transcendental conceptions of value, it may be held as a personal interpretation of the situation that these conceptions are misunderstandings of real values, or unjustifiable extensions of their significance.

It is inevitably a personal matter. Every one, presumably, will make that interpretation which makes one's most precious values most real to one's self. This may seem to be a trite expression. Nevertheless, altho the principle operates, it is frequently not recognized. In point of fact, many appear to take for granted that the desired and legitimate object is to formulate a theory which will make the highest values central in the universe of things and forces, or permanent in the order of time. It is here claimed that the ultimate appeal must be made to the feeling of naturalness, the conviction of reality. It is readily conceivable then that a philosophy of values which assigns them to a precarious status in the world of facts might be more satisfactory in that it presents a view of the ideal life which is believed to fit in naturally with those

facts.

Critical study of the ideal shows that the values denoted by the term are individual-social estimates. They result from the activities in the group, and get their quality and meaning from the nature of the social life. Thus the life of value has a double polarity: one pole being the individual appreciation, and the other the standards of the group. To vary the figure, we might say that the orbit of the ideal is an ellipse: its magic pathway can not be calculated without reference to the focus of the "socius" and to the focus of the "alter." James Mark Baldwin (in "Social and Ethical Interpretations"), Edward Scribner Ames (in "The Psychology of Religious Experience") and Irving King (in "The Development of Religion") have given us admirable accounts of these values. I would put more emphasis on the individual within the group for the higher development of the ideal, than do Ames and King. I would stress not only the significance of small groups, but also the unique and ineluctable claims of solitude upon the creative moment of idealization.

The ideal arises in experience, and must be explained in terms of its functioning. To extend its reference to a super-empirical realm is anomalous. The wider universe is explained, for example, by astronomy. Who would think of explaining the structure of the star by the use of psychology's definitions and descriptive adjectives? The positing of an eternal Consciousness back of, or within, all existences is a metaphysical psychologism.

To one accustomed to the empirical point-of-view,

this sort of speculation seems altogether unreal. The interpretative method of philosophy, like the descriptive method of science, should be faithful to empirical requirements. After all, the transcendentalist's insistence is at least largely due to a ~~less~~^{false} estimate of the idealizing process. In spite of his professed loyalty to "the values of life," they are deemed insufficient; and the attempt is made to transcend the sphere of experience. He assumes that a strange thirst is developed in the weary course of evolution; the fountain of living water must be sought in another realm, and imported as a sheer influx of a different energy. He insists that the real values of experience depend upon Something Else.

To the empiricist, these words form phantom images. But the super-empiricist is certain that the empiricist's thought is poverty-stricken and pitiable. "They (the naturalistic philosophers) artfully extract more out of life than it really contains, and the result is a life all froth and shimmer, lacking inward sincerity, a life which in itself can never satisfy them, but can only keep up the appearance of doing so." (Rudolph Eucken, "The Meaning and Value of Life," p. 67) Hugo Münsterberg, in "Philosophie der Werte," holds the same view.

Nevertheless, the empiricist believes that in the idealizing process he discovers life's genuine values. He refers very definitely to the values found in an improving social state, where the feeling of reverent devotion purifies every relationship. If he accepts Richard Le Gallienne's

definition of religion (in "The Religion of a Literary Man," p. 5), "Religion is the sense of the all-pervading sanctity of life," he will mean that it is the dream of an ideal social experience, where life in all its forms is sane and strong and beautiful, with its cosmic outlook of thrilling mystery. From this point of view, the apparently somewhat detached quality of reverence characterizes the general disposition toward reality when no concrete social valuation is stressed. It is the mood of expansive appreciation, of imaginative enthusiasm. It may take the form of esthetic rapture, or indulgence in cosmic expectation, or saintly contemplation and absorption in dreams of human welfare. This is the genesis of reverence, altho with the swift enlargement of the emotions it may readily assume the proportions of worship, mingled feeling of exaltation and attitude of submission, toward the Universe, personified in imagination.

2. Nature and implications of ideals of reflection

We are now concerned with the self-conscious effort of thought to achieve rational syntheses. We may observe that the marvelous advance of science has been rendered possible thru the agency of ideal constructions. Scientific investigation postulates certain principles which are called laws of nature. These "laws" are not written in a book of nature. They are recurrent tracings given generalized (preferably mathematical) formulation; they are pattern lines perceived by the mind, being based upon - and projected beyond - observation for the purpose of ordering experience, and of making possible further discovery and more effective mastery.

Since ideals of reflection are discrete aspects of our experience, concrete instances may be noted. However, since ideals are conceptual configurations (as has been shown), the analytic and synthetic treatment of the idealizing process must in the nature of the case be chiefly abstract. It is possible to list specific instances, for ideals are actual happenings. Nevertheless, if our theory of idealization is correct, ideals themselves are always abstractions; hence their interpretation must take a similar form. Ideals have their rootage in perceptual experience and in specific emotions; they maintain valid connections with facts; but in their own nature they are conceptual projections. Hence, when explanation is attempted, the terminology, as well as the point-of-view, unavoidably become abstract. (It should be clear that, in this dissertation, the use of "empirical" and of "empirical method" has always included the literal fact, and the practical significance, of concepts, theories, principles, and other generalizations and abstractions.)

In section "B" - Psychology of the Idealizing Process (beginning on page 59, above) - we have given an extended scientific ("empirical" - as defined) analysis of the psychological process of idealization.

Ideals of reflection are scientific or philosophic. The history of science, and the contemporary world of scientific investigation, are replete with instances; for all scientific thinking involves ideal formulations and postulates.

In the seventeenth century Isaac Newton achieved a great mathematical synthesis, illustrating beautifully the ideal process. "Newton stands at the end of that row of scientific

geniuses who effected the Copernican and the Cartesian revolutions: he finally drew up in complete mathematical form the mechanical view of nature, that first great physical synthesis on which succeeding science has rested, and which has endured unchanged until a present-day revolution bids fair to modify it. . . . The 'Age of Enlightenment and Reason' laid the foundations for our present-day beliefs in every field, and it led on naturally to the two great ideas which the nineteenth century has added to the achievements of its predecessor, evolution and relativity." (J. H. Randall, "The Making of the Modern Mind, p. 254)

Wrote Newton: "We are certainly not to relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and vain fictions of our own; nor are we to recede from the analogy of Nature, which uses to be simple, and always consonant with itself. . . . We must, in consequence of this rule, universally allow that all bodies whatsoever are endowed with a principle of mutual gravitation." (Isaac Newton, "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Book III.) "From Kepler's rule I deduced that the forces which keep the planets in their orb must be reciprocally as the squares of their distances from their centers; and thereby compared the force requisite to keep the moon in her orb with the force of gravity at the surface of the earth, and found them to answer pretty nearly." (Quoted in F. S. Marvin, "Living Past," p. 179)

Locke's ideals of liberty and progress furnish another most significant example in the long history of thought. "Locke stands as apologist and heir of the great seventeenth-century struggles for constitutional liberties and rights and toleration."

(Randall, op. cit., p. 254) In connection with the expository reference to Locke on pages 10-11, above, the revolutionary nature of Locke's psychological and social ideals is evident. "Both Locke and Newton stand at the threshold of a new era, Newton as the prophet of the science of nature, and Locke as the prophet of the science of human nature. From their inspiration flow the achievements of the Age of the Enlightenment; in their light men went on to transform their beliefs and their society into what we know today." (Op. cit.)

In 1859 Darwin published his "Origin of Species." In the course of long observation, and taking a hint from Malthus's idea of the bitter struggle for existence, it occurred to Darwin that, since slight variations from the parent^A are continually taking place, "favorable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of a new species. Here then I had at last got a theory by which to work." (Charles Darwin, Autobiography, chapter I.) In due course was projected that generalization which we know as the theory of evolution, one of the most magnificent abstractions which the mind of man has ever conceived.

These are instances of scientific ideals of reflection. The psychological analysis of the process in detail has been presented in II. B, above.

As for philosophic ideals of reflection, specific instances are presented, examined and criticized in this section, in the pages which follow. (For example, see the discussion of the ideal of truth, pages 87-91, the consideration of the idealizations of Kant (p. 88-89), of Leighton (p. 94, 96f.), of Hocking (p. 95-96), and of Coe (p. 98). For an extended treatment of a specific symbolic ideal of religion, "God as Father," see pages 98-101.)

Our examination of the psychological and logical nature of the idealizing process has made it clear that in true induction the ideal-synthesis surpasses experience, and yet makes experience intelligible. In the nature of the case, the ideal-design is never absolutely verifiable; however, the hypothesis (altho subject to modification) may authenticate itself in experience with reasonable assurance.

Scientific hypotheses are provisional in nature, and are strictly subservient to facts. They do not contemplate an order of reality alien to, or different from, the experienced order. This order has an objective, as well as a subjective, aspect. It is the reasonable assumption of critical thought that there are certain facts and relations which, existing not dependent on our perception of them, are parts of the order of things. The empiricist is convinced that we can do little more than accept this situation, and proceed with the ambitious and exacting program of scientific description and explanation.

There is such a splendid panorama in the out-reaching prospect of Science, there is such a disinter^{est}edness in its attitude, there is such a universality in its principles, that it is natural that it will compel some sort of world-view in the mind of the faithful devotee. What will this world-view be? The devotee, impressed by thought's magnificence, may be persuaded to place confidence in rationalistic speculation.

It was this persuasion that found a too militant and self-confident expression in Hegel's conception of Logic

as the self-unfolding of Thought, of the concrete universal as the synthesis of opposites, of God as Logos, Geist in rhythmic process of self-alienation and self-deliverance, of the development in nature and in history of Freedom; and again in his dictum: "Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale."

Kant, in the "Critique of Pure Reason," found that the crude stuff of mental life is the manifold of sense. This is first run into the molds of Space and Time as the pure forms of the intuition. Then these representations are strained and ordered by the twelve categories which give us the twelve concepts of the understanding, in terms of which we get our experience. But beyond the categories are the three transcendental concepts of pure reason, to which the senses furnish no corresponding object. These are the ideas of the Soul, the World, and God.

They are not mere fancies, but are supplied of necessity by the very nature of reason, and refer to the whole of the understanding as the immanent principles of its use. They aim at the absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, attempting to carry the mere mere synthetical unity, which is realized in the categories, to the absolutely unconditioned. It is the function of these highest powers of mind to impart to experience a direction toward a certain unity, comprehending all acts in an absolute whole. Within the three ideas there is a progression to the third, the supreme idea, God. This is the concept of the "ens realissimum." It forms the foundation of the complete determination of all that exists, to which all thought of objects must be traced.

This may seem to present an architectural perfection of idealization. But the empiricist must call in question even the modest regulative function of the three Ideas. According to our thesis, this speculation not only goes far beyond the validation offered by available data, but presents an essentially unreal type of explanation.

It does serve to show that the natural course of reason is toward comprehension of the fullness of life, and philosophy is called upon to secure the widest possible integration of experience. The several sciences are limited to restricted areas of experience, and yet critical, systematic thought is continually raising problems which open out to the Great Universe with which reflective thought has to do. If there is a universality in the thought-ideal which urges to the transcendence of the limits of scientific method, philosophy may well stress the values of acquaintance, study the scope and nature of civilization, classify the sciences, labor on the out-lying problems of valuation, and persuade its earnest followers to bow humbly before the ultimate mystery of existence.

Many religious thinkers are in the habit of using the word "God" as a sort of incantation by which to exorcise the mystery. It should be evident that ^{such concept or doctrine} ~~It~~ is an experimental idea, subject to error. It ^{is a symbolic} ~~is only an~~ idea in consciousness, and must be critically examined. As a symbol it gathers up many valuations, and synthesizes them in one major concept. But it enjoys no peculiar felicity nor special privilege.

Our age is notably interested in the theory of knowledge in its bearing on the problem of the nature of

reality. What is knowledge, and what can we know? It is becoming increasingly clear that in experience we have a valid acquaintance with reality, with the actual being of the universe. At the same time it is rather evident that we can not photograph, define or fixate this substance of things. I might suggest that we are in functional contact with reality, but can not quite capture nor comprehend it.

It is not possible to look reality in the face. It is only as reality turns its face this way and that, that we may expect to catch a glimpse of its profile. Now this facial outline is interesting enough, and attractive enough; but it is not reality's whole and proper self. What is given is seen in a glance, in many glances; these tell much, but the much is suggestive rather than entire. The "face of the whole universe" is turned somewhat away from us, and is looking forward: the significance of its expression is due largely to what it sees, and what it sees is yet to be.

What is truth? That use of the term which identifies it with reality is to be deprecated. Knowing implies a real duality. Truth is our working knowledge, or tentative comprehension, of reality. Elementary psychology indicates that, even in the process of sensation, our perceptions are not strictly "representative" of the real world. The sentimentalism that talks grandly of Truth is decidedly futile, and somewhat fatuous. Our judgments are held to be true in so far as they render a coherent and usable account of our experiences in any particular exigency. But they do not enable us to pigeonhole

being, nor to tie up reality in packages.

Our glimpsing of reality is dependent on the psychological laws of attention and interest. We can gaze on the face of the universe only from some selective vantage point. Our view is largely determined by our angle of vision, our interest, our preparation. This angle puts the face of reality in profile; its features can be observed only in contour.

We should not quarrel with this situation. We are thrice happy if the universe is silhouetted for our private delectation. Our little truth is not reality, for its meaning and its mystery are elusive indeed. They escape our fond examination. But we may say that our small truth envisages the profile of reality. For the silhouette does not offer itself as the total view of the matter.

Moreover, this view that we enjoy is our own understanding (partial and yet practical) of an order of being unthinkably complex. This forward-looking countenance, this contour of creation, has all the significance that we can take into account. In fact it is infinitely meaningful (in promise). Looking upon it, we grow humble; and it may be that we shall become patient, and then increasingly confident in our modest (and yet perhaps amazing) insights.

If the nature of the ultimate reality is defined, the definition can be only hypothetical. It is to^{be} feared that it is unreal, and therefore futile, and therefore deceptive. A fair estimate of science would have to hold that, if science exalts the powers of mind, if offers no evidence and little

indication of an immortality. Altho science is concerned with the intimate workings of nature, it finds no trace of a Consciousness in the universe. Kant held that the arguments for and against the Soul, the World, and God, could be conducted with equal facility and formal conclusiveness by the Pure Reason.

Some thinkers would argue thus: In as much as the physical order is made known only in consciousness, is it not inevitable that it should be an expression of Consciousness? For consciousness is the highest form of being; it discloses the truest unity of being. For the quality of its oneness is unique and penetrating; its unity is unparalleled in that of which it has experience. It is a oneness within its various activities, of which we may say (transferring the words of Anaxagoras), in each there is something of all. Here then we have suggested the nature of absolute unity, which may assemble within its perfect meaning the lesser and inadequate meanings of all other things. They would hold that reflection demands as the necessary postulate of reason the ideal of being, the spiritual World Ground. (To the empiricist, this is vain speculation. Granting the uniqueness of human consciousness, we can only accept it as we find it.)

This is the rationalistic method of tracing the inner necessity of the way of reason toward its ideal. Borden Parker Bowne has given a cogent statement of the felt necessity, that is, cogent for the one who grants the fact and the validity of this felt necessity. The real crux of his argument is found in the alleged inevitableness of the conviction. In his

"Theory of Thought and Knowledge," he examines the categories (immanent norms by which the mind proceeds in defining and relating its objects), and holds that they are insufficient to explain thought and the reality known by thought, that we are sent toiling back along a line of infinite regress until thought is elevated to the conception of self-determining personality as the supreme principle in causation and being. The dialectic of thought necessitates the affirmation of purposive causality, that is, divine Intelligence.

Now if this argument does not produce in the mind of the critical student an inevitable conviction, then the statement becomes pointless (at least in the opinion of such a student). We may admit that this line of reasoning is really the dialectic of thought, and yet find it necessary to maintain that it is nothing but dialectic.

Bowne ^{viewed} ~~views~~ ~~the static, cross-section view of the~~ ~~mind as a finished entity;~~ ~~it is the intellectualistic view~~ ~~of mind.~~ ~~I would hold that thought can be adequately viewed~~ ~~only in evolutionary process, that thought is an instrument~~ ~~in a complicated biological and social adjustment.~~ ~~With his~~ ~~perfectionist view of the mind, Bowne argued that thought is~~ ~~in unstable equilibrium until it rises to theological specula-~~ ~~tion.~~ ~~With the evolutionary theory of mind, we would expect~~ ~~thought to be of limited range, and to have an essentially~~ ~~tentative character.~~ ~~Hence we would hold that thought fulfills~~ ~~its true destiny when it seeks to make its adjustments in~~ ~~empirical, albeit in idealistic, terms.~~ ~~When it violates~~ ~~empirical requirements, thought is in unstable equilibrium.~~

Surely it is not such a tragic fate to recognize an ultimate Mystery, and to wait, with awed mind, before the splendid spectacle of the universe. This means much to the poetic temperament. As we have seen, mind has been evolved in the long course of evolution as an instrument of practical, social and emotional adjustment. Every line of inquiry and appreciation leads to mystery. Humbly to recognize this Mystery is human blessedness. It must be accepted, unless we desire to indulge in pure speculation.

Acceptance of life is the appointed lot of us all who have been called to the task of living. "I accept the universe," was a favorite utterance of Margaret Fuller, doubtless spoken with some dignity. Some one repeated the remark to Thomas Carlyle; his sardonic comment was, "Gad, she'd better!"

To be sure, ideals of reverent appreciation have made their appearance in the given world order. These values have emerged in evolution. To many, this consideration justifies the spiritualistic hypothesis. If so, it remains tentative, and not necessarily logically valid.

J. A. Leighton maintains ("The Field of Philosophy," p. 370) that evolution is meaningless unless there be an enduring teleological order of meanings. A statement like this seems to me subtly disingenuous: as tho one would prove by insistence (that is, by grandly assuming to be obvious) that which is difficult to prove by logic. Leighton's assertion is far from being axiomatic, as he takes it to be. Our needs and desires are relatively enduring; they are sufficiently stable (quite apart from the presence or absence of cosmic

corollaries) to give evolution a genuine meaning. Any workable standard may be selected or pragmatically determined, by reference to which the evolutionary process may be evaluated. That evolution is not valid or valuable in an absolute-idealistic sense, if Absolute Idealism be denied, is too obvious to require assertion.

We may take note of a suggestive discussion of religion in W. E. Hocking's "The Meaning of God in Human Experience." He states (p. 1-26) that religion is in part symbolical of truths beyond-reason. But religion (he continues) is altogether relevant to conduct. Hence reason and beyond-reason would seem to be not independent functions, and all truth would enter into the one system of the world. Religion is concerned with present values and with the Other-world. Religion can be understood best in terms of fertility, rather than of utility. For it is the "mother of the arts," remaining the more fruitful for its fruitage. It has an inalienable quality, a perpetual supremacy. It ever retains the primitive sense of reality's integrity. Religion is communication with the Whole.

Commenting on this passage, it is noteworthy that the most miscellaneous benefits are assigned to religion, thus conceived in too generous and hopeful a fashion. For example, the author remarks that creativity comes from sensation warmed and wet by the sky of religion. This is a confusion of the psychological and the poetic points of view. It would be more satisfactory, starting with the concept of sensation, to stay with the psychological terminology of inventiveness. Again,

he refers to the cruder (primitive) mind that knows its own integrity. It would help toward a more adequate understanding of religion to say: "Back to the animistic mind that enjoys an undifferentiated culture." The exalted diction is out of place in an analytic undertaking. It appears to try to float a reasoned argument on the wave of an unsuspecting emotion.

His discussion (op. cit., p. 23-24) of freedom as a reasonableness which refers everything to a source of its own kind, and of Religion as the comprehensive irony of the world toward all Owns, is fascinating. However, one might search for a certain operative unity in life (a system of varied values) without involving (as an axiom) Religion, - with a capital "R". His advocacy of religion is rather too naive. It is an example of his proneness to arrive at a too early synopsis, before adequate analysis and synthesis. The method appears to result from a characteristic habit of mind of the author's.

J. A. Leighton, in "Man and the Cosmos," (p. 476-500) maintains that truth as a value is basic to all other values. It is the most comprehensive (reflective) harmony between conscious life and the cosmic order. The cosmic standing of all values depends on the conservation and increase of reflective life. The supreme principle of continuity would be an over-self. We can not know the general structure of the cosmos. But this hypothesis is based on the supposition that the realm of intelligent meanings can not be sundered from the total character of the real. Selves respond to the incitements afforded by the energizing life of the over-soul, and so become

partial incarnations of its spirit. The latter is universal and individual, for universal meanings are immediately known. The universal Self has intuitive knowledge of us. As the absolute center of values, he transcends in worth all finite selves.

Leighton's discussion of selves as partly things and partly persons is interesting. If, as things, we are enmeshed in the motion-system of the spatial-dynamic world, we may the better understand the shortcomings of our psychophysical life. However, one feels that the author stresses too far the physical eddying of the cosmical energies if, as he maintains, nature in its individual forms and in its totality is the self-manifestation of spirit. On the basis of his main thesis, he would scarcely have the right to sketch in this manner the impermanence of "pseudo-individuals."

Our alleged "immediate knowledge" of another self (op. cit., p. 492) should have a more critical examination. I am considering first the epistemological aspect of the problem. The implication is that the normal acquaintance with another person is a sort of magical insight or miraculous comprehension. To be sure, the process of inference is not deliberate. But it is as certainly an act of mediated perception. We have become very expert in this reading of personality signs, and features have come to be rich, suggestive tokens of character qualities. The "intuition" doubtless rests on instinctive tendencies (the social sympathies, for example), and perhaps reflects a racial aptitude in reading facial expressions. But a swift judgment is not "the immediacy of

psychical rapport."

Nevertheless, his discussion of the intercommunicative experience is very much worth while. In regard to the ontological implication, we must note that the ease with which the imagination (and memory) operate, in the recognition of persons, has induced the author to have recourse to mystic formulas. The specific point should be stated thus, explicitly: The intimacy of friendship is an immanence of meanings; it is a logical, not an ontological, immanence. The experience is possible because knowledge is the knowing of something not the knower. And friendship implies an expertness in the art of symbolism. Thru the activity of the imagination, a sign re instates a mental construct, with opulent values.

In private conversation with the writer, Professor G. A. Coe has maintained that the God-friend is an essential postulate to complete the fragmentary circle of experienced (human) friendship, thus making the latter intelligible. I did not believe that this reasoning was logical. Does not experienced friendship have an immediately ascertainable value? Is not the only known species of friendship incomplete and disappointing? Does the yearning for an ideally completed circle prove that the perfect circle exists?

Let us turn to the Christian religion, and seek to gain a sympathetic understanding of its objective, appealing symbolism. How shall we interpret the wide-spread use of Jesus' conception of God as Father? The poet may express his vision of the ideal in its elusive onward flight in some such way as this: Religion is the exhilarating sense of the open

horizon and the outgoing of the heart eager to lose itself in the great tide of Life flowing everywhere. But this is not the reality. It is daring imagery descriptive of that which is known only in the immediate experience of learning, of loving, of serving. (In literal language, religion is the projection of some sort of ideals, and the attempt to be loyal in their service.)

If this experience is worthwhile, the presumption is that its expression can be transferred to the common life of all, and that there it can be reinterpreted in terms of everyday living. In that case the translator will make use of the most exquisitely tender phrase, and will draw from the most meaningful of experiences, to impart his ideal conception to the imagination and the life of the listener. Now friendship and family affection are the richest and rarest and most subtly suggestive of all the elements of daily life. As is "ideal" a quickening symbol to the philosopher, as is wonder in the presence of mystery to the poet, as is Beauty to the artist, so are love of friends, consecration to noble service, worship of the hypostatized goodness of the world, in the form of concrete, personal imagery, to the common life.

In every set of terms, and in every one of the corresponding experiences intimated, we have disclosed the same generic type of reality, the essence of religion. It is the opposite of self-ness, of factual, insignificant existence. It is the life of self-surrender; it is the devoted life, the striving for the realization of fair ideals.

Hence, when the translation of the poetic symbolism

for the ideal is made, the legitimate terminology for the highest values will be that of friendship and the family relationships. The supreme conception of religious experience will be God, and God will be Father. This symbolism taken literally has no cogency; but it is helpful imagery. Neither is "the open Horizon," nor "the tide of Life," literally true as used by the poet. But the idealistic experience symbolized in the imagery is real, and is the same in essential nature in both cases. The language is not literally correct, but is adequately suggestive. When thought, aspiration and purpose move in the realm of everyday living, the ideal may be hypostatized as God the Father. This will serve a practical, social need, and will be satisfactory according to the language of symbolism.

Most men have not outgrown the more naive symbolism. It stands so directly and simply for an experience of profound and enduring meaning. This recognition should not deprecate the value of more mature and artistic (if somewhat sophisticated) religious symbolism. "Religion becomes as natural and vital in a democratic and scientific age as in a patriarchal, custom-ruled era. The same will-to-live, to lay hold upon life-giving powers, which in primitive groups fashions ceremonials, with their dramatic action, myth, magic and emotion, may operate also in modern life thru the sense of a far vaster social whole. Why should not the latter also produce pageants, festivals, poetry and music, uttering and elevating its ideal life in powerful forms of art?" (E. S. Ames, "The Psychology of Religious

Experience," p. 414) We have the beginnings of this form of artistic expression. However, neither the mental clarification nor the felt need is great enough to produce widely its beautiful ritual, its ~~thir~~ thrilling symbolism.

With this understanding of the value and limitations of symbolism, we may assert that, from the point of view of formulation and ^u guidance, thought in the development of ideals is primal. This is not to pre_judge our estimate of the idealizing process considered from other points of view, nor is it to be taken as positing the preeminence of thought except from this angle of approach. I shall discuss this problem in section 5.

I have been concerned with the enterprise of critical philosophy, not with uncritical religious belief. Nothing in this section is to be taken as gainsaying the right of the individual to construct his own doctrines of hope and belief, in the light of that which he may deem valid experience or authentic revelation.

3. Nature and implications of ideals of esthetic appreciation

Feeling, in general, is the peculiarly vitalizing quality in consciousness. We may say, for our purpose, that it is a mental state whose chief components are systemic sensations, merging with the hedonic, affective qualities of pleasantness and unpleasantness. This subjective experience modifies perception. Feeling-affection combines with cognitions to form the ampler emotions, which are modified by kinesthetic experiences and developed by volitional expression.

When emotions are connected with acquired modes of behavior, and are organized around an object, person or situation, we have sentiments. Of course ideation is important in this process, as we have seen in the section dealing with the psychology of ideals.

Our preferences are largely determined by temperamental tendencies, and by imitation and suggestion. In its higher forms, esthetic appreciation is an ideal development, in which the emotional type of experience holds the central place. This is the core of esthetic valuations, altho all forms and phases of the psychic life are involved. In the intuition of sentiment life is recognized as possessing its intimate and compelling vitality.

In expansive mood, thru social suggestion or philosophic contemplation, our emotions may center in the natural or human environment, largely and impressively conceived. Thereupon our sentiment will assume (in imagination) cosmic significance.

The nature lover may find this subtle yet compelling intimation in the mysterious murmurs of the forest brook, in the quickening caress of the spring zephyr. In the fair suggestiveness of the wild-flower's charm there is (to him) much more meant than is physically embodied: he feels the presence of an evasive Something which still escapes his troubled gaze. And in all the elusive loveliness of nature's manifold forms, the vanishing spirit of its beauty compels him to exclaim, with Faust, "Where shall I grasp thee, infinite nature, where!"

Let us consider more closely esthetic idealization as found in the experience of a lover of nature. Such a one will confess a relationship more intimate than that based on observation of growth and becoming, or the physical interweaving and interflow of energy, more intimate because characterized by the consciousness of oneness with nature.

The devotee may thus express his rapture: Freely accepting her generous invitation to comradeship, I no longer perceive, but only feel; I do not observe and know: I participate and enjoy. Joy is unpremeditated, and pleasure free from the calculation of results. In the bright, bracing, before-breakfast hour, how good it feels in the lungs; how the dew sparkles and the sun warms! Everything thrills and tingles. The chest expands, the eyes sparkle with the eyes of the morning, - I jump, I run, I laugh. The communion of sorrow is more deeply initiative than the play of lighter happiness. In her somber mood nature speaks to me in a more compelling intimacy. In the joyous hours of sunshine and flowers and singing birds, it is I and nature: I come to her, and welcome her, receiving her gladly. Yet I condescend; I choose to forget my more important interests for a time to become the consenting admirer, the amused, the delighted. In the storm - on a melancholy autumn afternoon - beneath a towering cliff - on a still, snowy hill-side - by the shore of the sea, there is a difference. Now nature is commanding or she is mysterious: she awes the spirit. She may soothe or quicken, but she will touch the reverence. It is now nature and I. A vast power surges about me; I am alone with it. And if so be that I am worthy, I may lose myself in it. I forget

self and am wafted with the breeze or drift far away with the cloud.

Here is an esthetic idealization which can be understood only sympathetically, and described only suggestively. It can be analyzed and explained by the methods of psychology, and in terms of its fundamental principles. In the light of our investigation in II. B, and at the beginning of this section, it is easy to see that we have here a series of hedonic experiences which have evolved into an enveloping sentiment. This has taken the form of an ideal abstraction in a way which we have elaborately analyzed above.

In Augustine's "Confessions," we find an excellent example of friendship idealization. Augustine was deeply affectionate; he lived in the lives of his friends. Giving so much, he received accordingly. It is remarkable to find how many fast friends he won, binding them to him with bands of steel. As Ruth testifies to the tender character of Naomi, so his friends testify to ^{the} devoted nature of Augustine.

Alypius was one of his intimate companions. Of him Augustine wrote: "He clave to me by a most strong tie." At the death of this friend Augustine "bore about a bleeding and shattered soul, impatient of being borne by me; yet where to repose it, I found not." Almost distracted with grief, he went to Carthage where he found solace and refreshment in new friends, with whom "the tongue, the eyes, and a thousand pleasing gestures were so much fuel to melt our souls together, and out of many to make but one." ("The Confessions," VI.26)

His heart was most beautiful in its filial devotion.

It is portrayed with consummate beauty of feeling and delicacy of touch in the story of his mother's last hours. "I closed her eyes; and there flowed withal a mighty sorrow into my heart, which was overflowing into tears." This is the sweetness of love, altho it is deprecated unless it issues in the love of God, the Creator of all. In this way his later friendships are lifted up and purified. In the time of his carnal associations, "these friends I loved for themselves only, and I felt that I was beloved of them again for myself only." (VI. 26) Later, his earthly comradeships ministered to his sense of God's intimate presence. Augustine loved his God with all the passion of his ardent nature. The glow of this warm devotion is reflected back over the whole story of his Confessions. In the one consuming love of his soul all desires have been purified, all passions purged. His very curiosity became a reverent wondering and holy questioning: "Say, Lord, to me, thy suppliant, say, All-pitying, to me, thy pitiable one -" (I. 9)

Here we have an ideal amplification of sentiment, analyzed in the sections just noted, and more particularly also in the passage on pages 98 to 101.

For our purpose it is desirable to return to the esthetic idealization found in nature-worship. "By what name they (lovers of nature) call the object of their contemplation is in itself a matter of little importance. Whether they say God, or prefer to say Nature, the important thing is that their minds be filled with the sense of a Power to all appearance infinite and eternal, a Power to which their own being is inseparably connected, in the knowledge of whose ways alone is safety and wellbeing, in the contemplation of which they find a beatific vision. . . I can not believe any religion to be healthy that does not start from Nature-worship." (J. R. Seeley, "Natural Religion," pt. I., p. 22, 24)

For Wordsworth, the absorbing passion was Nature and her deeply significant beauty. He liked to stay, as he tells us in "The Prelude,"

"Not with the mean and vulgar works of man,
But with high objects, with enduring things -
With life and nature."

In communion with these, and

"With an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things."

Plato gave us the classic account of our progress toward the heavenly vision, the supreme ideal of divine perfection. In the evading beauties of earth, he beheld intimations of beauty absolute, "the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality, and all the colors and vanities of human life." ("The Symposium," p. 343, Jowett's translation, National Library Company, New York)

In the allegory of the charioteer and his steeds we have a graphic description of the conflict between passion and true love. From the former no ideal will ever spring. But the true lover of the beautiful will be led along the upward way. Using the beauties of earth as stepping-stones, he will go from one to two ~~fari~~ fair forms, and from two on to all fair forms, and then he will pass on to fair notions, and then he will see the beauty of institutions and laws and sciences. Gazing upon the sea of beauty, at length he waxes strong, "and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere." This absolute soul of beauty neither grows nor decays. "Separate,

simple, and everlasting, without diminution and without increase, or any change, it is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things." (Op. cit., p. 341-342)

In meditating upon nature, the lines of observation radiate vastly. The enveloping loveliness can not be grasped. Ideas vaguely wonderful throng the mind. The result is a strangely moving elation, alternating perhaps with submissiveness and awe before the splendid spectacle. Inexplicable systemic tremors add their thrill. Deep-lying instinctive tendencies are stirred; there appear powerful and ~~un~~ unanalyzed emotional states, perhaps the echoes of racial fears and amazements, the rhythms of ancient prostrations and weird exaltations.

Thru the influence of meditation and the restraint of poetic artistry, this cosmic ecstasy may assume milder forms. In form intense or mild, do we have in this esthetic rapture any genuine cosmic implication? In the warmth and persuasive beauty of the esthetic experience, many thinkers have held that we have evidence to substantiate the super-empirical hypothesis.

According to our analysis, the claims of the esthetic experience must be passed upon strictly and solely by the reason. According to our claim, there are only two possible sources of knowledge: experience and legitimate inferences from experience. Logically, we have to do in esthetic rapture only with sentiments, wholly subjective as far as their valuational aspect is concerned. (Of course

they have perceptual contacts with the objective order. It is the most flimsy logic which holds that this fact makes "values" - which exist only as a convenient figure of speech - "objective." See page 51 of this dissertation: "Faulty analysis" and "Faulty logic.")

We conclude that the situation discussed in previous sections remains essentially unaltered. No new evidence has been produced. Ideals of esthetic appreciation open no secret passage-way by which we may pass to the contemplation of the Ultimate. There are sufficient and delightful ranges of realization for ideals of esthetic appreciation in empirical realms. Since ideals are by nature extra-experiential (as defined), they may at least enjoy rapt cosmic contemplation, claiming no dianoetic or discursive quality.

H. M. Kallen, in a chapter entitled "Value and Existence" (in "Creative Intelligence" - John Dewey, editor - page 409), maintains that the world was not truly made for us. If it had been, there would be no problem of evil. Thinking came in response to discomfort, to problems. Civilization itself has brought new problems. Nature and human nature are not completely compatible.

I would admit the truth of this contention, but would question the necessity for the pessimistic tone. What does it matter if the world was "not truly made for us" (not perfectly and safely finished for us), if we are truly made by (or in) the world as it is, or if we are able largely to make our environment and our social world? We and the order of things are essentially "of a piece." Why should not

thinking evolve in praiseworthy fashion in connection with adjustments? Why are the conclusion that the world "is open to improvement," and the corollaries that civilization is "made by man," and that "the world does not stay made," so damning? The Problem of Evil in a value-creating world is bad; but it is natural, and is not necessarily permanently tragic.

Justly he states that value has its seat in human nature; and existence has its seat in nature, of which human nature is a part. Hence value is a content of nature, is a specific kind of natural existence. Value exists in nature in that nature and human nature in some respect are harmonious. This would appear to stabilize values. But he adds that value is irrational; it is determined by our instincts, appetites and feelings. And everything else becomes valuable or rational (!) by reference to them.

We admit, and assert, that value always has an instinctive rootage, and that emotion (the conscious side of instinct) is the core not only of esthetic, but (in an important sense) of all other, valuation. But it does not follow "that value is, in origin and character, completely irrational." (Op. cit., p. 413)

Further, value is not even essentially non-rational, just because it has an instinctive-emotional basis. For emotion is central in valuation only from the point-of-view of vitality-feeling. The idealizing process is not non-rational, because intellection is an essential factor. Intelligence must cognize the environment, thought must

interpret experience. Reason directs the attention, sublimates the emotions, and hence controls the instinctive-emotional life. Only thus is valuation made possible. It is an absurd and serious fallacy to conclude from the emotional nature of idealization that value is irrational, or even non-rational. Feeling-affection and intelligence have their separate offices and inalienable rights. Consider that without reason (cognition, comparison, understanding, imagination, conceptual thinking, intelligent appreciation), no valuation could issue from instinctive cravings, appetite or somatic feeding. (This sort of fallacy should make clear the importance of our empirical inquiry into the nature of the idealizing process. It is largely ignored. In my judgment, it should be one of the basic investigations of contemporary philosophy.)

Nevertheless, with the main current of discussion in Dewey's "Creative Intelligence," I am in entire sympathy.

I shall give a condensed statement of ^{Kallen's} ~~his~~ thought (p. 414-436):

Every individual is a different center of valuations, with its separate interests and peculiar emotions. This orienting is the establishment of our worlds of appreciation, the creation of our orders of value. And values fuse, and constitute the more complex and massive feelings. (I would say, emotions and sentiments.) A mind is an affair of saving and rejecting, of creating its systems of objects for desire and for use; mind is in constant process of change. Diversity and conflict are perhaps even more fundamental than cooperation and unity of interests.

Note the suppressions of the "new psychology," and the compensatory dreams of art, religion and philosophy. Note particularly the lyrical ultimate standards of philosophic thought: the unity of the world (conceived because such a world is easier to live in), spirituality (in which things are identified with the values of things), and eternity (the negation of change, and consequently the negation of the slaughter of values). Specifications of the last are immortality and freedom. They are value-forms, not existences. However, substitution of one for the other is frequently made.

Ideals of esthetic appreciation are embodied in art, and may be clarified and interpreted in art criticism. I would suggest this definition of art: Art is the spontaneous and yet disciplined expression of an ideal experience in a charming and unified sensuous medium, for the purpose of rendering the insight and valuation illuminating, possessive, communicable and permanent. (I have followed, in part, the definition of art in DeWitt H. Parker's "The Principles of Aesthetics," chapter II.)

It is the tentative (because incomplete and experimental) and pragmatic (because dependent upon the vagaries of taste and the shifting currents of appreciation) embodiment of the beautiful, or the interesting and meaningful, in human experience. I shall refer to Parker's analysis of the esthetic experience in the work just mentioned, (chapter IV. for the elements, and chapter V. for the structure, of the experience).

Bearing in mind our study of idealization (noting Dewey's characterization of its diversity and conflict), it is evident (to the empiricist) that Plato's conception of Beauty Absolute is utterly unreal and unjustified. We know nothing of "beauty separate, simple, and everlasting," existing without change. This is a pure figment of the fancy. It ignores completely the real process in which beauty is engendered and comprehended. The vision of the mystic nature lover may include many fine and valid appreciations; but his cosmic dreamings (if taken literally, and not as a form of imaginative play) issue in obscuration. They do not connect

with reality; they do not result in broad, sane understanding of genuine valuation. Altho usually comparatively harmless, because innocent and monastic, they are apt to create false perspectives, and to fail to integrate with the wider demands of reflective and moral idealization. With the more critical and the robuster types of people, this naive sentimentality serves to discredit the value of esthetic appreciation, and to interfere seriously with the fulfillment of art's true and priceless function in civilization.

Art is the liberalizing element in our culture.

Thought should emancipate; morality should move toward world cooperation. Nevertheless, art has a unique contribution in making the spirituality of the age cosmopolitan. It is the function of art to give sympathetic representation of every interesting and significant phase of life. To its hospitable gaze, nothing is common unless unclean. Its effort is, "not only to reveal an object to us, but to unite us with it." (Parker, op. cit., p. 100)

Divorced from the spirit and power of artistic appreciation, the thought of the age will become stereotyped, infertile; its morality will grow suspicious, puritanic. This is a hard saying, for the traditionally moral. For conventional morality is repressive; it is tyrannically dictatorial. The spirit of art is fundamentally un-moral (in this sense of the moral); "for art itself is a freely creative and happy activity. . . . Thru art we are compelled to sympathize with the aspiration toward growth, toward happiness, even when it leads to rebellion against our own standards and toward what

we call sin." (Op. cit., p. 333, 334)

The spirit of art is in essential harmony with rational morality, which identifies the good with wholesome living, not with the merely traditional. Art and morality should supplement one another: art may make morality generous and tolerant; morality may serve to keep art from degenerating into the trivial, precious or merely sensuous, and provide it with significant purpose and deeper understanding. Thus the interests of art and morality may be largely adjusted, to the mutual advantage of each.

Nevertheless, their aims differ, and (in a world of many conflicts) the ideals of art are bound, at times, to conflict with the ideals of morality. The aim of art is to give free and sympathetic representation of the beautiful, the characteristic, the sublime, the tragic, the comic, and of the minor types of esthetic experience. Morality is necessarily restrictive and disciplinary; when art threatens ethical values, morality is certain to attempt the use of some form of censorship. L. W. Flaccus reminds us that socially destructive art may be good art, that to make one's self imaginatively at home within the immoral is not necessarily immoral (it may be splendidly ethical), and urges that we all should be "broadminded enough to allow a full, assertive life to all large human interests." (L. W. Flaccus, "The Spirit and Substance of Art," p. 402. The entire chapter, "The Relation of Art to Life," is important.) We do not need to deny the right of morality to defend its values against attack, if we hold that art has a similar inherent right. "Every form of

life has an inalienable right to expression. . . . Without knowledge we run the risk of becoming ruthless destroyers of things which an intelligent sympathy might well preserve." "Mere purity of mind is not equal in value to that insight into the whole of life which a freely creative art provides." "To express life implies a certain mastery over it, a power of detachment and reflection, which are fundamentally ethical and may lead to a new way of living." (Parker, op. cit., p. 336, 337. Compare the entire chapter XIV., "The Function of Art: Art and Morality.") (Note the ironic title of a significant novel by Louis Bromfield, "A Good Woman.")

The elusive quality of all idealization appears quite clearly in esthetic appreciation. Recognition of this fact throws light on the general nature of idealization, and may help to explain the persistent universal-significance attached to valuation. There is a poignancy in appreciation, due to the evanescent character of the objects of its regard. It is due also to the comparative isolation of the experience: it is difficult to secure an adequate social sharing of those fleeting forms of beauty.

Because of the tender wistfulness, the unsatisfied longing to possess and to share, because of the evasive loveliness of the esthetic experience, the imagination is continually driven to contemplate vast and misty horizons of magic meaning. If this is a daring play of the imagination, the cosmic reference will add a panoramic sweep and imaginative range to thought. A perspective of limitless distance is an aid to humility of attitude, and adds a note of solemnity. Even if taken literally,

the glamor of unearthly beauty may be wholesome. For it may serve as a much needed corrective to our common absorption in the materiality of the too obvious.

Nevertheless, as indicated above, a sentimental corrective becomes a precarious expedient. Thru courtesy it might be tolerated; but it remains a dubious makeshift. The mature mind knows that the enlightened imagination of necessity inhabits an empirical realm. Poetic thought requires spatial freedom, but is not deceived by expansive imagery. "When Rodin contends that every great artist is religious he is merely referring to what the Germans call 'Weltgeföhle', cosmic emotions and imaginings, thru which a work of art is given reach, intensity, and volume for the imagination. His own world image, in terms of cosmic stress and urgency, reflects nothing but the condition on which he can satisfy his sculptural genius; it has no other meaning for him but that." (Flaccus, op. cit., p. 400, 401)

Thus esthetic appreciation is rounded out and completed in the religious consciousness, as we have chosen to define the term. This serious contemplation is enough for him who is content to wait before the majestic Beauty, the silent Mystery, of the universe. For this meditation on life's enveloping mystery, no "faith" is required; yet from it come reenforcement of courage, consolation for disappointments, and peace.

The religious idealism of art is better than supernatural belief; for that is subject to disillusionment. The esthetic redemptive way is more sure: it neither attacks evil,

nor by faith denies its real or ultimate existence, but seeks to rebuild the beautiful world in the imagination. (Compare Parker, op. cit., p. 362) "Altho as an interpretation of life based upon faith religion is doubtless eternal, its specific forms are probably all fictitious; hence each particular religion is destined to pass from the sphere of faith to that of art. The Greek religion has long since gone there, and there also a large part of our own will some day go - what is lost for faith is retained for beauty." (Op. cit., p. 366. Note the entire chapter XV., Art and Religion.)

This vision of critical intelligence is preferable to the meticulous and futile attempt to trace the manifestations of a will to beauty in the universe. Many details in nature might suggest a formative purpose. But the attempt, Flaccus believes, will prove unsuccessful:

"Nature is on too vast a scale, and too intricate and disorderly in its ensemble to allow us to confront it as we might a painting or a piece of sculpture, in a discriminating and appreciative understanding of an artistic purpose unfalteringly worked out and complete. Such attempts usually end in either a vague, unsatisfying esthetic mysticism or a religion of cosmic beauty, in dire need of all the faith that any religion can summon and build on.

It is a significant fact that when art becomes cosmic in its motives and ideals - as it often does in tragedy - it gains less from envisaging the universe as a transparent and harmonious system than from responding to it as something huge, fragmentary, semi-articulate, and questionable - something that arouses the imagination and perplexes the mind of man." (L. W. Flaccus, "The Spirit and Substance of Art," p. 406, 407)

Is the question still asked, What is the utmost that can be said in regard to the outlying significance of the ideal? If the ideal is concerned with the increment of growth, of knowledge, of appreciation, in conscious life, how far into

the universe does its meaning extend? The only answer is, as far as it seems real to think it as extending. Is the ideal more significant for the universe at large than are facts as fleeting incidents? Is it possible that the ideal has a validity beyond those values apparently contained in the natural, evolutionary order? Does not the sheer occurrence of values in a world-system justify this assumption? Does not the ideal, simply as a given fact of experience, carry the gaze into illimitable depths? And while listening to the strains of exquisite music, do we not seem to catch the gleam of a strange and wonderful light moving across the uncertain waters of human life?

If so, the vision is purely the gift of hope. It is the bright glory of the poetic passion, the mystic mood unrestrained by the fetters of fact or consequence. Poetic fancy is a marginal experience, and forsakes the consideration of the whole. The genuine ideal justifies itself in the total experience. To be sure, the ideal point-of-view tends to universalize itself. While one is living in the realm of colorful appreciation, one is apt to see the whole of one's world, even the universe, in glowing light. In poetic mood, one may take this attitude, and enjoy the exhilaration it brings. But the marginal interest ^{prevents} the suffusion of color from having the cogency of a critical statement.

It is always possible to reject the critical viewpoint in favor of religious faith. Then one could allow the postulates of belief. This paper is restricted to the critical inquiry.

4. Nature and implications of ethical ideals

We live in an age of shifting lights. The spirit of eclecticism is rampant. Old lines of development have become confused and blurred. We are living in the present in a new sense. We are influenced by our contemporaries to an extent unprecedented in the history of thought. Lines of modification and control run crosswise: they are found to be the woof, as much as they are the warp, of history. It is an age of hospitality to new truth and novel ways. An alertness of attention, a readiness of adaptation, a suppleness of interest, are the marks of the modern man. It is an age of emancipation from old fears and old restraints, and of joyous contact with the actuality of things.

This is good. For the fundamental motive to right conduct should be the desire for a more abundant life for the individual, a more wholesome and effective cooperation in society; true happiness is related only to this desire and this realization. Recognizing this, men are coming to see that intense emotions - whether of remorse or of exultation - (if deliberately induced, or carelessly permitted) are bad. Sinning is understood to be selfish, unsocial behavior. Hence the consciousness of sin is due to abnormal or to incomplete development. In the one case it should be regarded as a disease, in the other as an immaturity, in the moral life. Rarely should it be dwelt upon, never aggravated. The aim should be to help the moral nature secure a normal, well-proportioned development, and to find free, creative expression.

The present epoch (at least in the wide extent of en-

lightened thought) is more sensitive to essential questions of right and wrong than any other period, (even if in many respects we come short of the vision which the leaders of the humanitarianism of the eighteenth century had). For the morality of yesterday was largely self-centered. The morality of today is individual, but also governmental and economic. It recognizes that citizenship is a responsibility and patriotism a religious quest, that we are bound to maintain sound national policies and a just world order. The new ethics (the ethics of the Old Testament prophets) is concerned with the social sins: disease, poverty, ignorance, crime.

A conventional ethics does not satisfy men. Virtues and vices are being subjected to a new classification. In regard to many matters, the individual is being allowed more and more to be the judge of his own actions. In regard to others (which touch the public welfare) he is being held to stricter account; for the social conscience has become an instrument of control to reckon with. According to the principle of relativity, actions are coming to be estimated in relation to their special connections and environment. On the other hand, the principles of purity and honor and mercy are being applied more generally and practically. Many tragic happenings mock the spirit of optimism; but we are speaking not of the modern age as a whole, but of the new enlightenment. Confronted by these serious, heroic virtues, we can easily understand that the long-prized ascetic qualities (centering in abstinence from the common human pleasures)

will count for nothing in an emancipated world. The moral consciousness will despise the easy tag of asceticism, designed to indicate that some men are different from the general human kind. The ethical individual does not desire to be set apart from the world. He wishes to make the world of human relations natural and wholesome and beautiful. In this devotion, the present age cooperates with the ethical idealism of every age. Franklin K. Lane was fond of referring to this problem as the human one of getting on together. "And this is no more than civilization's whole movement from the primal day."

This achievement is made not without danger and loss. Sound conventions help to safeguard the mature, and to induct the immature into an ordered, healthful group life. Because of the clamant lower impulses, the drive of selfish ambitions, morality must be to a great extent restrictive and disciplinary. These restraints should not be arbitrary, repressive, nor merely conventional. The true ethical life is ideal development.

In the unfolding of the moral consciousness, thought is clarified; life presents itself as an earnest experience; the demands of the ethical law are recognized, its wholesome imperative is felt. To this degree is evolved "the impartial spectator," to use Adam Smith's fine phrase. ("Theory of Moral Sentiments") The judgments of the group are not altogether sufficient, because conflicting; the approval of men is not quite adequate, because external. Efficient judgments and final approval the individual assigns to "the man within the

breast." In the creation of the unseen gallery, we observe that idealizing process, that imaginative projection, which makes possible the noblest moral achievement.

This is strictly empirical progress, provisional, experimental, uncompleted. In the evolutionary, natural order, this must be its inevitable character. However, with these receding and uncertain lights, with this fragmentary adventure, naive thought has never been satisfied. Unless ideals are viewed "sub specie aeternitatis," they appear as tantalizing and incomprehensible will-o'-the-wisps. To find security for conscience, validation for duty, the rationale of obligation and its categorical imperative, the warrant for ideals, man has persistently sought to transcend the empirical order to attain to the absolute and eternal, to rid himself of the limitations of the finite in order to ascend to the infinite. In less figurative language, he sees in moral ideals the necessary implication of their ultimate Ground. This Spirit becomes the Justifier of strife and of suffering, the Adjuster of tragic inequalities.

Neither fact nor legitimate inference support this simple faith. It is sheer speculation which is negated by the obvious indifference of nature and the casual aspect of things, and discredited (if not actually disproved) by the presence of sordidness and pointless suffering, and by the mechanism of the universe, by the prevalence of physical forces in human history. Every one is familiar with the curious rationalizations of the theologian. For one so minded, discussion is unavailing. It is enough to say that, to the

empiricist, the argument of the rationalist is pitifully evasive and fallacious in reasoning.

But we have the Great Universe as the limitless background of human life. We play out our little drama on a perilous stage, with enormous recesses, in a theater which thrills us by its mighty mystery. The critical ethical consciousness is not unmindful of these vast perspectives, nor of these suggestions of unmeasured possibilities of destiny. Altho the enveloping life of the universe remains an enigma, and the future an impenetrable veil, mystery and (possible) destiny lend dignity and ~~element~~ solemnity to the ethical life. The moral adventure becomes a quest.

The rationalist might be tempted to call it a forlorn hope. Perhaps it is. Yet sometimes the desperate valor of a forlorn hope has snatched victory from seeming defeat. The history of the phrase is interesting. It is an adaptation of the Dutch "verloren hoop," ("lost band"). Thru happy similarity of sound, and by reason of the "hope" that springs eternal in the human breast, the "lost band" has become transformed into a cause not quite lost, not altogether hopeless. It is easy for the rationalist to make fun of this, to him, pseudo-religion. But the empiricist does not feel responsible for life's situation. He can only reckon with the facts, and be honest with himself. He takes the attitude which appears to be wise and necessary. It seems the inevitable reckoning with the universe.

When ethical idealism becomes intense and inclusive, it assumes a religious character. Ethics and religion are not

wholly separable, altho easily ^{discriminated} ~~separable~~ in meaning and scope. (See diagram on page 56, above). Ethics has to do with social standards of conduct. When these ideals become sufficiently intense, and intelligently conceived, so as to involve something of our total attitude toward life, and imaginatively held so as to include an attitude toward the ultimate mystery of the world, with its unknown potentiality for life and destiny, then they interpenetrate with religious ideals.

This differs from the usual understanding of religion in that the empiricist does not really have "faith" in the Larger Life; he does not actually believe that it is an order of existence different from that which appears in scientific description. However, he realizes that it may be different; and he confesses willingly that he does not know what the natural order of science is, or may be, in its farther significance. This modestly hospitable attitude does not justify the expectation of a causation outside of the observed order.

W. G. Everett, in "Moral Values," has an exceedingly valuable study of the principles of conduct, centering in the concept of "value." In chapter XIII., "Morality and Religion," he maintains that morality has certain claims, prior to the claims of religion, largely because the speculations of religion are uncertain. He states, "As long as it be admitted that religion derives its essential character from man's interpretation of the whole of being, we can not refuse the name of religion to any life-moving experience that springs from this source." (P. 386) He adds that unswerving devotion to high ideals, even in a bad universe, would constitute a religious

attitude. (P. 386) He holds that ideals are "genuine realities organic to the whole of Being." (This would depend upon the meaning of "organic;" ideals certainly have connections, indirectly at least, with the world order.) He writes:

"The central insight which is vital for all religion and morality is that the laws of spiritual life which hold within the kingdom of human values are no less valid because they are not laws of the whole empire. With presumptuous egotism men have often declared that love and righteousness have no meaning or worth unless it can be shown that they are principles which govern the entire scheme of existence. But this they can never be shown to do.

"Rather is it clear that they have their *raison d'être* and their full justification as elements of value within our human experience. The same is true of all our other ideals. Their sufficient vindication lies in the fact that they enrich and ennoble man's life. Their validity is established in and thru our experience of them. Happily it does not fall because we are unable to show that they determine every part of the universe. That would indeed be a precarious position for the ideal." (Op. cit., p. 419, 420)

When ideals are intensely felt, the resulting consciousness may assume a mystical character. This is a highly emotional form of experience. Because of its personal and volitional nature, and on account of its ethical connections, I consider the important theme here. Much has been written concerning the psychology and philosophy of mysticism. I have given years of sympathetic study to the problems of mysticism, from the psychological and historical points of view. It will be necessary for the present purpose only to record my conclusions.

Consciousness normally has its subjective and its objective phases. The emotionalized values of the mystic state are (to the psychologist) plainly subjective. By the mystic, the images involved are given an objective reference,

in harmony with the law that any mental image vividly entertained tends to take on sensational qualities. An emotional experience (especially of a fanciful sort), intensely realized, has a strong tendency to be projected (in imagination) into the environment, as artlessly pictured.

It has been frequently argued that the prevalence of the mystic experience, and its strong reality-feeling, justify its postulates. It is admitted that the character of thought (with its urge to objectivity) is of such a nature as to call for the assumption of the reality of the external world. (Integrated perception, and volitional and social experience, confirm the postulate of objectivity.) It may be admitted that the wide-spread tendency to have and to enjoy the mystic consciousness - with its practical (wholesome) outcome - tend to establish (in so far) its genuine subjective worth. But it ^{does} ~~does~~ not follow that the two assertions will fuse into one thesis: that the habit of making an objective reference in thinking can legitimately be practiced in the case of the subjective (emotional and imaginative) mystic states. The common argument has no cogency whatsoever; the merging of the two judgments involves a subtle fallacy.

James H. Leuba gives a psychological explanation of "the Unreality of the Real" and "the Sense of Invisible Presence." (Article, "Invisible Presences," the Atlantic Monthly, January, 1927) He points out that the conviction of the reality of a person (recognition of a friend) does not depend merely on familiar perception, but on the awakening by these impressions of complex reactions, among which the

emotional factors play a conspicuous role. Knowing a person means "being able to anticipate his thoughts, feelings and actions; and that involves the production withⁱⁿ/us, by his presence, of certain feelings, emotions, thoughts, and volitions. It is the production of these effects which gives to the sight of a person the vivid, intimate meaning characteristic of a real presence." (Op. cit., p. 80) The measure of this anticipation is found in the infinite nuances of behavior corresponding to an infinite variety of impressions.

When this complex pattern of inner responses is absent, mere perception of the person is utterly unconvincing. (Leuba gives pathological instances). "On the contrary, whenever these inner responses exist, the impression of a real presence is produced, even in the absence of any sensation from the external world," providing (it might be added) that the imagination is active, the critical faculties dormant, or an effective suggestion is given. The fancied individuality of the invisible person will be determined, of course, by dominant preoccupation or concern, or by suggestion. We must remember also the powerful reenforcement of vague emotion, dread, fear or joy. Suggestions from the fringe region of consciousness may be very effective. Hallucinations may be involved.

It follows that the sense of the presence of God is no proof of his presence or existence. "The mystic is mistaken when he gives the sense of warm, personal intimacy he has experienced as proof of the reality of the Presence." (Op. cit.)

Nevertheless, genuine valuations may lead, or contribute, to this type of moving experience, which in turn may

enrich and empower the idealizing process. In spite of many extravagances, mysticism has been beautiful and worthy because it has been the nourisher of values, and often in the history of civilization has been the producer of pioneer thinking. (Mysticism has had a double tendency: to reenforce familiar symbols, and therefore orthodoxy and tyranny; and to break with the forms of sacerdotalism, and hence with the claims of ecclesiastical organization). At its best, mysticism has intensified loyalty to the more intangible worths of experience.

If this intensification and clarification of the appreciative mood be called knowledge, then mysticism may be said to add to our comprehension of the possibilities of human life. But there is no evidence that the mystic trance adds one iota of information concerning the structure of the universe. It opens no secret door.

Mysticism merely causes familiar values to glow with a brighter light, or to take on a vaster (imagined) significance, or discovers values in some hitherto unnoticed, or perhaps unsuspected, relations. These ideal estimates are necessarily the precipitates or developments of the more commonplace judgments of daily experience. Here we have a two-fold source of the novelty found in the mystic rapture. The meditation involved may create meanings, may make new interpretations.

It is not necessary to discuss mysticism and the "sub-conscious." It is enough to note the fact that many judgments, appraisals (especially of an emotional sort) are drawn from the marginal field of attention. Hence their genealogy is often unnoticed, and therefore their causation is attributed to

supernatural influences. Moreover, mood and emotion have physical (unconscious) determinants, often mysteriously perplexing, oppressive or elating. We shall return to this theme later, in our discussion of William James.

Mysticism, as poetic idealism, may have more than historical or biographical worth. It may be a legitimate phase of the modern appreciative, striving life (all too meager and hectic), and therefore a permanent aspect of religious experience. Under its quickening influence, duty may be transmuted into loyalty to a Cause, greatly and imaginatively conceived. Morality, which is a two-dimensional affair, is thereby afforded new vaultings, and therefore new horizons. Its idealism becomes three-dimensional.

Religion adds something to "mere morality." To be generous, free and daring, life can not be lived on the commonplace plane of factual humanness. It must be lived with the quickening consciousness of the surrounding Mystery, suggesting boundless possibilities of destiny. Every line of scientific and cooperative experience leads to the threshold of this mystery of being. Before this enveloping power, in its infinity (or indefinite extension) and in its ultimate (or unknown) significance, the member of society is endowed with a new sense of humility, and attains personal elevation.

He waits and wonders; he may bow his head in reverence; he may worship. He may go much farther, and confidently speculate concerning the nature of this ultimate Mystery. He may go farther, and dogmatize. However, the more certain he becomes, the less religious he is apt to be. There is an important

truth in a suggestion which Chesterton makes somewhere, that only the agnostic can be truly religious, in the tender and wistful sense of the word, with the passionate wonder of the poet-mystic.

In our social thinking we need this new humility and this new confidence. Perhaps they will appear only with the coming of a more comprehensive view of things. This will suggest the contribution of philosophy to social science. We are still rather woefully parochial in our outlook; in political thought, in ethical theory, in religious idealization. It may be that a genuinely cosmopolitan spirit is the chief need of the hour. Decidedly we have had enough of sentimental generalizations, futile doctrines, fanatic counsels and conventional expectations. We have had more than enough of childish optimism and of heroic pessimism. We are ready for the emancipation of the mind.

The world is waiting ~~now~~ for a more general recognition of the natural fact that we do not look full upon the face of life. If we could do so, the sight would mean nothing to us. To see everything at once would be equivalent to seeing nothing. We must be content with effective understandings and with demonstrable ideals.

Art is the fine and enduring Esperanto of the spirit's speech just because its eloquence springs from tangible figures, and soars with the flash of color and the lilt of song. The moralist has been in the habit of suspecting art; in part his fears have been justified. Our social theorizing must be more artistic, and our artistic creations more profoundly imbued with

the spirit and power of morality. We must study the principles of esthetics, and emulate the artist's skill in dealing with life's elusive values.

Our theory will probably grow less didactic, and more suggestive. By the creative artist, life is seen in silhouette. He deals not in literal absolutes, nor in super-experiential realities, altho his thought quivers with extra meanings. He is steeped in the appreciation, and cognizant of the activity, of his own time, and is aware of its dazed gropings. By reason of his superior sensitiveness and his expressive skill, he can tell men of things that they had dimly guessed. He is an utter patriot, and therefore a citizen of all centuries. The prophets of Israel have challenged the ethical mind of the ages because they were stalwart nationalists. The melodies of the world's supreme poets move in racial rhythms. The social thinker must have an empirical interest in movements and motives; he must have lifting horizons and a fine artistry.

Such a realization will prick many bubbles and check some bounding enthusiasms. It will destroy the cults of the hour, - no loss; for we are perishing for lack of clarity and poise and power. If we learn to look upon the entrancing profile of reality, we shall distrust a too buxom metaphysics which rejoices in the mathematics of matter. We can not believe that reality floats so blithely and so unconcernedly in and out of our ken. Reality is more organic and more awful than this.

We shall mistrust an airy confidence in Democracy. Who has looked upon its countenance? If this fair social

ideal is indeed reality in the making, scarcely more than its profile is now revealed to our anxious gaze. But we shall not fear. We shall the more clear-mindedly and courageously accept the challenge of these revealings. As we trust less to Democracy, we shall believe the more in democratic facts and principles. Altho we may not gaze into the eyes of Eternity, we may contemplate in a sort of ecstasy the profile of reality. This is the truth of ideals.

But we will not scorn any form of wholesome and pragmatic symbolism. We may say that the exalted customary religious mood is the sublimation of the experience of friendship. It is human affection carried out and exalted to a universal enthusiasm. It is the poetry of the home cadenced to more majestic rhythms till it becomes the poetry of the universe.

This is not the careful stepping of the mind from perplexity to amazement. It is the vast and splendid flicker of the imagination, like the lightning splendid and unshackled. Concrete, familiar imagery may still be used, even tho now the purpose is not the indication of a particular value, but rather a suggestion of the largest worthfulness of life. Bearing in mind the uncritical, practical attitude, the representation of this worthfulness as God the Father (with the related symbols) may be more nearly adequate than any other language would be. But by very reason of its function in naive devotion and in practical activity, it becomes selective and partial in outlook, and hence foregoes the point-of-view, and with it the prerogatives, of critical philosophy.

Genuine religion is the projection of ideals and their progressive realization in the realms of thought, appreciation and social achievement. (Some of the fields of religious idealism are: Science in the service of the community life, Friendship with its love and loyalty, Art, Music and Literature in their more universal aspects, Love of nature as consolation and inspiration, Meditation on high and practical themes, Service as a passion, Education where enthusiastic guidance is given to the awakening mind and heart, Adventure for freedom's sake, the Kingdom of peace and good-will.) The philosophical interpretation of these values ^{is found} /in terms of empirical idealism. For their naive comprehension and uncritical use, the same values may be clothed in more picturesque phrase and in simpler, more familiar beauty. Meanwhile the poet will employ his soaring melodies, seeking the vanishing form of a glory not possessed nor fully comprehended. The essential experience is the love of Beauty and the quest of the Beyond. Religion remains the Great Adventure. The choice of expression will depend on the need, and the purpose.

We must be patient even with bizarre insights and with the fanatic's vision. Idealism does not always develop in symmetric fashion, and the philosophy of revolt contains a strange accounting. Of course we shall seek in all legitimate ways to secure just understanding and wholesome harmony.

A democracy will never save itself thru the mere existence of a camp of reactionaries and a camp of revolutionists. Neither is the tolerance on the part of conservatives

and radicals sufficient. We need a new tolerance. The negative tolerance of supercilious indulgence, or of cold or cowardly forbearance, should be abandoned. It is not good enough for the twentieth century, even tho it was an improvement (in some of its forms) in the past. We need the positive tolerance of sympathetic sharing of insights, of cordial cooperation. We should study the inter-workings, and the respective values, of conservative and liberal principles. For this purpose, the modern philosophy of history, such as is presented in that splendid volume, "The Making of the Modern Mind, A Survey of the Intellectual Background of the Present Age," by John H. Randall, is invaluable.

At this point, social idealism may learn much from the sometimes erratic course, and yet healthy evolution, of Art. Many a time, revolt has served the useful purpose of restoring the balance when the social motif has come to overbalance the personal motif, in the creation and maintenance of art. (See the chapter on "Tradition and Revolt" in "The Spirit and Substance of Art," by L. W. Flaccus.) We have creative eruption, as Flaccus calls it, when individuals refuse to accept uncritically the current and accredited.

"Great rebels refuse to compromise. . . .
Theirs is not the fault if little minds ape their ways and reduce them to a rigmarole, or if rebels flaunt selves which are not worth expressing. The right to revolt is a dangerous one, but in spite of its frequent misuses, it is a right that ought to be exercised in the interests of a strongly personal art.

"The story, then, of art is one of tradition and revolt: of the interplay of discipline and creative freedom; of the steadying processes of elaboration and social mastery, broken into and saved from a deadly

mechanization by the force of individual artists who are not afraid of new paths of aim and technique, and who save themselves from caprice by the weight, bulk and masterfulness of their artistic genius." (Op. cit., p. 394, 395)

This process will be recognized as fitting into, and as illustrating, our philosophy of ideals. This fine development is not the achievement of art in any narrowly professional sense. It is the triumph of the ethical spirit, as well. It is accomplished by the splendid and impressive cooperation of all ideals in the making of a new civilization, a world of illimitable horizons.

5. Primacy of factors in valuational consciousness

In our study of the idealizing process, and in our interpretation of the types of ideals, we adopted the view that the expression of man's nature is threefold, and demands a threefold statement: one reflects, one feels, one wills. These three expressions were discriminated, but not kept separate, nor accorded isolated treatment. The ideal consciousness, in every one of its major forms, is the life of the whole personality. "In each there is something of all," and in the whole each has its appropriate function.

Personality is a unique unity. It is such an interpenetrated unity that in every part of experience will be found all factors, every one necessary to the others. Analysis involves abstraction. In the case of the religious consciousness, as the high manifestation of mentality, its varying forms of expression are only modes of the one idealizing process.

This has been virtually denied by some thinkers, who

do not recognize the intimate relationship of the ideals of reflection, appreciation and moral striving, nor realize that all are factors in the integrated experience where the true is the beautiful, and the beautiful is the good. For instance, a critic holds that art has nothing to do with morality; but hear the words of Sidney Lanier, who is quoted (I do not know the reference) as saying: "He who has not yet perceived how artistic and moral beauty spring from a common origin and toward a common goal, who therefore is not a fire with moral just as with artistic beauty, who has not come to that stage of quiet and eternal frenzy in which the beauty of holiness and the holiness of beauty mean one thing, burn as one fire, shine as one light within him, is not yet the great artist."

However, the question might be propounded: within the unity of idealization, which is its most intimate or primary manifestation? Which is the central expression of the religious consciousness: the intellectual, the esthetic, or the ethical, ideal?

Many uphold the first alternative. John Caird (in "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion") was fond of maintaining that the central principle in the many-sided aspects of the spiritual life is Thought. For it is only in thought that we can transcend our finitude to grasp the universal and infinite. (Query: is this the function of thought?)

Others insist upon the primacy of feeling. Writes Everett: "We conclude that, in religion, feeling has the primacy as compared with intellect and will." For, he maintains

that thought is private as well as feeling, and that community of feeling is the end to which community of thought is the means. ("Psychological Elements of Religious Faith," chapter II.) (Query: Is any feeling or emotion "the end"?)

Is either one of these views clear in its assignment of "primacy"? No; both theories are false in premise and in inference. In regard to the double formulation of the question in the middle of the preceding page, I shall state that the first formulation has no answer: no one manifestation is primary; every one is primary from the point-of-view of its unique function. In regard to the second formulation of the question, I believe that there is a real sense in which it may be said that the ethical manifestation holds a centrality, which may be defended from the biological, the psychological, and the idealistic, view-points.

Lack of clarity here will result in strange notions. For instance, it will be held that thought is the solvent of all things; emotion may be tolerated in small quantities, but it is by nature perverse and deceiving; it is narrow and earthly. Or, it may be held that feeling is the pearl of great price; in emotional experience we find the universal life; then we may dispense with the crutches with which poor, lame reason totters along; we may escape from the pettiness of thinking. As for volition, it may be relegated to a foot-note, considered as a peculiar, intangible process, and summarily dismissed from a serious psychology of religion! (See Pratt, "The Psychology of Religious Belief," p. 6, foot-note.)

In this interesting foot-note of Pratt's there is at

least a recognition of the unique character of volition, considered of course as an aspect of the conscious process, not as an element or faculty. This is what we would expect from the biological approach, which indicates that psychic life has been evolved as an instrument of adjustment. There is that about volitional activity which seems to include, and to find expression in, the reflective and the esthetic processes.

This suggests the function, and therefore the nature, of volition; and perhaps justifies the postulation of its "centrality" in idealization. It may be that, in this centrality of reference, there may be involved a kind of pre-eminence of value.

Idealization is primarily reflection, from the point-of-view of the function of thought: illumination and guidance. Idealization is primarily emotional appreciation, from the view-point of the function of feeling-affection (with its wider emotional configurations): vitalization, or the supplying of that warmth and intimacy, and that satisfaction, which create the core of value. Idealization is primarily volitional-ethical in the sense that will is a convenient name by which to characterize the whole personality as an active, striving process. If the "will" is not a third factor, but rather the entire process of consciousness in its most fundamental biological nature, then it is just (as far as words can suggest the organic, unpicturable situation) to assign a unique "centrality" to "will".

Hence our key-word has been "idealizing process;" for the valuational consciousness is essentially an attitude, a

striving, which is the result of needs and demands, sublimated in ideality. It is the striving to know and to feel, to be sure, but is rather the striving to achieve in knowing and in feeling. In this process, the cognizing of reality and the vitalizing by the emotional nature are necessary factors. And the discriminated phases of process are simultaneous and inter-blending in the ineluctable unity of conscious being.

Everett insists that in the very activity of the will is "the confirmation of the primacy of feeling. For what the will is trying to bring about is a new condition of feeling; feeling is the essential." (Ibid.) Rather is it not true that the trying-to-bring-about is the essential? Feeling and the desire-to-have-the-feeling are two different things; and the latter is the determining factor, and is volitional.

In most cases, the object is desired as the goal of effort, as the object of striving, and hence has directly a conative reference. But even in the cases where the object is desired for the sake of the feeling which its possession will stimulate, that the feeling is the goal does not make the feeling primary or determining; nor does the fact that will determines the possession, that is, is directed to an end, make volition secondary. It is the essence of will to strive to realize a purpose, and the volitional nature is enhanced and ennobled in that process. Will (self-conscious conation) is made more by creating efficient attitudes.

Needs, desires, wishes are conative. Feeling and emotion exist only in relation to these fundamental urges. It is significant that, in a later chapter, Everett admits

this very contention: "When I spoke of the primacy of feeling, I had in mind its primacy in manifestation rather than in fact." (Op. cit., p. 141, 142) This is not clear; is not conation a fact also, that is, known in consciousness? "We do not desire a thing because it is desirable; it becomes desirable as we desire it, as it meets some instinctive demand of our nature."

Everett is correct in this admission. It is true of action even when feeling is the desired end-result. In volitions of the higher type, in ethical acts, feeling is not the end. The value of the moral deed is its own end and justification. A kind act is performed not for the sake of the feeling of pleasure which follows, but for the sake of the inherent worth of the act itself.

Life is action. Intelligence functions properly as the guide of activity in paths excellent and beautiful. Contemplation should be an inspiration to endeavor; esthetic delight should not interfere with life's stream, but fulfills its mission in making the flow serene and joyous.

With this conclusion there is bound up a judgment of profound significance concerning the preeminence of volition and of ethical idealism. From the point-of-view of logical understanding, formulation, thought is fundamental; from that of satisfaction, appreciation, love, the life of feeling is primary. From the point-of-view of inner reference, will is basic. In this primacy of volition there is centered a unity of the whole nature, and human life is viewed in the light of its most complete comprehension.

If this be true, does not thought recognize it, and does not the feeling of satisfaction validate it? If so, are not reason and emotion (one or the other, or both) reinstated as supreme, at the expense of the volitional nature? No; thought is supreme as seer; the emotional nature is supreme in supplying the intimate core of value. It is the office of neither to constitute the dynamic principle of psychic life. Both function rightly as the servants of the life process. If thought fails in this function, it becomes a pallid and puerile affair. If emotion fails, it becomes unwholesome and dangerous.

After all, we are primarily social beings. Delight in worship of beauty and ecstasy of high thinking are transcended in that which Wordsworth, with all his exquisite appreciation of nature, called "that best portion of a good man's life, his little, nameless, unremembered acts of kindness and of love."

We have stressed the fact that logical ideals have their own intrinsic meaning. Ideals of beauty are not derived forms of ethical ideals; the former possess their own peculiar radiance. Nevertheless, both the esthetic ideal and the reflective ideal acknowledge their inner dependence upon the will of man, and its wholesome satisfaction. Ethical idealism is pervasive and determining, seeking the conservation and increase of character values. The moral consciousness is not a dictator, however, and must not disparage nor invade other legitimate fields of idealization. We have discussed this ⁱⁿ problem/the two preceding sections.

The adjustment of life's major interests is often a difficult and trying matter. We must insist that the moral consciousness, when rational and sane, enjoys a real supremacy. The great artists have understood this. Deprived of this accounting, art has always exhibited a deplorable tendency to degenerate. It is subject to fads and fancies. With woful readiness, it becomes superficially sensuous, and hence its devotees grow sensual. The true lovers of art should set themselves against these tendencies to triviality and banality and voluptuousness. Much of contemporary so-called art is decadent, even contemptible. This sort of offering is flippant, drearily obscure, merely clever, sentimentally pessimistic, precious, sensational or sensual. Note the pessimistic pre-occupation, and even morbidly cynical obsession, in present-day "art." Its exponents are frequently fanatical in their attitude, and vicious in their methods.

"The final judgment as to beauty can come only from one who combines a delicate appreciation of technique with a wide insight into life and a sane perspective of its values." (Durant Drake, "Problems of Conduct," p. 274) The prerogatives and contributions of art I have defended in a previous section. The actual solution of the difficult social problem must come thru an insight intuitive, pragmatic. It will call for the operation of an intelligence for which no rules can be put down. It must be cooperative; it will involve many compromises and some permanent friction. In a world of widely varying needs and temperaments, solutions must be tentative and partial. In the real world, ideals are not altogether symmetrical, nor harmonious.

What are the implications for the religious consciousness? Ethical idealism has no religious sanctions, as they are called. Solutions of our problems of adjustment must be worked out on the rational basis and in empirical terms. Nevertheless, a fusion of contemplative (rational and esthetic) elements with dynamic (social) elements (in which, kinesthetic factors are prominent), both referring to the immensities of the cosmic background, will yield the impression of the Sublime. (Objectified and personified in a divine Character, with the quality of righteousness stressed, we have the sense, or vision, of Holiness.)

The religious consciousness (as we have defined it), with its vista and solemnity, will contribute to experience a majesty of proportion, and a dignity, which will serve to create an attitude of humility and a spirit of understanding sympathy.

This general view of the psychic life, and our whole theory of ideals, leads to a rejection of mechanistic determinism, and to the acceptance of rational determinism, self-direction thru the operation of immanent principles, a natural process of realization.

No form of words is very satisfactory. Probably the only real knowledge of the will act is found in the experience of volition, not in any theory about it. However, some sort of determinism at least reflects my conviction that all parts of experience are lawfully inter-related, that no real cleavage exists in the world of reality, experienced or known.

Our theory of ideals favors, and is favored by, the

concept of "emergent evolution" as worked out, for example, in C. Lloyd Morgan's book of that title. Life is in the making: new values successively appear on higher levels; novel meanings come into being; fresh achievements are made. But the principle of continuity, however defined, (which evolution appears to validate) would seem to rule out (make improbable, or unreal) essential chance or caprice, in a universe of law.

C. S. Peirce (in "Chance, Love and Logic"), William James (in "Some Problems of Philosophy," p. 139-141), Hans Driesch (in "The Science and Philosophy of the Organism") and Henri Bergson (in "Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays," "Creative Evolution," etc.), have argued for the reality of chance, indeterminism, freedom of creativity. Their language is not always clear; their positions are somewhat dubious. But at least they have stressed the organic, becoming aspect of life, the presence of spontaneity, insurgence (whatever these really may be) in nature. - I have given above (p. 67) a suggestion for the conceiving of novel insight in empirical, scientific terms. We must bear in mind, too, that much that is genuinely novel to the individual is new in his acquaintance, strange to his memory system, not necessarily an absolutely original creation in human life.

As a critical empiricist I believe, granting the directive character of conscious experience, that evolution takes orderly ("predictable") lines of growth; that is, given all the conditions, life's forms are inevitable, and its process determined - not mechanically, but organically, or rationally (on the more developed planes). Even the more

involved processes of idealization must be thought of as continuous, lawful. It is inconceivable that a wayward (uncaused), fickle or capricious factor should be present. If so, where does it come from, and why should it come? This is pure magic; it can not be clearly stated; it is actually unthinkable. The "will" could not furnish this mythological factor; for "will" is merely a convenient term for the whole conscious process, where the principle of causation obtains as much as anywhere else in the universe.

This position is buttressed by the whole weight of the physical sciences, the biological sciences, by psychology, ethics and logic. Vitalists may assert the existence of an element of contingency, new or unrelated being, but can do nothing with it (as it seems to their critics); it remains a bare characterization, or sentimental claim, an awkward way of insisting that life is manifold and mysterious. In their genuine explanations, they employ the principle of continuity and the category of causation. They must do so; for without them there can be no explanation, no coherence, no rationality.

Of course, we do not know much about continuity, or causation, or evolution. But one is obliged to take the prevailing attitude which all considerations render most reasonable. Ignorance does not justify the recourse to a myth.

A careful and sympathetic definition of the problem would probably go a long way toward solving it, and would indicate that a rationally and organically conceived determinism and a freedom of "spontaneity," of inner, ideal direction, are mutually compatible. (Compare Bertrand Russell, "Scientific

Method in Philosophy," p. 236.) The traditional controversy largely misconceived the problem, and to that extent its discussion was irrelevant. The true nature of the "freedom of the will" emerges with sufficient clarity and power in the critical and appreciative study of the idealizing process.


D. The Function of Philosophy in the Perspective of the Progress of Thought

According to our thesis, ideals are tentative formulations of value for the clarifying and ordering of experience; they are provisional thought-forms projected by the imagination for the purpose of suggesting new reaches of experience. They are constantly subject to revision; they are continually modified in the course of their vital functioning. They are validated only in and thru experience, and in no other sense are revelatory of reality.

In the long epic of human thinking, the specific descriptive interest of science and the more general interpretative interest of philosophy have had curious interrelations and a significant history. Science and philosophy have made many blunders; each has hindered the other. Thru dramatic clashes, and by wholesome cooperation, each has helped the other to a better understanding of its function and method. By steady pressure, philosophy has brought science to a social interest, thus making it more friendly to idealism; while science has slowly weaned philosophy away from its arrogant, absolutistic pretensions, from its sterile abstractions, thereby inducing it to recognize empirical requirements. The following

diagram may serve to indicate the mutual influence of the scientific method and the philosophic method in the


Progress of Thought



This diagram requires little comment. The chief symbolism lies in the bent line (a . . . a . . . a)

diagram may serve to indicate the mutual influences of the scientific method and the scientific world in the

Progress of Thought



A Proprietary Diagram: The reconstruction of history on an empirical basis. The broadening and increasing of science.

This diagram requires little comment. The other symbols lie in the next line (a . . . a)

of the Scientific Method, which has yielded (altho often reluctantly) to the pull of philosophy, which has always been interested in the larger, valuational interpretation of life; and in the curves (A, and B), where Philosophy has been bent (after prolonged and stubborn resistance) out of its former (relatively) uncritical course. The dotted line (h - h) indicates the scientific materialism and mechanism, which refused to yield to the philosophic pressure. The curve (A) shows the Critical Philosophy, as the result of which the Philosophy line was pulled to a position at right angles to its former direction. The dotted line (M--M) indicates philosophic speculation losing itself in the sands of time, having refused to answer the challenge of experimental developments (inductive thinking).

Of course this is an over-simplification. Scientific and philosophic interests and aims have always been more or less intermingled. But I believe that there is an exceedingly important development in the progress of thought, which the diagram aptly reveals. And it is understood that science and philosophy developed under their own leadership, and willingly - as far as the progressive leaders were concerned.

The sciences broke away from Philosophy (generalized Wisdom) successively, thru the working out of specialized techniques. (In a few representative cases, I have indicated the transitional stages: e.g., astrology, celestial spheres; catastrophic geology. Every science has preliminary stages of pseudo-scientific development). Science also grew out of the early arts and crafts (primitive technology). With the latter, magic was considerably involved; and magic has influenced

the early and intermediate periods of science-growth all the way along; e.g., alchemy. I do not think it is correct, however, to say that the sciences (in the proper sense) developed directly from primitive magic.

The horizontal line, PHILOSOPHY, is the line of progress, as opposed to the vertical line (5), which is the static line, representing 99% (plus) of the total population of Western Europe, past and present. The line of progress represents the small minority (a fraction of one per cent.), who have been aggressive, dissatisfied, courageous. These are the pioneers of thought and culture, quick of curiosity, eager in appreciation. I do not distinguish too sharply between the aggressive line and the defensive line. The light line (1) indicates that a considerable amount of magic, convention and tradition passes into the Philosophy and Science development; and the light line (3) suggests that a little something of the more vital ethical and intellectual interest seeps into the static attitude. But, in general, magic and convention and tradition determine the character of the defensive line of custom, superstition and authority; while the more vital social intercourse and the tribal religious ceremonial (mediating genuine group values), thru curiosity and value appreciation (see heavy line (4)), develop into mythologies, then theogonies (compare Hesiod and the other pre-philosophic Greek achievements), and cosmologies. From these interests and achievements, Philosophy finally emerges.

This diagram does not show the precise order in which the sciences arose, but merely indicates that order in a general way. It appears that the more abstract, objective and impersonal

sciences were erected first. Then the more concrete, manipulative disciplines were evolved. Then came, with their special methodologies, the sciences of organic life, of society, of the mental processes. Finally, the empirical method was employed in the valuational studies. This was the triumph of the philosophic interpretative spirit.

But it was a victory without dishonor to the opponent; for, in the curve B, we find Philosophy itself becoming empirical, forswearing its ancient pretensions to heavenly insight and to absolute knowledge. To be sure, only comparatively few philosophic leaders have made the thorough capitulation to the scientific method, gracefully accepting the terms of the armistice. Many philosophers do not see, or repudiate, the necessity of taking the curve B, and remain in the line (A - B), boldly erecting rationalistic systems of metaphysics, or championing absolutistic theologies.

Such a one not only wastes valuable time and energy, but obscures the whole issue. He is busily engaged in perpetuating ancient, futile and petty mysteries, and is making it difficult for students to perceive the single, splendid and enduring mystery of life. He does not fully comprehend the symbolic nature of concepts; otherwise he would not be so naively confident in the power of thought to transcend experience. He does not adequately understand the instrumental theory of knowledge, the biological view of mind, or the empirical notion of the idealizing process. His philosophy is clever, often brilliant and eloquent; but it is illogical. It may be

coherent, in the sense of enjoying an inner, formal consistency, and also in the sense of integrating with life (by a liberal and athletic adjustment thru faith and fancy). But consistency is no guarantee of validity in a system of thought, the premises of which are unsound; nor is an agile and gymnastic faith convincing. Such a one is shocked by the imputation concerning the illogical nature of his reasoning. (I have pointed out these fallacies in several of the critical portions of this dissertation). But he has not ~~the faintest~~ ^{an adequate} comprehension of the truth. He never will comprehend it until he comes to understand the empirical method. He can not do this so long as he secretly despises the method, and deems the empiricist a shallow or superficial investigator.

Another type of philosopher has lost faith in the rationalistic speculation (A - B), and has passed beyond this line forever. But he has failed to ~~negotiate~~ ^{round} the curve B, and is lost in other futile sands of pessimism, or of cynicism, of "disciplined skepticism," or of the effeminate sentimentalism of the dilettante. In the diagram, this is represented by the dotted line N.

They who, with clear and cordial mind, make the turn B, empirical philosophy, come to a sound and enduring Philosophy of Value. (The diagram willingly admits that there are many theories of value, partially illuminating, which do not fully recognize the validity of the empirical method, and seek to fit values into some rationalistic scheme.)

Here then is a most magnificent panorama! From Mysterious Power and primitive ceremonial to an empirical

philosophy of value is an epic march; it is a survey of impressive proportions to one who finds religious value in the progressive emancipation of the human mind. In the outcome at the present time we have peace with honor; for it ^{is} the shared victory of science and of philosophy in an inevitable and wholesome cooperation. It is the reconstruction of Philosophy on an empirical basis; it is the broadening and humanizing of Science.

It is more than an amazing victory: it is a prophetic triumph. The imagination is stirred profoundly by the anticipation of a new epoch just beginning, which opens up unlimited possibilities of development in thought, in appreciation, and in mutual understanding. This moving experience is the religion of the future.

John Dewey has presented this general view in his "Reconstruction in Philosophy." Philosophy has frequently arrogated to itself "the office of demonstrating the existence of a transcendent, absolute or inner reality, and of revealing to man the nature and features of this ultimate and higher reality. It has therefore claimed that it was in possession of a higher organ of knowledge . . ." (Op. cit., Chapter I., "Changing Conceptions of Philosophy," p. 23) If we come to an empirical understanding of the matter,

"the history of philosophy will take on a new significance. . . . Instead of the disputes of rivals about the nature of reality, we have the scene of human clash of social purpose and aspirations. Instead of impossible attempts to transcend experience, we have the significant record of the efforts of men to formulate the things of experience to which they are most deeply and passionately attached. . . ."

"When it is acknowledged that under disguise of dealing with ultimate reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social

traditions, that it has sprung from a clash of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with incompatible contemporary tendencies, it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day. . . . That which may be pretentiously unreal when it is formulated in metaphysical distinctions becomes intensely significant when connected with the drama of the struggle of social beliefs and ideals. Philosophy which surrenders its somewhat barren monopoly of dealings with Ultimate and Absolute Reality will find a compensation in enlightening the moral forces which move mankind and in contributing to the aspirations of men to attain to a more ordered and intelligent happiness." (Op. cit., p. 25-27)

Dewey is not unmindful of the value of poetic atmosphere and of religion's expansive horizons:

"We are weak today in ideal matters because intelligence is divorced from aspiration. The bare force of circumstance compels us onwards in the daily detail of our beliefs and acts, but our deeper thoughts and desires turn backwards. When philosophy shall have cooperated with the course of events, and made clear and coherent the meaning of the daily detail, science and emotion will interpenetrate, practice and imagination will embrace. Poetry and religious feeling will be the unforced flowers of life. To further this articulation and revelation of the meanings of the current course of events is the task and problem of philosophy in days of transition." (Op. cit., p. 212-213)

E. Concluding Note on the Metaphysical Evaluation of Ideals

In philosophical speculation, over-analysis is unfortunate. It defeats the ends of reflection. For the final synthesis then becomes so artificial that it fails to recapture the primary quality of experience. That which is really desired (I suppose) in the end is a synoptic view of experience; but this now can be offered only in terms so distant that the reality-feeling must be excused from attendance.

I would not set up arbitrary limits. I know that minds differ widely in their understanding of that which constitutes genuine and useful analysis. I would not disparage any serious theory. The transcendentalist requires the objective reference of

idealization. He claims that his nature demands the assumption for the production of the sense of reality. The reply is that the reality-feeling by itself is not enough; it may attach itself as an illusory quality to almost any judgment. It must be justified by logical reasoning, inductive as well as deductive.

Nevertheless, philosophy will recognize this insistent demand as a datum. Taken by itself, this demand might enjoy a certain plausible character, to the degree that the need correctly interprets itself. Much of the supposed native need may be the result of conventional, or habitual, expectation. If this demand clearly understands itself, and if it could maintain itself in isolation, it would retain a certain plausibility, and a quality of realness would attach itself to the belief in question.

The case is hypothetical: this demand can not maintain itself in isolation. There remains the challenge: does the belief integrate with the body of knowledge? For many thinkers, the very difficulty of making the mighty venture of a transcendental faith seems to be enough to force reality into the conception. It would rather appear that, if the Universe is so very different from the universe we know, then the validity of the hypothesis is weakened to the extent of the degree of that difference. The transcendentalist takes pride in the feat of believing in a spiritual realm different from the known order of reality. This is not admirable in the eyes of the empiricist.

The order of conscious life, which the evolutionary sciences describe, is a specialized form of reality, highly

complex in comparison with the rest of the observed universe. It is developed on a planet which is a member of a vast system of energy whose nature other sciences, the physical sciences, are concerned with studying. To all appearances nature is "cold and indifferent." Where then is there an order of consciousness other than that of human nature? Mind, consciousness, personality, is developed in the midst of many stresses and strains. It is limited, vexed, defeated. When victorious, it succeeds thru painful experimentation. Its best attainment is fragmentary; its insights are partial and provisional. Surely it is anomalous to make personality the ultimate metaphysical category. It is more reasonable to suppose that personality is a human category which has nothing to do with a metaphysical determination of reality.

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Borden P. Bowne was fond of declaring that the scientific category of causation was meaningless unless given an ultimate personal reading, that without it reason was sent toiling back along a line of infinite regress, vainly seeking for a rational stopping-place, for a logical fulcrum by which reality may be lifted out of stark irrationality. This is egocentric assertion, more vigorous than valid. It rests upon the ~~vain~~ assumption that thought can have a cozy, comfortable universe, and a formal rationality, for the asking. The empiricist would rather toil back along the infinite regressus than to posit an Absolute Mind, which is nothing but a metaphysical ghost. However, he does not go toiling back; he remains here. The difficulty is ~~g~~ gratuitous, for the ~~problem~~ problem is misconceived. For an appreciation of truth and value, he

*E.g., Metaphysics, p. 92, 417, 429.

requires no Primal Intelligence, or First Cause, of the purest speculative water. To him, this is a ~~stupid~~ caricature of real intelligence. (It is worth while to note that even the rationalist can do nothing with the Absolute after he has secured it with so much trouble, and with rather too great a show of assurance. He can only hold the Absolute in a form of words, oft repeated as an incantation. - This parenthesis is stated only as a persistent impression; as such it may be allowed, especially in view of the fact that the rationalist does not scruple to state his persistent impression of the empiricist.)

There is no evidence to support the hypothesis, there is no logical reasoning to justify the postulate, that conscious life as developed on the earth is related in personal terms to the energy of the universe at large. It is related, most certainly; but the very qualities that characterize life on this planet differentiate it from that energy which, to all appearances and according to all experiment, is manifested in other forms. The continuity of energy proves nothing beyond the observed facts. - The empiricist believes that we are logically compelled to rest the case here, and disparages transcendental attempts to ignore the limits set by the facts and by logical requirements.

Certainly it would be pleasant to believe that the whole universe of time and of energy is involved in our happiness and well-being for eternity. And our social values would be romantically complete if the wide world were infused with a loving Spirit, Hope of our hope, Life of our life. If these are

necessary and wholesome demands, then empiricism contains an element of pessimism. These dreams are ~~wisdom~~^{fair;} but theirs is a childish ~~wisdom~~^{character,} which the stern facts of life refuse the name of "natural." That which is not part of the nature of things (assuming this to be the reading of the facts) is not valid for our expectation, and is therefore not wholesome for mature thought or emotional desire. It would seem to be the outcome of our persistent egoism, centering all things in self and selves.

I think we should insist on the autonomy of the idealizing process. The ideal is the principle of appreciation and of growth; its meaning is worked out in the course of developing life. Supernaturals and immortals are vain figments, lying altogether beyond the limit of our sober reckoning. Let our thought of extra-experiential reality be confined to new realms of knowledge and accomplishment, opening up to our ken. As the principle of psychic evolution, the ideal is genuine only as it is realized and then projected in imagination on the basis of proved, that is to say, experienced, values. "Knowledge appears as instrumental, provisional and practical; while faith becomes the attitude of confidence and expectation in reference to the further progress of experience. Knowledge, in actual, vital operation, is accompanied by the glow of interest in the concrete process and outcome, which is faith; and faith, in its hope and trust, relies upon knowledge and tested experience. Faith, unrelated to such knowledge and experience, becomes wholly sentimental and fatuous." (E. S. Ames, "The Psychology of Religious Experience," p. 413, 414)

Since this type of faith is permissible and praiseworthy, since philosophy begins and ends in wonder, and because imaginatively we may inhabit a wide universe, we return to our definition of religion, which our theory of the idealizing process validates: Religion is the appreciation of the highest values, loyalty toward adventurous ideals, both appreciation and loyalty made stronger by the solemnity underlying, given amplitude by the attitude of reverent wonder toward the surrounding and inclusive mystery of the Universe.

III. Development and Demonstration of the Thesis by a Critical Appraisal of One Phase of William James's Philosophy of Religion *

A. Examination of "The Varieties of Religious Experience"

This book owes much of its importance to its author's perception of the significance of concrete religious experience. In the preface he writes of his belief "that a large acquaintance with particulars often makes us wiser than the possession of abstract formulas, however deep." Hence he goes for his material to personal documents, and makes use of psychological description.

His theory of truth is faulty, owing to his championing of an extreme pragmatism. In "The Meaning of Truth," he holds that statements are inherently or statically true (true in themselves) only by courtesy. They may pass for true; but their truth is too vague for definition, too vague for comprehension, until reference is made to their functional possibilities. The last give logical content to the truth-concept. "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events." (Ch. I.)

Pragmatism confuses the criteria of truth with a theory

* See pages 8 and 9, above.

(definition or characterization) of truth. Its criteria are largely pragmatic. But if they were wholly such, it would not follow that a definition of truth in pragmatic terms could be drawn from the pragmatic criteria. That which proves the existence of A is not identical with A. A particular phase of this confusion is seen in the three (undifferentiated) uses of the word "truth" in pragmatic discussion: (a) Sometimes truth means objective facts or incidents. (b) Generally it is made to mean the verifiable character of our knowledge. (c) Frequently (in James) the (surreptitiously) assumed conformity, or absolute agreement, with objective reality is hinted at, or definitely asserted. Hence the Pragmatist is hard to catch, for he runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds.

We witness the confusion of verifiability with verity. It is admitted that the process of verifying (remembered and imagined, as well as actual) gives much, or most, of the reality-color which our thought of verity possesses. And the quality of verifiability does change and progress. This has nothing necessarily to do with the postulated conformity of ideas with reality (as a theoretic condition and practically real situation). This postulation is a necessary law of the knowing process, and is sufficiently justified in experience.

In a previous section I have discussed the epistemological problem, noting that it is generally admitted now that in experience we have a valid acquaintance with the actual being of the universe, but maintaining that we can not define or fixate this substance of things. I held that we are in functional contact with reality, but can not quite capture nor fully

comprehend it. Truth is our working acquaintance, or tentative comprehension, of reality, the given ~~erãd~~ order; for knowing implies a real dualism. Our judgments are held to be true in so far as they render a coherent and usable account of our experience in any particular exigency. In knowing, we do not tie up reality in packages; but we do realize the functional contact, and work out the possibilities provided by nature.

The strength of William James, nevertheless, lies in his reliance on the empirical method. Curiously enough, at certain critical junctures in his philosophy of religion, he loses confidence in the empirical procedure, and naively invokes super-experiential, or even supernatural, sanctions which are inconsistent with his main view-point and declared loyalty.

In spite of James's descriptive interest, he makes clear the distinction between the "existential judgment" and the "proposition of value," or "spiritual judgment." (The Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 4) He defends the method of intellectual analysis, and of explanation by tracing the law of cause and effect, but warns against the danger of forgetting that analysis must not do away with the unique character of the individual, and against the peril of assuming that the genealogy of an experience will of itself account for the meaning and worth of that experience.

Perhaps he is a little unfair in his reference to those who "criticize the religious emotions by showing a connection between them and the sexual life." (P. 10) In the case of the instances (adversely) cited, it is indeed true that we have aberrations of the sex nature. However, he is right in

criticizing "the medical materialists" for discrediting religious experience by exhibiting the dependence of mental states on physical conditions. Nevertheless, there is a real point here. Of course it is arbitrary to attempt to refute the actual values of religious experience by tracing origins. But the empiricist would have the right to hold that the deep-lying connections with sex impulse, the physiological dependence, and the biological background, make anomalous the reading of ultimate reality in terms of their qualities. To the empiricist, the supernatural claims of religion are most certainly discredited, if not disproved (they are not disproved), by the type of facts cited.

James holds that the value of religion can be ascertained only by spiritual judgments based upon immediate feeling and on experiential relations to the rest of what we hold as true. (P. 18) "Immediate luminousness, philosophical reasonableness and moral helpfulness are the only available criteria." (Ibid.) This would appear to be a pretty sound basis; but it really does not settle anything. The second criterion opens up the whole range of philosophic theory and disparity; the first criterion is subject to various interpretations and rival claims; and it remains for the last to be interpreted and applied.

As long as James keeps to a record of seeming mental content, he is correct in saying that, "It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence." (P. 58) But this feeling has no evidential value as "a perception of what we may call 'something there.'" (Ibid.)

James himself has just previously stated, "This absolute determinability of our mind by abstractions is one of the cardinal facts in our human constitution. Polarizing and magnetizing us as they do, we turn towards them and from them; we seek them, hold them, hate them, bless them, just as if they were so many concrete beings." (P. 57) He adds that they are real beings in the realm which they inhabit. Yes, but what is that realm? It is the realm of the imagination, or of conceptual meanings. These Platonic realities are real, but subjectively real. They have an objective reality only in the sense that they have indirect perceptual connections, and a social and communicable usefulness. (At least this is reasonable as a minimal statement. It is only a summary, since I have argued the question in our discussion of mysticism).

In my judgment, this would be the logical and scientific position. James seems to waver between this point of view and the naive notion that there is a bona fide sense of presence. (I say "naive" because James does not, as a good psychologist, even attempt to carry thru a rigid analysis at this point.) We have here the key to his curiously vacillating attitude toward the whole problem of the philosophy of religion. He asserts that an idea is often "exteriorized," and suggests that this may have a psychological explanation; "but," he says, "with such vague conjectures we have no concern at present." He is interested in the "faculty" by which we have "a sense of reality more diffused and general than that which our special senses yield." (P. 63)

James insists that many people possess the objects of

their belief not as conceptions intellectually accepted, "but rather in the form of quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended." (P. 64) (He is referring ~~specifically~~ specifically to religious experience.) This must mean "seemingly apprehended." Perhaps the phrase "in the form of" is intended to carry this meaning. But he has stated, "Our interest lies with the faculty rather than with its organic seat." (P. 63) In precisely what sense is this a "faculty"? Is it a genuine faculty of perception, or a tendency to hallucination? James probably means to leave the question open at this time; but his position appears to be a little too cordial in relation to an uncritical mysticism. (The wise man would not dogmatize, but ~~he~~ prefers to consider the simplest possible explanation.)

"Such is the human ontological imagination, and such is the convincingness of what it brings to birth." (P. 72) He states that these feelings of reality will be held as genuine perceptions of truth, which "no adverse argument" can expel from belief. However, the psychologist and logician ought not to be satisfied to rest the case there! And it is not always true. The writer has had mild mystic experiences, for the explanation of which he accepts "adverse arguments."

On page 73 James opposes a rigid rationalism (in the sense of a logically demonstrated system of beliefs) to mystical certainty. This is not a fair statement. We may recognize the limitations of logic, the significance of the impulsive, the (in a sense) primal value of the emotional, the rich and varied contributions of the marginal field, without rating "the dumb intuitions" above reason, without accepting "the human ontological

imagination" at its face value. We may appreciate the peripheral sources of insight (if these are important) and emotional valuation without stigmatizing rationalism as "the loquacious level" or as "logic-chopping rationalistic talk."

(P. 73) (Note that I am using the term, rationalism, as James here uses it: the view opposed to mysticism. I would prefer to call the un-mystical view the truly empirical, or scientific, view.)

It is frequently true that our impulsive belief "sets up the original body of truth, and our articulately verbalized philosophy is but its showy translation into formulas." (P. 74) It does not follow that all "articulate reasons" have a secondary cogency, or that mysticism enjoys a primary validity.

"Instinct leads, intelligence does but follow." (Ibid.) Biologically speaking, instinct precedes, altho there is a circular reaction in the development of instinct and reason. I have already defended the position that, while emotion (based on instinctive tendencies) is superior in its realm, reason is supreme in its sphere, which is the sphere of the logical judgment. If a person be logically-minded, he will distrust his impulsive beliefs (altho he will often be unconsciously influenced by them); reason will often correct impulsive belief in the realm of religion as elsewhere, will go contrary to it, will set it aside, will reconstruct it from the bottom up.

Again it appears that James is too hospitable to "mind-cure metaphysics." It may be a fine suggestion that "the world can be handled according to many systems of ideas," that the world may be "so complex as to consist of many interpenetrating spheres of reality." (P. 122) But psychotherapy as such

has no necessary religious implications. It is making an unnecessary mystery to refer so casually to this type of experience as affording a "disparate conception" of the universe. (P. 123, foot-note) Religious faith (in healing) and psychological suggestion do not represent disparate spheres of reality; they are supplementary, or identical, experiences.

In his interpretation of the gospel of healthy-mindedness, James holds that the mind-cure metaphysics offers a perfectly definite and plausible conception of the structure of the universe, and that this pluralistic hypothesis offers the only obvious escape from the paradox of absolute idealism. (P. 132, 133) According to the latter, the world appears as "one flawless unit of fact." This unit is an Individual, "and in it the worst parts must be as essential as the best." (P. 131, 132)

Here we see the old fallacy re-appearing: James fails to recognize the middle position. We are not shut up to a choice between the ultra-rationalistic solution of absolute idealism and pluralism. James is so anxious to discredit Hegelian rationalism and to commend religious mysticism, that he forgets his own fundamental principles. He is not sufficiently empirical, and hence is constantly betrayed into fallacy in his philosophy of religion. As for the problem of evil, one may give the biological, and a modest ethical (social), interpretation, and hold to an empirical monism (in the light of science and experience). This is entirely satisfactory to the consistent ~~empr~~ empiricist, who does not

have recourse to a fantastic pluralism. It is enough to recognize that the universe wears both a pluralistic and a monistic aspect. (James has said this, too, at times.)

By his desire to make a vigorous statement or contrast, James is betrayed into making a false dichotomy. He writes: "Let our suffering have an immortal significance, let Heaven smile upon the earth, and deities pay their visits . . . and the days pass by with zest; they stir with prospects, they thrill with remoter values." Take away all permanent value, "and the thrill stops short, or turns rather to an anxious trembling." (P. 141) He ignores the fact that, between glad, sure (albeit unfounded) confidence and blank, pathetic despair, lie a natural joy in present values and even hope, and that man can live effectively and contentedly on a little hope. Moreover some of the more moving tender-nesses of religion are nourished by the ~~wistful~~ wonder that is neither buxom faith nor stark despair, with its mono-ideistic sentimentalism.

Some of James's wiser words on this matter are in foot-notes. For instance: "The difference between Greek pessimism and the Oriental and modern variety is that the Greeks had not made the discovery that the pathetic mood may be idealized, and figure as a higher form of sensibility." (P. 142)

James's analysis of conversion and of saintliness, and his appreciation of their character and social value, are admirable. The logic is sound. Nevertheless, one feels that he resists with difficulty the temptation to forsake his declared principle of empiricism. More than once he hovers on

the verge of being disloyal to the unimpassioned simplicity of scientific explanation, for the (to him) dearer delights of vague mystic speculation.

In the chapter on mysticism he finally yields to the inner urge, and admits that his dominant devotion (in religion) is not to the empirical method, but to a preferred interest in the non-rational, non-empirical order of reality. I have in mind this statement, for example: "One conclusion has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal, waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different, . . . definite types of mentality" which our account of the universe can not afford to disregard. (P. 388)

This marks a definite (altho unconscious) break with the empirical procedure. According to the latter method, these vague, emotional "forms of consciousness" are "different" only in that they are more purely physiological, not involving so actively the higher cortical centers, in that they are mysteriously determined by the condition of the internal organs and of the glands, thru the mediation of the autonomic nervous system. No doubt they have their field of application, as James asserts, but not "somewhere" far away, but rather in the "field" of the physiological, and of course indirectly in the field of vague mood and of ~~the marginal field of~~ attention.

It is strange that ~~such a~~ ^{an} ~~empirical~~ empirical student of human nature should make such a naive reflection, especially

after the admission that he had come to this unshaken impression partly as a result of observations of the effect of nitrous oxide intoxication! "Nitrous oxide . . . stimulates the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree." (P. 387) One with Occam's razor in his mental grasp would hardly be inclined to be so generous toward the claims of those "special types" and "potential forms" of consciousness (P. 388), separated "by the filmiest of screens," characteristically induced by a drug! I can not admire such credulous hospitality to weird claims. Paraphrasing James, I can only say that, "looking back on my own experience," such claims do not "converge towards a kind of insight" of metaphysical significance. We do not wish to have "a premature closing of accounts with reality." (P. 388) No doubt these forms must be included in our total world view; but that place is physiological and insignificant.

I suppose that Hegelians are pleased with James's grudging concession to the probable, slight truth of the Hegelian philosophy. ~~James with a certain~~ (Ibid.) But we have an unnecessary lapse into vague speculation. No doubt "the opposites of the world" seem to be "melted into unity;" but it is because, in this near-physiological, emotional experience, cognitive discriminations are lost sight of. Why indulge in gratuitous fantasies?

James becomes more and more ^{overcritical.} ~~naive~~. He quotes approvingly R. M. Bucke's myth of the experienced "cosmic consciousness," and the Hindu yoga practices. In the latter, the yogi "overcomes the obscurations of his lower nature, . . . and comes face to face with facts." (P. 398, 400) James should

rather say, "overcomes the real facts of experience, and comes face to face with obscurations."

But he is in the mood to disparage analytic explanation. "To pass a spiritual judgment upon these states, we must not content ourselves with superficial medical talk, but inquire into their fruits for life." (P. 413) Is medical talk superficial? Perhaps the mystical arguments are superficial. Moreover, do the fruits for life prove~~ing~~ anything concerning the validity of the mystical elements within the valuational experience? No; idealistic fantasies may have beneficial effects, but this does not imply a noetic quality. Hallucinations may have practical consequences, and illusions may clothe themselves with ideal qualities. James admits this contention on page 415.

Nevertheless, altho he admits that the outsider has the right to be critical of mysticism, he asserts definitely that "mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come." (P. 422) They are authoritative as a matter of fact; but that "they have a right to be absolutely authoritative" is absurdly false, if my reasoning is correct. Only the reason has the right to be authoritative in matters of belief, as far as the final decision is concerned.

"Mystical states break down the authority of the understanding," in its exclusive claims. "They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which we may freely continue to have faith." (P. 423) If the intelligence is functioning, its authority is not broken down. The foregoing illustrates

James's failure to recognize that one may enjoy the valuational experience with a mystical tinge, and may continue to be intelligent, giving due credit to the beauty and enthusiasm of the one aspect of life, and to the critical appraisal offered by the other. We may insist that there is only one kind of consciousness (altho with different degrees of awareness), and that there is only one order of truth (or reality), albeit of infinite variety.

Of course this criticism of James, altho not unfair, is somewhat misleading. For, if he is at times too hospitable to the notion of "another order" of consciousness, and of reality, he straightway makes up for the lapse by becoming critical, and rigorous in his logical demands. We may admit that the higher mystical states "tell of the supremacy of the ideal," and in a sense the supremacy "of vastness," if not "of union, of safety, and of rest." (P. 428)

In the chapter on Philosophy, James is in more exacting ~~exactly~~ temper, naturally enough. He hints that mysticism is too private and too various to claim much warrant of veracity. (P. 430) I could repeat with James: "I doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart from inner unhappiness and need of deliverance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the other, would ever have resulted in religious philosophies." (P. 431)

It has been the task of philosophy to "redeem religion from unwholesome privacy." (P. 432) The question ^{is} ~~is~~, how shall this task be accomplished? James rightly seeks to discredit that intellectualism in religion which "assumes to construct

religious objects out of the resources of logical reason alone." (P. 433) "Philosophy in this sphere is thus a secondary function, unable to warrant faith's veracity. . . . In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless." (P. 455)

Quoting a long passage from John Caird, James holds that Caird has not transformed private faith into public certainty by coercive reasoning. Unquestionably the religious (that is, mystic) rapture is real as an emotional experience. Is it possible to transcend the direct experience of the individual by an eloquent description? James answers: "I believe that he has done nothing of the kind, but that he has simply reaffirmed the individual's experiences in a more generalized vocabulary." (P. 453)

Hence it is nothing short of amazing to find James asserting (on page 465) that the entire series of his lectures has proved the truth that religion "everywhere and at all its stages" is the consciousness of an intercourse with higher powers, and that if prayer (as the sense that "something is transacting" with the higher powers) be illusory then the whole of religion is "rooted in delusion altogether." (P. 465) "The genuineness of religion is thus indissolubly bound up with the question whether the prayerful consciousness be or be not deceitful." (P. 466)

According to our thesis, this is a false statement of the case. It places religion in a fatal predicament, at least

for the increasing number of men for whom ~~religion~~^{prayer} is not a transacting of business with higher powers. We have held that religious idealism does not depend for its validity upon this precarious and primitive defence.

James contends that the impersonality of the scientific attitude is shallow, but as soon as we deal with personal phenomena we have realities in the completest sense of the term. (P. 498) This is true, if experience is to be given a subjective reading. But experience has an objective aspect or reference; and it may be that the universe at large is not personal. In that case, the impersonality of science would be correct. Certainly science seems to justify its explanations, at least as far as they apply to the mechanistic order of nature. The projection of "private phenomena" into the objective order of the universe may give us mere "symbols of reality," which do not even possess the demonstrability of the despised scientific "symbols of reality." When the philosopher makes such a projection, perhaps "he has simply reaffirmed the individual's experience in a more generalized vocabulary," a charge which James himself brings against Caird's naive idealism. (P. 453) It may be that the only shallowness we have here is in James's slurring reference to the "deanthropomorphization of the imagination" called for by science!

By a curious inversion of evaluation, James argues for the conventional objectivity of religion by stressing the prior significance of "private phenomena," and then proceeds to define one of the major tenets of the religious consciousness as the belief that "the visible world is part of a more spiritual

universe from which it draws its chief significance." (485)

"That unsharable feeling," "the pinch of his individual destiny," may make a man's private experience peculiarly real to him; but surely it requires a violent (and exceedingly ~~naive~~ ^{uncritical}) assumption to make this quality of experience the means of reinstating an animistic view of the universe over the protests of science.

"The axis of reality runs solely thru the egotistic places."

(P. 499) So it does as far as thoughts, feelings and volitions are concerned. To assert that it does for the great universe is to beg the question flagrantly.

In a foot-note (page 501) James holds that science is moving, or may be moving, toward a "legitimation of occultist phenomena under newly found scientist titles," and cites the admission of "the time-honored phenomenon of diabolical possession" under "the name of hystero-demonopathy." This is almost unbelievable misrepresentation. It is obviously not the legitimation of occultism. On the contrary, it is the bringing of so-called occult phenomena under the descriptive laws of science. This is no indication that the impersonal view of science may "one day appear as having been a temporarily useful eccentricity." On the contrary, this and every other advance of science justifies the impersonal method of interpreting the wider universe, at least as far as scientific description is concerned. (James is not concerned with "vitalism;" however we have discussed that question in a former section).

We may admit the importance to valuation of "the recesses of feeling;" but it is a gross misstatement that, "the darker, blinder strata of character are the only places

in the world in which we catch real fact in the making." (P. 501) We may recognize the danger of over-intellection, and yet hold that James's charge is false: "The intellect shows everywhere its shallowing effect." (P. 502) We have maintained that intellect is required to overcome the shallowness of mere emotion; until reason has operated on "the recesses of feeling," they can make no genuine ideal contribution.

On pages 505-507, James is back on the experiential basis, stating that religious feeling is an excitement of the cheerful, expansive order, which freshens the vital powers. This emotion overcomes temperamental melancholy, and imparts enchantment to common objects. The faith-state may be mere vague enthusiasm. He quotes Leuba approvingly to the effect that God is not known, but is used; questions concerning God are irrelevant; the end of religion is not God, but a richer, more satisfying life. (We might amend this by suggesting that it is commonly, rather, a more secure, bright and comforted life.) Of course the more ambitious and intellectual religious consciousness seeks to define and justify that life more elaborately. He quotes W. Bender approvingly to the effect that religion centers, not in God, but in Man; religion is that activity carrying his essential vital purposes thru "against the adverse pressure of the world." (P. 505-507)

Why should James forsake this point of view, and "make inquiry into the intellectual content itself," which he has been steadily discrediting? Once more he abandons the clear and convincing empirical method for ~~vain~~ metaphysical speculation. (P. 507) Now he declares that religion has a uniform deliverance:

it consists of an uneasiness and its solution. The solution is the sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers. This ~~dramatic~~ dramatic form is common, but is unnecessary. This phase is a derived form, a conventional construct. The more psychological and fundamental view James himself has stated: The germ of religion is "this readiness for great things," the "sense of the exceedingness of the possible over the real." (P. 506, foot-note)

And why should he insist that the religious person becomes conscious that his higher part is "continuous with a MORE of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him"? (P. 508) This belief is derived and secondary, if (as James has held): Trust and faith "have their source in that onrush of our sanguine impulses, and in that sense of the exceedingness of the possible over the real." (P. 506)

James saves his choice suggestion to the end, namely that in the "sub-conscious self" we have the mediating term (long sought for) between the self and the MORE. (P. 511) In this way he thinks we may preserve a contact with science which theology lacks. This is a poor makeshift of a suggestion, and this concluding section becomes the weakest portion of a great work.

We ought to be exceedingly skeptical concerning this alleged "self", conscious and yet not conscious. If there were such a thing, it would be a poor substitute for the rich, developing idealizing process which we have studied. But what do we have in these phenomena more than the results of unconscious process, or happenings in the marginal field?

This tour de force is even less satisfactory than the theologian's forced march; for it makes capital out of vagueness. If one were to venture on a belief in the "more," it would be more praiseworthy to take the valiant, straightforward path of theology, than to make this gesture of pacifying science. James seems to stultify his position when he admits that "it is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take on objective appearances." (P. ~~511~~ 512)

To be sure, James repeatedly reconsiders; but this recurrent skepticism does not remove the necessity of my criticism. He states that religious visions, raptures and other openings neutralize one another, so that if we follow any one of them we "build out our religion in the way most congruous with our personal susceptibilities." (P. 514) Then he straightway asserts that "over-beliefs in various directions are absolutely indispensable." (P. 515) (!)

I do not agree that "the most interesting and valuable things about a man are usually his over-beliefs." (Ibid.) They may be interesting; they may have their value. But they are usually stupid, overweening and deceiving. If they are decidedly "over," they are superstitious or magical. If they really are interesting and valuable, it is because they are imaginative extensions of approved and vindicated ideals. It is the latter that are truly interesting and valuable, as this paper has tried to show. James beautifully says that "we belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong," and yet plunges them "into an altogether^{other} dimension of existence" from that of the real idealizing process which we have examined.

To identify the realm of impulses and emotions with the supernatural seems to me utterly uncalled for; it results in confusion and unreality. There would seem to be even less reason to identify the physiological (and related) processes with the Eternal Mystery (in a unique fashion, as James does) than so to identify the alert, conscious, appreciative and striving processes of the mind. To be sure, we can not (fully) "articulately account for" our ideal impulses. Their roots lie in the instinctive regions, as do the roots of all our concepts, habits, valuations, volitions. But the significance of idealization is to be found, not in their obscure rootage, but rather in their forward ~~reaching~~ launching virility and upward reaching power. They become meaningful only as they take conceptual and imaginative form.

But James contrasts the inarticulate, "unseen region" with the visible, empirical world, to the decided disparagement of the latter. This so-called unseen world, as a matter of fact, is just as visible (that is, sensible or sensed) as is the realm of clear experience. The inarticulate, physiological world is known thru and by the bodily senses; it is sensed in a more crude, elemental and animal-like fashion than is the world of appreciations. Even the external world is perceived by the organs of special sense, whose offerings are far more readily and intelligibly taken up and cognized by the rational processes, than is the obscure material of the somatic sensations. If we were to apply an appellation, surely this latter order would be the "lower," not the "higher."

With astounding naïveté, James identifies this impulsive

inarticulateness with God, calling it the higher part of the universe! (P. 516) One suspects that it is "higher" only because it is so vague and inexpressible that James can refer to it all sorts of mystic, divine qualities which are too obviously questionable when assigned to the clear order of experienced and intelligible ideals. I have maintained that ideals do not achieve their true being until they have emerged from the impulsive region, formless emotionality, and have become rational appreciations, intelligible appraisals of experience. Nor is it true that the facts suggest a double order of reality: the clearly experienced or order and "an altogether other dimension of existence." (P. 515) It merely means that what is at first largely impulsive, vaguely felt, or marginal, becomes rational, ethical and esthetic. (What aberrations occur in the name of religion!)

James asserts that a good hypothesis must be more than experiential: it must be prolific. This is true; but it must also be reasonable. It is not good if it ^{is} _^prolific of absurdities. (P. 518)

When he asserts that Religion is not a mere illumination of facts already given, but is "a postulator of new facts as well," he has made a statement which calls for careful definition and determination. In this paper I have tried to set forth the true conception of novelty in religious experience. The thesis discredits James's ~~little~~ and uncritical assumptions.

James insists that religion adds concrete details to Nature, and makes good its claim to discover a new order of being, "a characteristic realm of fact as its very own." (P. 519)

What are "the more characteristically divine facts," apart from experienced facts? Says James: "I know not. But I make my personal venture that they exist." (P. 519) He records that the whole drift of his education persuades him that there are two worlds of consciousness, for the most part discrete; but that at certain points they are continuous, and that "higher energies filter in." (Ibid.) In the light of experience, psychology and logic, this appears to me to be pure myth.

James admits that he can take the sectarian scientist's (I would prefer to say, the empirical) attitude; but whenever he does this, he hears the inward monitor whispering, "Bosh!" And he adds that humbug is humbug, even tho it bear the scientific name. I suppose that every one must hear the word "Bosh!" according to his own sense of hearing. I may say that I am able to adjust myself sympathetically to James's curious supernatural dualism. When I do this, I hear a loud whisper, "Bosh!" And I would add that humbug is humbug even tho it assume the name of spirituality.

The Postscript presents a sort of challenge. James divides philosophers into three classes: naturalists, refined supernaturalists, and crasser, or piecemeal, supernaturalists. He classifies himself in the last group. I believe that he is in error when he states that the second type bars out ideal realities from interfering causally in the course of phenomenal events. Neither this type of philosophy, nor naturalism, would necessarily "bar out" ideal realities. For ideals are experienced realities which function in experience; they are organic and integral parts of experience, and hence of the known order of events. James should not use the word, "interfere;" he makes the

entire misconception because he has assigned ideal values to the supernatural sphere. The thesis defended in this paper has presented the nature and function of the idealizing process in a wholly different manner. My criticism of James should serve to illustrate and to demonstrate its value. I have tried to show the unsatisfactory character of transcendental idealism. But even this "universalistic supernaturalism" would be preferable to James's theory of the opening of "the subliminal door" thru which "transmundane energies," divine entities, pass, in order to produce "immediate effects within the natural world to which the rest of our experience belongs." (P. 524) It is truly astonishing that a reputed empiricist should "admit miracles and providential leadings," and should "find no intellectual difficulty in mixing the ideal and the real worlds together by interpolating influences from the ideal region" among the causal forces of actual experience! (P. 520, 521) I can see no single line of ~~edi~~ evidence, not one legitimate requirement, which would call for this sort of hypothesis. I am convinced, on the contrary, that James at this vital point has completely misconstrued the nature of the idealizing process.

B. Critique of "The Will to Believe, and Other Essays"

The peculiar thesis defended in "The Will to Believe" is fundamentally at fault, altho it contains certain valuable suggestions. The statement that, "The question of having moral beliefs or not having them is decided by our will," is ambiguous. Of course our volitional nature is the driving force, and in this sense determines moral attitudes and urges to moral decisions. It is equally true, and equally irrelevant, that

"your pure intellect does not decide." (P. 22, 23) For it does not follow that the will (our active nature) judges the merit (and thus decides) in regard to moral issues, or formulates ethical ideals. Judging and formulating is the exclusive function of reason. "Will" and intellect must work together. Neither phase of our conscious life, considered in abstraction, can determine the nature or the value of moral ideals. This problem has been discussed in sections C. 4 and C. 5 of Part II. ~~III~~ in this dissertation. If the dynamic and the reflective factors in consciousness do cooperate normally, then we have neither "Mephistophelian skepticism" on the one hand nor inarticulate gullibility on the other. James makes a false opposition in drawing the contrast thus. A correct theory of the idealizing process would prevent this glaring defect in the analysis of the problem. (P. 23)

To the distorted question he gives a distorted reply. Since one fits the other, the discussion secures a superficial plausibility. The artificial and false opposition is that between belief and unbelief (that is, assumption of objective reality on the one hand, and rejection of practical value on the other). In the manner presented, it is not true that "religion offers itself as a momentous option," nor as "a forced option." (P. 26)

"Where faith in a fact can help create the fact," it is legitimate to hold that faith. (P. 24, 25) This may be true (in a modest and circumspect sense) in regard to promotions, boons, appointments and love-making. James is undertaking a difficult (and essentially absurd) task to show that

this pragmatic principle has any application whatever to the question of our attitude toward the fundamental structure of the universe!

This paper has attempted to present religious idealism as essentially the acceptance, with an access of tenderness, of life's known and approved values. Religion is the cherishing of our common ideals with a fervor which carries the attention beyond the practical moment. It is passionate loyalty to ideal ventures, loyalty which attains a certain solemnity in view of life's mystery and possible destiny. Neither enthusiasm, nor tenderness, nor loyalty, includes or implies a definite belief in the more conventional claims of religion. To be sure, our buxom intellect is fond of enlarging upon the declared objects of religious veneration. It furnishes delightfully fanciful extensions and imposing speculations. But these are not the core of religious idealism. Hence I deny that we are faced with a momentous choice, as James would have us believe. All that James's belief would add would be a heightened degree of comfort and a precarious confidence; it would not alter the essential nature of the idealistic consciousness.

This dubious comfort we can very well get along without. The empirical idealizing process contains all the exquisite beauty, the thrilling pathos, the tragedy, the triumph, of life. The intelligent man may choose to cherish these values, and to be true to their behests, without venturing to take up James's options. If one does permit himself, or force himself, to take up the disingenuous option, he gains nothing but a sense of fatuity, and the splendor of the ancient experience is dimmed.

Secondly, it is not true that we have a "forced option." We not only can, but must, "escape the issue by remaining skeptical and waiting for more light." To do this is not to "lose the good." To remain skeptical may be precisely what the intelligent thinker must do. James attempts to present his "option" as a forced one by drawing a precise line between belief and disbelief. This falsifies the situation in a manner which it is difficult to ~~be~~ forgive. It is entirely possible to enjoy the essential gift of the religious spirit by cultivating the reverent appreciation of ideals without venturing to assert any definite belief concerning the ultimate nature of the universe. Of course the degree of skepticism may vary widely; there are an indefinite number of positions lying between positive, naive "belief" and militant or pessimistic disbelief.

He maintains that it is "as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him;" he loses her as definitely as tho he decided not to ask her. (P. 26) This well illustrates the sophistry with which we have to deal. Marriage is a definite and irrevocable act. But we do not have to marry the universe; infact, we can not marry it, if we would, altho the mystic secures the temporary illusion of such union. We are at perfect liberty to take any sort of coy attitude we may choose, or may think fitting or necessary - all things considered. At this point in life, if at no other, the individual has complete freedom of imaginative adjustment. And the Universe is not harmed by the tentative nature of the arrangement. If we are to have a conventional ceremony, we may advocate here, if anywhere, the companionate marriage.

The alleged forced option in religion is reduced to the vanishing point. One may pass thru life with full appreciation of its accredited values, with veneration for all out-reaching ideals of experience, with generous attitude toward the Surrounding Mystery, and yet remain entirely skeptical as far as "belief" is concerned. By doing so ~~he~~^{one} enjoys the legitimate happiness and blessedness of the religious spirit.

I am aware of the fact that this use of the words, spirit and religion, is offensive to many. But I hope that I employ the terms in no arbitrary or question-begging manner. I intend only to redeem them from their ghostly connotation, and to give them their legitimate significance. However inadequate or even offensive the use may be to many, the fact is rather clear that an increasing number of thoughtful men and women are coming to prefer the empirical connotations. I have followed the suggestion so well phrased by George T. W. Patrick: "Spirit is nothing different from mind, but it is mind seen under the aspect of value. To be spiritual, says Santayana, is to live in the presence of the ideal. . . . Thus religion loses its mysterious and dogmatic and oracular character. . . . It is not something the 'truth' of which we have to question and argue about and seek evidences for." (Introduction to Philosophy," P. 29, 30)

This view of religion is infinitely to be preferred to James's childish special pleading. It is a matter of surprize and discouragement to see how many keen minds (by reason of over-fondness for deductive processes) fail to comprehend the significance of this point of view. They do not perceive its far-reaching significance; not seldom they regard

it as "shallow," or even as contemptible. James is not free from this harshness; altho, in his case, one feels that he is indulging in friendly fencing, or in play-acting to produce a dramatic effect. One does not discover this palliative in many writings.

Durant Drake, in "Problems of Religion," presents religion as the persistent and humble process of adjusting ourselves to the fundamental and irremovable aspects of life, in contrast to practical activity where things are adjusted to ourselves. The necessary adjustment of life to its conditions is transformed, in the imaginative atmosphere of religion, "from a mere stunned submission to fortune to the peace that comes from complete self-surrender in the service of the Ideal." Thus viewed, religion is not "an extra solace tacked on to life," (as it often appears in James's philosophy of religion). The psychologically necessary adjustment is made "when we have attained a harmony of our impulses with one another, with the wills of other people, and with the fortune that befalls us." "This disposition of the heart and will, thru which a man comes to care for the highest things, and to live in gentleness and inward calm above the surface aspects and accidents of life, we call, in its inner nature, Spirituality." ("Problems of Religion," P. 243, 244)

James insists that we must choose definitely between our fear that the "religious" hypothesis is error and the hope that it may be true. Life does not compel us to make this choice, nor does Logic command. Rather, both prohibit us from ~~ha~~ making it. The wise man may entertain both fear and hope. If the

universe compels this balanced judgment, or an unfavorable judgment, it is not his fault.

It is easy to cry out against this appraisal of the situation. However, since the problem at best is so obscure, since arguments can be brought forward for either side with equal facility (if not with equal cogency), a skeptical attitude would appear to be reasonable and inevitable for the critical-minded individual. Suppose we compel ourselves to recognize a "forced option," posit a correspondence of ideals with the ultimate structure of the world, and "will to believe"? To the intelligence, the obscure colossus of the Universe still lifts its impenetrable vastness. There is no answering Voice. The actual situation being what it is, what have we added to the genuine content of our religious experience? In what way have we changed the essential nature of the idealizing process? The truth is that we are in real danger of substracting something. For we have come near to adding a note of insincerity, because of special pleading and of self-delusion. The critical reader has difficulty in believing that James has not done this.

We may well contrast the religious character of Shakespeare's work with that of the more conventional author. I believe that Shakespeare produces the more genuine religious attitude in the mind and heart of the reader. The conventional writer offers to conduct us to a cleverly illuminated stage, where the puppets dance under observation, and myth, magic or morals are duly exploited, with the hand of fate or providence in evidence. But Shakespeare leads us out into the night of stars, and leaves us there to wait and wonder before nature's

vast panorama, the moving spectacle of life, and to contemplate the silence and the mystery of the over-arching vault of heaven.

Asks James, "Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery thru hope is so much worse than dupery thru fear?" (P. 27) But why be subjected to either dupery? It is not true that we are shut up to the choice between "backing the field against the religious hypothesis" and "backing the religious hypothesis against the field." (P. 26) Not to will to believe is not, I think, to be duped; it is not to be irreligious. It is not to show one's self unintelligent; for it is not a mark of intelligence to assume a certainty, or a probability, which the facts do not warrant.

In contrast with James's insistent declaration of a forced option, I would present Dewey's dignified statement:

"We need to accept the responsibilities of living in an age marked by the greatest intellectual^{re} adjustment history records. There is undoubted loss of joy, of consolation, of some types of strength, and of some sources of inspiration, in the change. There is a manifest increase of uncertainty; there is some paralysis of energy, and much excessive application of energy in materialistic directions. Yet nothing is gained by moves which will increase confusion and obscurity, which tend to an emotional hypocrisy and to a phrasemongering of formulae which seem to mean one thing and really import the opposite. Bearing the losses and inconveniences of our time as best we may, it is the part of men to labor persistently and patiently for the clarification and development of the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and science, and to work for the transformation of all practical instrumentalities of education till they are in harmony with these ideas." (John Dewey, "Religion and Our Schools," article in the Hibbert Journal, volume vi., 1907-08)

Paraphrasing his continued statement, we may venture to suggest that it is better for the philosophers of today to confine themselves to their obviously urgent task of studying and

interpreting the idealizing process, than that they should form (in the name of religion) habits of mind which are at war with attitudes congruous with scientific method, with the ideals of democracy and all other empirical valuation.

To reject the possible dupery of belief is not "to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side." (P. 27) This is an unfortunate conception. I have maintained that religion is essentially loyalty to life's out-reaching ideals. This is religious experience in empirical terms. Compared with this mature and valid idealization, "getting on the winning side" in the matter of a dubious theological belief is a puerile anxiety. Foregoing this gamble, we may still, in humble spirit and quiet ecstasy, continue to contemplate the vast and awful Mystery that wraps us 'round. "It is noticeable," writes E. S. Ames, "that with the increasing rationalization and organization of experience, prayer tends to lose this character of literal, direct appeal to a definitely imaged Being. It becomes more and more an aspiration to understand the laws and nature of reality whether in the large or in detail, and to work in harmony with the forces and tendencies of such reality. On the contemplative, esthetic side, adoration and reverence are directed to the magnitude, power, progress and beauty of nature and of society. . . . In this esthetic element, the religious consciousness is normally at one with other human interests; and here, as in other respects, religion is differentiated by the inclusiveness and ideality of the ends which belong to it." (The Psychology of Religious Experience, P. 301, 302)

It is not only illogical, but probably unethical, to try to force the issue, as James does. This appears in his argument that the religious aspect of the universe as personal makes even more illogical a veto on our active faith. This is reasoning in a circle: it is making religion justify our faith, and our faith justify the claims of religion. (P. 27, 28) Of course, if "we meet the hypothesis half-way," as a matter of assumed "courtesy," then the matter will be settled to that extent. Obviously this is begging the question. To compare the skeptic to a churl among gentlemen is absurdly unfair, the unfairness being relieved only by the suspicion that James is not to be taken too seriously. The whole question is, is it reasonable to suppose that we are in the presence of a Gentleman? The unethical aspect of the affair may be intimated, in part, by noting that one who is familiar with deity may become somewhat churlish toward his fellows, accusing (by implication at least) those who reject a naive faith of "shutting themselves up in snarling logicity." (P. 28)

In the light of our discussion, does not the "feeling" appear childish, and the claim hollow, "that by obstinately believing that there are gods we are doing the universe the deepest service we can"? (P. 28) And yet James says, "I do not see how this logic can be escaped." (P. 29) James was a better psychologist than he was a logician, as we noted at the beginning of this section. We have "escaped this logic" by showing that it is merely a plausible solution of a distorted problem.

In the "Varieties" and in this essay James has given

us his philosophy of religion. Going thru his other writings, I find little additional that is significant. For our purpose it will suffice to take note of a few passages in the remaining essays in this volume.

In the essay, "Is Life Worth Living?" James significantly records: "In the deepest heart of all of us there is a corner in which the ultimate mystery of things works sadly." (P. 32) Again he says, "Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, - a moral multiverse, as one might call it." (P. 43) Hence it is good that, in the educated mind, the "idol of the spirit of nature" has been deposed. Man can make short work of evil empirically regarded. It loses "its haunting and perplexing significance." (P. 46)

Nevertheless, James insists that our religious longings yield the faith that the world we know is "the mere scaffolding" of a more eternal world. He seems to be strangely unaware of the weakness of the argument from ignorance which he employs when he reasons that wonderful, supernatural truth may exist unknown to us, because we have not the perception for it. (P. 57, 58) Of course this formal possibility always remains. He attempts to push it farther than this.

His well-known illustration of the mountain-climber's leap is pointless; for the cosmic leap is of an entirely different sort. (P. 59) "You make one or the other of two possible universes true by your trust or mistrust." This is absurd unless the very existence of the invisible world depends, at least in part, upon our response. In this case, the Universe does not save puny man, but puny man (strong with his veto power) redeems

the vacillating cosmos. This serious suggestion James makes. "For such a half-wild, half-saved universe our nature is adapted." "God himself may draw . . . increase of very being from our fidelity." (P. 61)

My sufficient comment is that the scientific veto to this weird speculation does not appear to be "like mere chatterings of the teeth"! (P. 62) I disagree decidedly with the assertion that the essence of faith "is to believe that the possibility exists, ^{as a reality.}" / (Ibid.) I have held that legitimate faith is the confidence that that which exists holds certain possibilities (according to experience and reason) of extension, of further development.

We may heartily agree with his closing admonition: "Be not afraid of life. Believe that life is worth living, and your belief will help create the fact," the fact of empirical worth, most certainly.

In "The Sentiment of Rationality," James well argues that philosophical abstractions are valid substitutes for concrete realities only with reference to some particular interest in the conceiver; and that the progressive simplification, due to "the relief of identification," is but one of many legitimate purposes. The universe in one aspect is simple, in another it is indefinitely complex. It is a question just to what degree the universe is "simple." "Enough simplicity remains, however, and enough ~~eraving~~ urgency in our craving to reach it, to make the theoretic function one of the most invincible of human impulses." (P. 70)

We attain to a metaphysics thru a progressively

comprehensive classification. The last is increasingly abstract, "since the basis of every classification is the abstract essence embedded in the living fact, - the rest of the living fact being for the time ignored by the classifier. This means that none of our explanations are complete. They subsume things under heads wider or more familiar; but the last heads, whether of things or of their connections, are mere abstract genera, data which we just find in things and write down." (P. 67)

With some thinkers, the passion for distinguishing predominates; and then we have a multiplying acquaintance with facts. With others, a passion for simple (inclusive) generalizations; such a one will rejoice in abstract formulas (altho he will be apt not to perceive the symbolic reference, hence the strictly empirical meaning, of these formulas). "A man's philosophical attitude is determined by the balance in him of these two cravings." (P. 66) (Of course no respectable system entirely subordinates one to the other.) However, we have at one extreme the barren union of all things in the ultimate abstraction of Spinoza's Substance, and at the other extreme the equally barren fragmentariness of Hume. One's own satisfactory philosophy will be some sort of "compromise between an abstract monotony and a concrete heterogeneity." (P. 67)

William James is at his best in this admirable presentation, the significance of which is rarely appreciated by philosophers. He is correct in admitting that the metaphysical impulse is imperious, and also in maintaining that the rival claims of clearness and integrity (of perceptual knowing) on the one hand, and of abstract simplification on the other, create a

real dilemma for the thinker. (P. 66) (He should say: a real problem for the thinker, and a real dilemma for the ultra-rationalist.) Hence metaphysical speculation (of the super-experiential sort) is doomed to be unsatisfactory. If we take literal refuge in abstract simplicity in order to escape the "empirical sand-heap world," then - in so far as we really escape the multiplicities - our speculations become barren of real meaning, hence infertile for genuine idealization.

As usual, James fails to work out the implications of the sound empirical method for the idealizing process. In the light of our theory of the representative significance, and functional nature, of ideals, the problem is solved. There is no dilemma for the empirical idealist, altho important questions of interpretation continue to arise. James always stops short of the most fruitful development of his thesis, a presentation of which I have attempted to make in this dissertation.

The correct statement would be, that the speculations (above referred to) remain in barren and confused abstractness as far as their literal, or alleged demonstrable, reference to ultimate reality is concerned. It is important to note that, when touched with emotion, these rationalizations possess an eloquent (altho vague) symbolic reference, and therefore have genuine (altho troubled) value for the one who comes under the magic spell of their incantation. (I have discussed this problem rather fully, and sympathetically - in spite of this facetious reference, in section II. C. 2, pages 98-101.)

On one occasion I listened to a theologian as he unfolded his doctrine. I attended to his reasoning, but believed

that his abstractions were utterly lacking in cogency; they signified nothing of truth. Suddenly his voice broke; he was choked with emotion. These abstract phrases held for the lecturer vital significance. Immediately the responsive hearer, by a process of imaginative courtesy or of sympathetic reconstruction, permitted in memory the arid utterances to assume spiritual meaning.

The lecturer, of course, would not have been satisfied with this tardy assignment of significance. His own reason had been won by the nice distinctions; his thought was captivated by the formal logic. Nevertheless, one listener found it necessary to believe that the real source of meaning to the theologian was not the rational processes involved, but rather the emotional coloring that transformed the abstract phraseology into a living symbolism. The genuine meaning was wholly empirical; it lay in the idealizing process itself, unrecognized.

This is the explanation of the persuasiveness of the Platonic idealism. His angelic forms are pure phantoms as far as logical validity is concerned. They are as fantastic as the Pythagorean "numbers" from which he derived them. But they possess poetic meaning and large symbolic value. They picture forth, dramatically and impressively, the valuational aspect of experience. They reproduce its epic sweep. Again, they appeal to the persistent romantic quality in the human imagination, and give to the idealizing process a picturesque appeal and picturable quality.

It is convenient and necessary to distinguish and to name abstract essences. These become useful modes of classifica-

tion; they are neither valid nor real in any other sense. Universals neither exist, nor "subsist" (whatever that may mean). They afford convenient ways of referring to the facts, of manipulating the values, of experience. It is strange that man should have had the cleverness to form generalizations, but often has not had the wit to recognize their strictly empirical character as functional concepts. Man has been victimized by his logical engines. In philosophy he has been a follower of phantoms, a persistent pursuer of will-o'-the-wisps. (This statement is for illustrative purposes. I make no attempt to refute in detail the contrary position. It is a waste of time to attempt to refute the scholastic realist, remaining aloft in his shining tower of abstractions. The instrumental view of cognition and idealization is to be recommended only by the total weight of its presentation.)

The chief charge against speculative rationalism is that it is (as offered in intellectual theory) barren in meaning and sterile in value. (I have said that much adventitious meaning is imported into it, by sympathetic or poetic suggestion, from experience.) To call theology's supreme universal, the ultra-abstraction, "concr^ete," is a mere flourish, and changes nothing. Many are the philosophic fallacies which take the easy form of hypostatization! Absolute Existence, in the dress of ultimate abstractions, remains nothing. "Hegel, by trying to show that nonentity and concrete being are linked together by a series of identities of a synthetic kind, binds everything conceivable into a unity, with no outlying notion to disturb the free rotary circulation of the mind within its bounds." (P.72)

One who enjoys this type of rotary motion will probably attain to a satisfying sense of reality. To the empiricist, this "sentiment of rationality" is illusory.

However, James offers another super-experiential pleading for a forced "faith," illogically conceived. Arguing from the necessary "ingredient of expectancy," (p. 77) he holds that the craving to have this "expectancy defined" (p. 82) may be legitimately ~~def~~ satisfied by "faith." This faith is conceived not as a tentative hypothesis, not as hope, but rather as a "pressing against" ultimate reality, and as definitely defining the future "congruously with our spontaneous powers." (P. 82)

This violates the empirical principle flagrantly. Granted that "man needs a rule for his will, and will invent one if one be not given him," (p. 88) it does not follow that "the particular mood called seriousness" (p. 86) may be commended by critical philosophy only by a foray of faith such as James calls for. James is seriously at fault, and perhaps disingenuous, in shutting us up (by implication at least) to a choice between naive faith as he defines it and "a philosophy which utterly denies all fundamental ground for seriousness, for effort, for hope, which says the nature of things is radically alien to human nature." (P. 89)

James defines faith thus: "Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible;" that is, faith is accepting as true that which is doubtful. In urgent human relations, this conception might be permissible: in the interests of courtesy and cooperation, we must take much

for granted; we have many forced options. Applied to religious experience, the conception is dubious; for here there are no super-experiential facts forthcoming, and supernatural claims present no forced option, as we have seen. I would maintain that faith, in the legitimate sense, is the imaginative extension of an experience-construct beyond the given facts in the direction, and of a sort, suggested by the facts themselves. It may even be hope that that for which we yearn may be true eternally.

James's restatement is better: "Faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance." (P. 90) This is to re-assert the fundamental axiom of idealization, that values are intrinsically worthy, that ideals are to be preferred, enjoyed and promoted. The ideal cause claims our devotion; and there is reasonable expectation (inductively justified and deductively applied) that the out-working of this cause holds still larger possibilities of value. E. S. Ames has well said that it is the unarticulated view which makes faith the occasion of mysteries. I quote from "The Psychology of Religious Experience":

"Religion and science both involve the whole mental life,- emotion, imagination, reason and action. Science, religion, art, and other interests are distinguished simply by emphasis upon different aspects of human purposive action. . . . Wherever there is an ideal of any kind, there is faith. . . . For faith is just that interest, confidence and vivid envisagement which make the ends sought so vital and appealing. . . . Faith is normally dynamic and practical whether in religion or elsewhere. It is just a conventional term for the propulsive, forward striving effort of human nature. It is at its best when, under the control of the highest intelligence, it fulfills in practical ways with energy and power the noblest ideals of the race. . . . Faith becomes the attitude of confidence and expectation in reference to the further progress of

experience. . . . Faith, in its hope and trust, relies upon knowledge and tested experience. Faith, unrelated to such knowledge and experience, becomes wholly sentimental and fatuous. (P. 296-300, 413, 414)

This builds on the ideo-motor theory of the nature of ideas, which this paper has taken for granted thruout. The idea is the incipient stage, or rehearsal, of the act.

In a characteristic tour de force James violates his own psychological principles and his empirical philosophy, and defends a super-faith as the only alternative to mental nullity. (P. 93) Witness the astounding statement: "He who commands himself not to be credulous of God, . . . of immortality, may again and again be indistinguishable from him who dogmatically denies them;" and again he uses the mountain precipice illustration. (P. 109) Even if the assertion is literally correct (modified by, "again and again"), it states too much, and the implications are unfair.

"The ultimate philosophy," writes James, "must not divide heresy from orthodoxy by too sharp a line." (P. 110) This is what he himself has done repeatedly. But the true James speaks out when he declares that men will willingly forego certainty in universal matters if only they may be allowed to run the risk of beautiful dream and daring hope.

IV. Summary of Fundamental Propositions

I have undertaken this inquiry with the conviction, growing stronger thru a period of twenty years, that one most important (if not the chief) single requisite of contemporary philosophy is a self-conscious and adequate theory of the idealizing process in experience. Axiology has made significant

progress in bringing idealization to the stage of self-consciousness, and in defining and investigating the field of valuational phenomena. Nevertheless, I have believed that the entire problem might be fruitfully approached from the angle, and with the purpose, of this dissertation. I have attempted to make an analytical and interpretative study of ideals, with the view of tracing their implications for the genuine nature, and the validity, of the religious consciousness, with its more inclusive ideal attitudes.

I have held that religion is not a department among other departments, not a unit experience correlative with other, and special, idealistic interests, such as art, morality, science; but that religion is a highly complex form of experience in which the special idealizations culminate, as the most inclusive sentiment, the most expansive attitude, toward the universe contemplated in reverent imagination.

This quality gives religious experience a specific character, and a certain simplicity within its complexity. This does not generate a sacredness which can impose upon the more concrete idealizations. I have held that every type of ideal exists in its own right, possesses its own technique, and is independent of pretended religious dictation or assumed authority. Hence I have sought to make patient analysis and synoptic interpretation of the actual processes of idealization, and - in the ampler assignment of meaning - to be loyal to the empirical principle, which scientific method and logical theory unite in commending for the evaluation of the religious experience. I have tried to avoid an athletic verbalism and the

too common expedient of baptizing a difficulty, ^{accompanied by} ~~in~~ a wide gesture of explanation. I have permitted the justification of the thesis to be the total weight of its presentation as a true account of experience.

Any claim to originality which this paper may justly make lies in the development of significant phases of a method of inquiry (within the well-developed, general axiological field); and it may be that I have secured a few results of value for an appraisal of religious experience, and for a better understanding of the ideals of our contemporary life. Lacking a self-conscious and systematic theory of the idealizing process, even leaders in empirical thought have fallen into unfortunate errors in their philosophy of religion. My criticisms of the writings of William James and of John Dewey may have indicated the timeliness and necessity of this particular type of inquiry. Altho the resulting conception of religion is rather widely held today, it may assume new shades of meaning from the method, and the results, of this study. In my own thinking it has seemed to be an illuminating thesis, the possibilities of which I have not discovered fully and systematically developed elsewhere.

The ideal, as embodied in the increment of growth in conscious experience, is a construction in imagination of a phase of experience whose meanings are not fully realized. Ideals, being complex ideas, are configurations of mental images, in constant process of modification; they are symbols, provisional formulations, which have emerged in the complicated and exacting process of biological and social adjustment to the

environment (physical and human); and therefore they can not signify a static or absolute order of being, nor refer to a reality other than that natural order known in growing experience.

"Values" are not self-contained entities, to be ~~manipulated~~ manipulated in the interests of a formal value-view of the universe. "Value" is a convenient term to indicate that experience has a valuational aspect; but valuations are thoroly organic, and interpenetrate with the whole of conscious life.

Careful study of the child's learning shows that the principle of idealization is operative. The ideal is partially designated as an idea which functions in experience as its organizing factor, in the interest of progressive understanding, appreciation and achievement. It is a synthesis of selected aspects of experience, mediating richer interpretations. The new pattern-meanings emerging from the wealth of new relations, discovered and created by thought, provides an empirical accounting for novelty. It is impossible to condense the psychology of the idealizing process, the outline of which required the whole of section II. B., nor to trace its fruition in conscious prevision of the unattained beyond. This was done in the detailed study of "conceptual thought, meanings and idealization."

Not being discrete things, nor separable spiritual essences, ideals may be considered "objective" only in so far as they have contacts and connections with our perceptual, objective world. Since ideals are merely extra-experiential (holding suggestions reaching beyond fully understood and tested

values), they can furnish no certain information concerning the ultimate structure of reality. The major portion of the religious consciousness includes the ascertainable values in an enlarging experience, imaginative and social in character. Because ideals are functions of psychic evolution, they minister to the religious sentiment, whose appreciations and loyalties are quickened by awe in the presence of life's ultimate Mystery. This is the genesis of reverence, altho with the swift enlargement of the emotions it may readily assume the proportions of worship, mingled feeling of exaltation and attitude of submission, toward the Universe, personified in imagination.

Development of the theory of ideals of reflection, of ideals of esthetic appreciation, and of ethical ideals, serves to buttress the main thesis. The elusive quality of all idealization helps to explain the persistent cosmic significance attached to valuation. Because of the ^{poetic and suggestive nature} ~~tender wistfulness~~/of the idealizing process, the imagination is continually led to contemplate vast and misty horizons of magic meaning. The perspective of limitless distance is an aid to humility of attitude, and adds a note of solemnity. Nevertheless, the mature mind knows that the enlightened imagination inhabits the empirical realm. Poetic thought requires spatial freedom, but is not deceived by expansive imagery.

Mysticism opens no secret door. The mystic experience merely causes familiar values to glow with a brighter light, or discovers values in hitherto unnoticed relations. These ideal estimates are necessarily the precipitates of the more commonplace judgments of daily experience.

Ideals of thought and ideals of beauty are not derived or dependent forms; they have their own intrinsic meaning. Nevertheless, both the esthetic ideal and the reflective ideal acknowledge their inner reference to the volitional nature. Ethical idealism is pervasive and determining, seeking the conservation and increase of character values. The moral consciousness is not a dictator, however, and must not disparage nor invade other legitimate fields of idealization.

The strength of William James lies in his exposition of the empirical method. Curiously enough, at certain critical junctures in his philosophy of religion, he loses confidence in the empirical procedure, and naively invokes super-experiential, or even crassly supernatural, sanctions which are inconsistent with his main view-point and declared loyalty.

In his juster thought there is much to commend our thesis that the weaving ideal-patterns facilitate the individual's adjustment to the world of culture, and to the wider panorama of cosmic forces. For our human evaluations are made against the background of the stars; our little earthly drama seems to be a troubled interlude in their vast and tranquil epic. However, religion, as applied philosophy, dynamic idealism, is life's supreme Adventure. It is the Great Quest, undertaken in expansive mood and with heroic courage. Sharing the common life of human experience and of nature, ~~socially~~ imaginatively conceived, we throw ourselves forward in the direction of hope, and along the pathway of alluring ideals.

V. Statement of Conclusions

We may draw the following conclusions:

(1) Our approach to a theory of idealization is based on an interest in the actual experienced nature of the idealizing process. Since ideals are phases of experience, they should be examined in their natural functioning. This interest is justified in that it is strictly and whole-heartedly consonant with the results of the sciences, and with the requirements of inductive logic; it asserts the place and value of deduction, but recognizes frankly the instrumental character of thinking and the limitations of knowledge.

(2) Inadequacy of Rationalistic Approach.

a. Hegel's Method in His "Philosophy of History." In his cosmopolitan interpretations, when he forgets the mechanical working of the dialectic, Hegel is largely and impressively true. He has many empirical interests. Moreover he insists that we must not introduce a priori inventions, but must proceed inductively. If he does not always do this, we should give Hegel full credit for recognizing the necessity of this logical procedure.

However, in tracing the links in the dialectic of transition, the empirical has no adequate place. Hegel is clearly far more interested in the dialectic than he is in the rich pattern of facts. Since the view-point is formal and unreal, actualities are distorted. The fundamental difficulty is that Hegel is concerned primarily with metaphysical speculation, not with the determination of the experienced nature of idealization.

b. Sorley's Assumptions in His "Moral Values and the

Idea of God." Sorley postpones the interpretation of reality in favor of a primary theory of moral values. This is sound method. Moreover, the author clearly discriminates between the two aspects of reality: the realm of causation and the moral order, or realm of ends. He insists - and rightly - that the laws determining value are not of the same order as the laws determining the causal or other connections of things and persons. Again, with clear perception, he states that the value which we ascribe to material things is never value in the strict sense, but only a means to value.

How, then, can he assert so confidently that it is legitimate to assume the objectivity of knowledge and consequently at the same time the objectivity of morality? The argument becomes quite unconvincing, and the logic much too formal, when he asserts (P. 499) that "the grounds for denying the objectivity of morality are equally grounds for denying the objectivity of knowledge." The deduction is the more strange since Sorley himself has insisted that there is a lack of congruity between the natural order and the moral order. (P. 501)

(3) The Descriptive-Normative Method. The descriptive method is scientific: it explains in terms of process examined, analyzed and synthesized. The normative method is philosophical: it interprets experience thru an evaluation involving a wide perspective of meaning. The dissertation proposed to make an analytical and functional study of the idealizing process. Its very nature compels an "empirical" treatment which departs from one conventional (or historical) notion of that term. I have not restricted myself to a purely descriptive study, but have asserted the philosophical, interpretative character of the

undertaking. Ideals are factual and normative in their own nature. Good logical procedure will take account of both aspects of idealization. We must begin with description, and then pass on to more inclusive, imaginative interpretations.

(4) Ideal Experience as Individual-Social. The exposition justifies the assumption that experience is restricted to individual centers which, however, have developed, and continue to develop, in a social environment. Social life affords rich material for idealization, but the idealizing process is always a function of the individual's subjective experience.

(5) The Idealizing Process. Being transcendent meaning, the ideal is essentially intangible and elusive; but it is none the less the principle of all psychic evolution. The idealizing process is a vital, organic, emergent experience in which appreciations are crystallized and novel pattern-meanings are formulated thru imaginative projections, which make possible fresh valuations and genuine development. The ideal is an emotionalized concept which functions in experience as the organizing factor, in the interest of progressive achievement. When this experience becomes clarified and directed, the ideal (conscious prevision of the unattained) achieves its true nature.

(6) Novelty in Idealization. We have been particularly concerned with creative consciousness, with ideals in the making. I have shown that the idealizing process integrates with the whole of psychic life, but is itself a construction in imagination of developing meanings. In idealization we have old mean-

ing, tested and enjoyed, and novel meaning. By novelty is meant not merely unfamiliar, unexpected or different experience, but rather experience which has new values, made possible by the wealth of new relations discovered and created by thought.

The ideal weaves new value patterns.

(7) Ideals and the Culture of Our Day. Our theory enables us to throw into proper perspective, and to evaluate, ideals of reflective thought, of esthetic appreciation, and of moral striving. Every one of the three types of ideal has its peculiar qualities and special claims, and also its just relations to the others. It is the urgent business of philosophy to adjust the frequently competing and conflicting claims of our contemporary cultural ideals.

Ideals of reflection have rich and manifold expressions in science and philosophy; and yet these ideal formulations do not yield absolute metaphysical insight, but rather enjoy symbolic meaning referring to the qualities of experience. Divorced from the spirit and power of esthetic appreciation, the thought of the age will become stereotyped, infertile; its morality will grow suspicious, puritanic. On the other hand, reflective morality may serve to keep art from degenerating into the trivial or merely sensuous, and may provide it with deeper purpose and understanding.

(8) The Function of Philosophy in Perspective. Science and philosophy have made many blunders; each has hindered the other. Thru dramatic clashes, and by wholesome cooperation, each has helped the other to a better understanding of its function and method. By steady pressure, philosophy has brought science

to a social interest, thus making it more friendly to idealism; while science has slowly weaned philosophy away from its sterile abstractions. This evolution has impressive proportions for one who finds religious value in the progressive emancipation of the mind. The task of philosophy will be to interpret the ideal possibilities of human life.

(9) Primacy of Volition in Valuation. From the point of view of the function of thought (illumination), idealization is reflection. From the point of view of the function of sentiment, idealization is appreciation. But valuation is primarily volitional-ethical in the sense that will (volition) characterizes the whole personality as active and striving. The reflective ideal and the esthetic ideal acknowledge their inner dependence upon the wholesome satisfaction of the will. Ethical idealism is pervasive and determining, seeking the increase of character values. The moral consciousness is not a dictator, however, and must not disparage nor invade other legitimate fields of idealization.

(10) Religious Idealism. Our philosophy of ideals validates the religious attitude, if conceived in the spirit of simplicity and humility. This attitude is based on an imaginative postulate, not subject to demonstration. The major portion of value experience has to do with the ascertainable worth of ideals in an enlarging medium, reflective and social in character. When these ideals become sufficiently intense, and are intelligently conceived so as to involve something of our total attitude toward life, and imaginatively held so as to include an attitude toward the ultimate^t mystery of the universe, with its

unknown (yet possible) potentiality for life and destiny, then they assume a genuine religious quality.

On account of the dynamic, novel and creative character of ideals (mediating fresh insight and enriched experience), a generously empirical theory of idealization integrates naturally with a normative evaluation supporting the religious sentiment with its tentative mood of reverence. Since ideals are life in the making, since they are essentially elusive and symbolic, their wider imaginative reference - in a universe of mystery - may be rated as natural and poetically acceptable.

(11) The Idealizing Process and Mysticism. At its best, mysticism has intensified loyalty to the more intangible worths of experience. If this be a sort of knowledge, mysticism may be said to add to our comprehension of the ideal meanings of human experience. But there is no evidence that the mystic rapture adds one iota of information concerning the ultimate structure of the universe. There is a twofold source of the novelty claimed for the mystic experience. The meditation or rapture may clarify and intensify familiar meanings, or may discover values in new relations and interpretations.

(12) Appraisal of William James's Philosophy of Religion. The strength of James lies in his brilliant and forceful exposition of the empirical method. Curiously enough, at certain critical junctures in his philosophy of religion, he loses confidence in the empirical procedure, and invokes super-experiential, and even supernatural, sanctions which are inconsistent with his main view-point and declared loyalty.

James often stops short of the most fruitful develop-

ment of his thesis; failing to work out the implications of a sound empirical method for the idealizing process, he is involved in unnecessary dilemmas and difficulties. But the true William James speaks out when he declares that men will willingly forego certainty in universal matters if only they may be allowed to run the risk of beautiful dream and daring hope. His genuine thesis is the assertion of the fundamental axiom of idealization, that values are intrinsically worthy, that ideals are to be preferred, enjoyed and promoted.

(13) Two Practical Deductions. Bearing in mind the provisional character of thinking, the representative and suggestive aspect of language, and the symbolic nature of all ideal formulations, we should be sympathetic in our social relationships, and willing to make practical adjustments in the communicating and sharing of ideals.

The critical and interpretative investigation of the idealizing process is one of the most fundamental and significant undertakings of the present time in the field of philosophy. It is basic to many of the most important inquiries of the day.

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VII. Autobiography of the Author

Edward Rust Lewis:

Born in Little Rock, Arkansas, February 23, 1886.

Parents: Edward Samuel Lewis, Anna Sparks Lewis.

Attended grade schools (Public) in Cincinnati and Cleveland, Ohio. Attended East High School, Columbus, Ohio, during four years, graduating in 1903.

Attended Ohio State University five years, 1903-1908, graduating in 1907 with the degree of A.B., and in 1908 with the degree of A.M.

Received the Diploma of the Summer Session, at Harvard University, 1907, having studied with Prof. Josiah Royce.

Student in Union Theological Seminary, New York City, four years, 1908-1912, graduating with the Diploma of the Seminary ("magna cum laude") in 1911. During the two years, 1910-1912, graduate student in Columbia University, looking toward the doctor's degree.

Pastor in the New York East, the Ohio, and the West Ohio, Conferences, 1912-1922.

Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion in Wesley College (affiliated with the University of North Dakota), Grand Forks, N.D., 1922-1923.

Lecturer in Philosophy and Psychology, Boston University, 1923-1924, and the Summer Session of 1924. (Pursued graduate studies in Boston University during that time.)

Professor of Philosophy, Nebraska Wesleyan University, Lincoln, 1924 to the present.

Regular weekly contributor to the Western Christian Advocate (published in Cincinnati, Ohio, by the Methodist Book Concern), 1909 to the present. Regular and special contributor during several years to several monthly magazines of Religious Education published by the Methodist Book Concern; articles published in the Methodist Review (bi-monthly), New York City, and in Social Science (quarterly), Winfield, Kansas.

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